Indignation

Abstract: Emotions are back. Once at the center of the study of politics, emotions have receded into the shadows during the past three decades, with no place in the rationalistic, structural, and organizational models that dominate academic political analysis. With this new collection of essays, Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta reverse this trend, reincorporating emotions such as anger, indignation, fear, disgust, joy, and love into research on politics and social protest. The tools of cultural analysis are especially useful for probing the role of emotions in politics, the editors and contributors to "Passionate Politics" argue. Moral outrage, the shame of spoiled collective identities, or the joy of imagining a new and better society, are not automatic responses to events. Rather, they are related to moral institutions, felt obligations and rights, and information about expected effects, all of which are culturally and historically variable. With its look at the history of emotions in social thought, examination of the internal dynamics of protest groups, and exploration of the emotional dynamics that arise from interactions and conflicts among political factions and individuals, "Passionate Politics" will lead the way toward an overdue reconsideration of the role of emotions in social movements and politics generally. Contributors: Rebecca Anne Allahyari Edwin Amenta Collin Barker Mabel Berezin Craig Calhoun Randall Collins Frank Dobbin Jeff Goodwin Deborah B. Gould Julian McAllister Groves James M. Jasper Anne Kane Theodore D. Kemper Sharon Erickson Nepstad Steven Pfaff Francesca Polletta Christian Smith Arlene Stein Nancy Whittier Elisabeth Jean Wood Michael P. Young

Abstract: I. Gratification over advances of others: the tunnel effect introduced, 545. — II. Some evidence, 548. — III. Consequences for integration and revolution, 550. — IV. From gratification to indignation, 552. — V. The tunnel effect: social, historical, cultural, and institutional determinants of its strength, 553. — VI. An alternative reaction: apprehension over advances of others, 559. — VII. Concluding remarks, 560. — Mathematical appendix, 562.

Abstract: PREFACE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS * Pathos and Passion * Anger * Satisfaction * Shame * Envy and Indignation * Fear * Gratitude * Love * Hatred * Pity * Jealousy * Grief Conclusion NOTES BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX

Abstract: This text argues that moral accountability hinges on questions of fairness: When is it fair to hold people morally responsible for what they do? Would it be fair to do so even in a deterministic world? To answer these questions, we need to understand what we are doing when we hold people morally responsible, a stance that Wallace connects with a central class of moral sentiments, those of resentment, indignation and guilt. To hold someone responsible, he argues, is to be subject to these reactive emotions in one's dealings with that person. Developing this theme, he offers an interpretation of the reactive emotions and traces their role in our practices of blame and moral sanction. With this account in place, Wallace advances an argument against the common view that accountability requires freedom of will. Instead, he maintains, the fairness of holding people responsible depends on their rational competence: the power to grasp moral reasons and to control their behaviour accordingly. He shows how these forms of rational competence are compatible with determinism. At the same time, giving serious consideration to incompatibilist concerns, Wallace develops a compelling diagnosis of the common assumption that freedom is necessary for responsibililty. This book touches on issues of broad concern to philosphers, legal theorists, political scientists and anyone interested in the nature and limits of responsibility.