TL;DR: A conditional sentence expresses a proposition which is a function of two other propositions, yet not one which is truth function of those propositions as mentioned in this paper, which has given rise to a number of philosophical problems.
Abstract: A conditional sentence expresses a proposition which is a function of two other propositions, yet not one which is a truth function of those propositions I may know the truth values of “Willie Mays played in the American League” and “Willie Mays hit four hundred” without knowing whether or not Mays, would have hit four hundred if he had played in the American League This fact has tended to puzzle, displease, or delight philosophers, and many have felt that it is a fact that calls for some comment or explanation It has given rise to a number of philosophical problems; I shall discuss three of these
TL;DR: In this paper, it is argued that P.C. may be safely used, except in inferences whose conclusions are conditionals whose antecedents are incompatible with the premises in the sense that if the antecedent became known, some of the previously asserted premises would have to be withdrawn.
Abstract: The standard use of the propositional calculus ('P.C.’) in analyzing the validity of inferences involving conditionals leads to fallacies, and the problem is to determine where P.C. may be ‘safely’ used. An alternative analysis of criteria of reasonableness of inferences in terms of conditions of justification rather than truth of statements is proposed. It is argued, under certain restrictions, that P. C. may be safely used, except in inferences whose conclusions are conditionals whose antecedents are incompatible with the premises in the sense that if the antecedent became known, some of the previously asserted premises would have to be withdrawn.
TL;DR: In a celebrated trial, Harr as discussed by the authors elicited the following information from an expert witness about the source of a chemical pollutant trichloroethylene (TCE): If the TCE in the wells had been drawn from out of the river, then there would be TCE on the riverbed. But there was no TCE at all.
Abstract: You reason about conditional relations because much of your knowledge is conditional. If you get caught speeding, then you pay a fine. If you have an operation, then you need time to recuperate. If you have money in the bank, then you can cash a check. Conditional reasoning is a central part of thinking, yet people do not always reason correctly. The lawyer Jan Schlictmann in a celebrated trial (see Harr, 1995, pp. 361–362) elicited the following information from an expert witness about the source of a chemical pollutant trichloroethylene (TCE): If the TCE in the wells had been drawn from out of the river, then there’d be TCE in the riverbed. But there isn’t any TCE in the riverbed.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the subjectivity of Indicative Conditionals and their relation to the need for worlds and the necessity for worlds in the context of the references index of persons index of topics.
Abstract: 1. Introduction 2. The Material Condition: Grice 3. The Material Condition: Jackson 4. The Equation 5. The Equation Attacked 6. The Subjectivity of Indicative Conditionals 7. Indicative Conditionals Lack Truth Values 8. Uses of Indicative Conditionals 9. The Logic of Indicative Conditionals 10. Subjunctive Conditionals - First Steps 11. The Competition for 'Closest' 12. Unrolling from the Antecedent Time 13. Forks 14. Reflections on Legality 15. Truth at the Actual World 16. Subjunctive Conditionals and Probability 17. 'Even If...' 18. Backward Subjunctive Conditionals 19. Subjunctive Conditionals and Time's Arrow 20. Support Theories 21. The Need for Worlds 22. Relating the Two Kinds of Conditional 23. Unifying the Two Kinds of Conditional References Index of Persons Index of Topics
TL;DR: In this article, a critique s'etend a theory of conditionnels contrefactuels de Stalnaker, and a serie de contre-exemples and demonstrations are presented for andablir que la regle logique classique du modus ponens (si, si p alors q, et si p, alors Q) n'est pas toujours valide.
Abstract: L'A. donne une serie de contre-exemples et de demonstrations pour etablir que la regle logique classique du modus ponens (si, si p alors q, et si p, alors q) n'est pas toujours valide. Cette critique s'etend a la theorie des conditionnels contrefactuels de Stalnaker.