Indeterminacy problem

Abstract: Evans's reasoning provides, in essence, a conclusive argument for the view that indeterminacy in identity statements must be regarded as due to semantic indeterminacy and not as due to indeterminacy in the world. But there are various reasons why some philosophers are reluctant to endorse this conclusion. In what follows I wish to consider one such reason, namely, the evident availability, if Evans's argument is accepted, of an apparently parallel argument against the possibility of contingent identity. I shall be arguing that the appearance of parallelism is illusory, a fact which can be made evident by attention to the linguistic phenomenon of (what I wish to call) Abelardian predicates.

Abstract: This essay investigates the indeterminacy thesis - roughly the claim that the content of authoritative legal materials (such as the texts of constitutions, statutes, cases, rules, and regulations) does not determine the outcome of particular legal disputes. The indeterminacy thesis can be formulated as either "strong" or weak." The strong version of the indeterminacy thesis is demonstrably false, but several weak versions of the thesis are true but lack the radical implications of strong indeterminacy.The strong indeterminacy thesis is the claim that all cases are "hard" cases - or that in any case any conceivable result can be derived from existing legal doctrine. Strong indeterminacy does not hold if there are easy cases - cases in which some outcomes cannot be legally correct. For example, if it were the case that the first paragraph of this abstract did not slander Gore Vidal, then there would be at least one easy case, and strong indeterminacy would be false.Weak versions of the indeterminacy thesis include the claim that important cases are indeterminate, that the law does not necessarily determine outcomes, or that every case could become indeterminate if political conditions supported indeterminacy. These weaker claims may be true, but they lack the critical bite associated with strong indeterminacy.The essay also distinguishes between "determinacy," "indeterminacy," and "underdeterminacy." The law is "determinate" with respect ot a given case if and only if the set of results that can be squared with the legal materials contains only one member. The law is "indeterminate" with respect to a given case if and only if the set of results that can be squared with the legal materials is identical with the set of all imaginable results. The law is "underdeterminate" with respect to a given case if and only if the set of results that can be squared with the legal materials is a nonidentical subset of the set of all imaginable results.This article was first published in 1987, and some of the author's views have been revised in interim.

Abstract: This paper engages with the question of the new as the first stage in what may, at a later time, turn into an innovation Taking our cue from John Dewey, the new is here interpreted as a consequence of indeterminacy We study practices that induce indeterminacy in order to ‘source’ the new Based on findings from a collective research programme, we distinguish three ways of inducing indeterminacy: configuring situations, creating things and risking valuations For each of these ways of inducing indeterminacy basic variations are described and discussed in greater detail The three ways of inducing indeterminacy are shown to correspond to a present-centred concept of time that distinguishes the now from a past and a future horizon The cases presented affirm the claim that the new is not an inevitable consequence of the increasing entanglement of technoscience and the economy but something that needs to be sought for, cared for and actively produced

Abstract: We examine an interesting puzzle in monetary economics between what monetary authorities claim (namely to be forward-looking and pre-emptive) and the poor stabilization properties routinely reported for forecast-based rules. Our resolution is that central banks should be viewed as following Calvo-type inflation-forecast-based (IFB) interest rate rules which depend on a discounted sum of current and future rates of inflation. Such rules might be regarded as both within the legal frameworks, and potentially mimicking central bankers' practice. We find that Calvo-type IFB interest rate rules are first: less prone to indeterminacy than standard rules with a finite forward horizon. Second, for such rules in difference form, the indeterminacy problem disappears altogether. Third, optimized forms have good stabilization properties as they become more forward-looking, a property that sharply contrasts that of standard IFB rules. Fourth, they appear data coherent when incorporated into a well-known estimated DSGE model of the Euro-area.