TL;DR: The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate some possible decision procedures and to test them on pictures of both possible and impossible objects, a novel way of testing picture analysis procedures.
Abstract: To every 3-dimensional scene there correspond as many 2-dimensional pictures as there are possible vantage points for the camera. It is, however, possible to construct pictures for which there is no corresponding scene containing physically-realizable objects. Pictures of such 'impossible objects' can be useful in giving insight into the constraints or grammatical rules associated with the 'language' of pictures, just as nonsense sentences can be useful in illustrating the rules of other languages. Impossible objects have been used by psychologists (Penrose and Penrose 1958) to create visual illusions which successfully challenge the ability of our perceptual systems to synthesize a 3-dimensional world from 2-dimensional information. The incompatibilities among the various portions of pictures of these objects are a novel way of testing our picture analysis procedures. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate some possible decision procedures and to test them on pictures of both possible and impossible objects.
TL;DR: It is shown that increases in blood flow in inferior temporal regions are associated with object decisions about possible but not impossible objects, and that there are increases in the vicinity of the hippocampal formation associated with episodic recognition of possible objects.
Abstract: An object's global, three-dimensional structure may be represented by a specialized brain system involving regions of inferior temporal cortex1–3. This system's role in object representation can be understood by experiments in which people study drawings of novel objects with possible or impossible three-dimensional structures, and later make either possible/impossible object decisions or old/ new recognition decisions about briefly flashed studied and non-studied objects. Although object decisions about possible objects are facilitated by prior study, there is no corresponding facilitation for impossible objects, thereby implicating a system that is specifically involved in the representation of structurally coherent visual objects4. Here we show, by positron emission tomography (PET), that increases in blood flow in inferior temporal regions are associated with object decisions about possible but not impossible objects, and that there are increases in the vicinity of the hippocampal formation associated with episodic recognition of possible objects.
TL;DR: The geometrical-optical illusions show promise as analytical tools in unraveling neural processing in vision by showing how conflicts are resolved when there is mismatch in the output of the processing modules for various primitives as a perceptual pattern's unitary structure is assembled.
TL;DR: This paper showed that participants are biased to respond "possible" on the object possibility test because structural processing was facilitated by prior study of possible, but not impossible, portions of objects and demonstrated that bias in this context was a form of, not an alternative to, implicit memory, by showing priming effects when accuracy scores for studied and unstudied items were equated.
Abstract: Previous investigations have shown that participants are biased to respond "possible" to studied items when asked to decide whether objects could or could not exist in an object possibility test. The present study clarified and extended the concept of bias in implicit memory research in two ways. First, the authors showed that participants were biased to respond "possible" (rather than "impossible") on the object possibility test because structural processing was facilitated by prior study of possible, but not impossible, portions of objects. Second, the authors demonstrated that bias in this context was a form of, not an alternative to, implicit memory, by showing priming effects in response times when accuracy scores for studied and unstudied items were equated. The authors concluded by comparing proceduralist and memory-systems accounts of implicit memory effects and suggested that the two approaches could be seen as complementary rather than conflicting.
TL;DR: Results support the view that the detection of impossibility requires the construction of a mental representation of the interrelationships of the constituent parts of the depicted object, and it is suggested that theConstruction of such internal models may be of general importance in picture perception.
Abstract: Four experiments investigating children's ability to detect the impossibility of impossible figures are reported. In the first, children were required to identify the impossible figure from a pair of corresponding possible and impossible figures. Whilst seven-year-old children were able to detect the impossibility of certain impossible figures, their overall level of performance was lower than that of older children. Regardless of age, the impossibility of some types of figure was found to be relatively easy or difficult to detect. Experiment 2 confirmed this pattern of results using a task that required children to copy possible and impossible figures from memory. Experiment 3 showed that, when the impossibility of an impossible figure is not readily detected, this is not due to failure to understand the conventions used in that figure to represent depth and solidity. In experiment 4 predictions from different hypotheses concerning the principal factor responsible for the detection of impossibility were ...