Impartiality

Abstract: A change in the audition procedures of symphony orchestras--adoption of "blind" auditions with a "screen" to conceal the candidate's identity from the jury--provides a test for sex-biased hiring. Using data from actual auditions, in an individual fixed-effects framework, we find that the screen increases the probability a woman will be advanced and hired. Although some of our estimates have large standard errors and there is one persistent effect in the opposite direction, the weight of the evidence suggests that the blind audition procedure fostered impartiality in hiring and increased the proportion women in symphony orchestras.

Abstract: The two concepts — human rights and capabilities — go well with each other, so long as we do not try to subsume either concept entirely within the territory of the other. There are many human rights that can be seen as rights to particular capabilities. However, human rights to important process freedoms cannot be adequately analysed within the capability framework. Furthermore, both human rights and capabilities have to depend on the process of public reasoning. The methodology of public scrutiny draws on Rawlsian understanding of 'objectivity' in ethics, but the impartiality that is needed cannot be confined within the borders of a nation. Public reasoning without territorial confinement is important for both.

Abstract: * Preface * Introduction * The Big Issue * Rescuing Equality and Justice * Some Methodological Disagreements * Justice and Fairness * The Two Standpoints * The Greatness of John Rawls * An Outline of the Book Part One: Rescuing Equality from... 1. The Incentives Argument I. The Incentives Argument, The Interpersonal Test, and Community * Incentives, the Difference Principle, and Equality * Nigel Lawson's Tax Cut * On Uttering Arguments in Variable Interpersonal Settings * The Kidnapper's Argument * Community, and the Interpersonal Test * Does the Incentive Argument Pass the Interpersonal Test? II. Testing the Incentive Argument * What Makes the Minor Premiss of the Incentive Argument True? * Why the Incentive Argument Fails the Interpersonal Test * The Incentive Argument and Bad Faith * Should the Poor Reject the Incentive Argument? * First Persons and Third Persons III. Incentives and the Difference Principle * Strict and Lax Readings of the Difference Principle * Why Just People Must Practise the Strict Difference Principle * The Difference Principle and "Daily Life" * Dignity, Fraternity, and The Difference Principle * The Difference Principle and "Mutual Indifference" * The Difference Principle and the Unjust Society 2. The Pareto Argument for Inequality * Introduction * The Argument Expounded * The Argument Challenged * The Argument Rejected * Labour Burden in the Metric of Equality * Inconsistent Metrics * Raising the Baseline * Impartiality and Mutual Advantage * Inequality: A Necessary Evil? * Conclusion 3. The Basic Structure Objection *"The Personal is Political" * Incentives and the Difference Principle: A Review of the Argument * The "Basic Structure" Objection * The "Basic Structure" Objection: A Preliminary Reply * The "Basic Structure" Objection: A More Fundamental Reply * Who is to Blame? * Coercive and Non-Coercive Social Structures * Appendix I. More on Coercion and the Basic Structure * Appendix II. The Basic Structure is a Structure 4. The Difference Principle * Introduction * Reconsidering the Difference Principle * The Moral Arbitrariness Case for the Difference Principle Contradicts its Content * A Recent Argument for the Difference Principle * A Contractarian Argument for the Difference Principle * What is the Moral Arbitrariness of Talent Differences Supposed to Show? * Chamberlain and Pareto *"Can't" or "Won't" * Human Nature and Constructivism 5. The Freedom Objection * Introduction * Equality, Pareto, and Freedom of Choice of Occupation * Equality, Pareto, and Rawlsian Liberty * Equality, Pareto, and Freedom in Work * The Unequal-Income Inference * Blood, Kidneys, and Sex 6. The Facts * A Statement of my Thesis * Facts, and Some Meta-Ethical Questions * What Most Philosophers Think about Facts and Principles * My Thesis: Ultimate Principles are Fact-Insensitive and the Clarity of Mind Requirement * An Illustration of the Thesis * More Illustration of the Thesis * The Argument for the Thesis *(i). A Defence of the First Premiss of the Argument *(ii). A Defence of the Second Premiss of the Argument *(iii). A Defence of the Third Premiss of the Argument * Still Further Illustration and Defence of the Thesis * The Clarity of Mind Requirement * The Merely Logical Priority of Fact-Insensitive Principles * The Conditional Character of the Thesis * On "Is" and "Ought" * On "Ought" and "Can" * Possible Misunderstandings of the Thesis * The Thesis is not a Causal Thesis * The Thesis is not a Psychological Thesis * The Thesis is Neutral with Respect to Central Meta-Ethical Disputes * Some Bad Rawlsian Arguments that Reject My Thesis * Utilitarianism, and the Difference Between Fundamental Principles and Rules of Regulation * The Interest of My Thesis * Appendix: God Part Two: Rescuing Justice from... 7. Constructivism * Introduction, and Preliminary Overview * Fundamental Principles of Justice and Constructivism * Fundamental Principles of Justice and Constructivism: Matters Arising * Is Justice the First Virtue of Social Institutions? * Two Illustrations: Social Insurance, Property Taxation * Justice and the Pareto Principle * Justice, and Constraints, Notably Publicity, on Choice of Optimal Rules at Regulation * Justice and Stability * The "Circumstances of Justice" * Conclusion * Appendix: Is the Original Position Justification of Principles Contractarian? 8. The Publicity Argument * Andrew Williams on Publicity and the Egalitarian Ethos * An Anatomy of Williams's Argument * Racism, Justice, and Assurance * Does Assurance Williams-type Determinacy? * Does Justice Require Precision? * Egalitarian Ethi at Home, in the Market, and in the State * Publicity as a Desideratum of Justice * Justice and Occupational Choice * Conclusion General Appendix: Replies to critics * Public and Private Action * The Site of Justice is not Where it Gets Caused * Prior Principles, Self-Respect, and Equality * Incentives and Prerogatives * Pogge's Mastergoals and Supergoals * Pogge's Failure to Address the Standard Case * The Currency of Distributive Justice and Incentive Inequality * Earlier Discussions of Rawls on Incentives

Abstract: The recent growth in research on "good governance" and the quality of government institutions has been propelled by empirical findings that show that such institutions may hold the key to understanding economic growth and social welfare in developing and transition countries. We argue, however, that a key issue has not been addressed, namely, what quality of government (QoG) actually means at the conceptual level. Based on analyses of political theory, we propose a more coherent and specific definition of QoG: the impartiality of institutions that exercise government authority. We relate the idea of impartiality to a series of criticisms stemming from the fields of public administration, public choice, multiculturalism, and feminism. To place the theory of impartiality in a larger context, we then contrast its scope and meaning with that of a threefold set of competing concepts of quality of government: democracy, the rule of law, and efficiency/effectiveness.