Immorality

Abstract: Introduction.1. The Self-Defeating Nature of Immoral Business Practice.Introduction Immoral Actions Are Based on Self-Defeating Maxims Inconsistency and Immorality Applications to BusinessIt Seems Right in Theory But Does It Work in Practice?Objections to the Application of Kantian Ethics to BusinessExtending the Reach of Categorical Imperatives: Pragmatically Inconsistent MaximsWhy Neither Being Trustworthy nor Not Trusting in Business Involves a Pragmatic Contradiction.Transition to Chapter 22. Treating the Humanity of Stakeholders as Ends rather than as Means Merely.IntroductionThe Respect for Persons PrincipleNot Using Employees: Neither Coercion nor DeceitBusiness Practices That Reduce or Remove Coercion and DeceptionAn Objection and RepliesPositive Freedom ad Meaningful Work: Respecting the Humanity in a PersonKant's Reflection s on WorkMeaningful Work and Contemporary Business3. The Firm as a Moral Community.IntroductionViewing Organizations and Human NatureCreating the Kantian Moral Firm: The Kingdom of Ends Formulation of the Categorical ImperativeThe Principles of a Moral FirmImplications for Organizational Studies4. Acting from Duty: How Pure a Motive.IntroductionKant's Position on the Purity of Moral MotivesStrategic Payoffs and Moral MotivesReasons and Emotions: A Brief AsideMultiple Moral Motives5. The Cosmopolitan Perspective.IntroductionThe Morality of the MarketInternational Business Can Contribute to World Peace, Universal Rights, and DemocracyObjections and RepliesConclusionBibliographyFurther ReadingIndex

Abstract: Results of 2 experiments supported the proposal that empathy-induced altruism can lead one to act in a way that violates the moral principle of justice. In each experiment, participants were asked to make an allocation decision that affected the welfare of other individuals. Participants who were not induced to feel empathy tended to act in accord with a principle of justice; participants who were induced to feel empathy were significantly more likely to violate this principle, allocating resources preferentially to the person for whom empathy was felt. High-empathy participants who showed partiality agreed with other participants in perceiving partiality to be less fair and less moral (Experiment 1). Overall, results suggested that empathy-induced altruism and the desire to uphold a moral principle of justice are independent prosocial motives that sometimes cooperate but sometimes conflict. Implications of this independence are discussed

Abstract: In five studies, we explored whether power increases moral hypocrisy (i.e., imposing strict moral standards on other people but practicing less strict moral behavior oneself). In Experiment 1, compared with the powerless, the powerful condemned other people's cheating more, but also cheated more themselves. In Experiments 2 through 4, the powerful were more strict in judging other people's moral transgressions than in judging their own transgressions. A final study found that the effect of power on moral hypocrisy depends on the legitimacy of the power: When power was illegitimate, the moral-hypocrisy effect was reversed, with the illegitimately powerful becoming stricter in judging their own behavior than in judging other people's behavior. This pattern, which might be dubbed hypercrisy, was also found among low-power participants in Experiments 3 and 4. We discuss how patterns of hypocrisy and hypercrisy among the powerful and powerless can help perpetuate social inequality.

Abstract: When something is wrong, someone is harmed. This hypothesis derives from the theory of dyadic morality, which suggests a moral cognitive template of wrongdoing agent and suffering patient (i.e., victim). This dyadic template means that victimless wrongs (e.g., masturbation) are psychologically incomplete, compelling the mind to perceive victims even when they are objectively absent. Five studies reveal that dyadic completion occurs automatically and implicitly: Ostensibly harmless wrongs are perceived to have victims (Study 1), activate concepts of harm (Studies 2 and 3), and increase perceptions of suffering (Studies 4 and 5). These results suggest that perceiving harm in immorality is intuitive and does not require effortful rationalization. This interpretation argues against both standard interpretations of moral dumbfounding and domain-specific theories of morality that assume the psychological existence of harmless wrongs. Dyadic completion also suggests that moral dilemmas in which wrongness (deontology) and harm (utilitarianism) conflict are unrepresentative of typical moral cognition.