Topic
Holdout problem
About: Holdout problem is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 66 publications have been published within this topic receiving 1901 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors formulate a complete, but analytically simple, equilibrium model of vertical mergers to evaluate the logic of standard vertical foreclosure claims and the criticisms made of those claims.
Abstract: The authors formulate a complete, but analytically simple, equilibrium model of vertical mergers to evaluate the logic of standard vertical foreclosure claims and the criticisms made of those claims. The model includes incentives of the integrated firm and unintegrated input suppliers to exclude rivals, and the potential holdout problem. In this fully specified model, vertical foreclosure can emerge in equilibrium. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.
520 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the link between the holdout problem and urban sprawl and discuss possible remedies, including the use of eminent domain for urban redevelopment, and examine the possible solutions to solve the problem.
Abstract: Developers attempting land assembly often face a potential holdout problem that raises the cost of development. To minimize this extra cost, developers will prefer land whose ownership is less dispersed. This creates a bias toward development at the urban fringe where average lot sizes are larger, resulting in urban sprawl. This paper examines the link between the holdout problem and urban sprawl and discusses possible remedies, including the use of eminent domain for urban redevelopment.
90 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors model the holdout problem in a bargaining framework, where a developer seeks to acquire several parcels of land for a large-scale development, and show that in the absence of eminent domain, holdouts are a significant threat, resulting in costly delay.
Abstract: The holdout problem is commonly cited as the justification for eminent domain, but the nature of the problem is not well understood This article models the holdout problem in a bargaining framework, where a developer seeks to acquire several parcels of land for a large-scale development We show that in the absence of eminent domain, holdouts are a significant threat, resulting in costly delay However, if the developer has the power to use eminent domain to acquire the land from holdouts, all sellers will bargain, thus avoiding delay An offsetting cost is that owners may negotiate prices below their true value, possibly resulting in excessive transfer of land to the developer
89 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors solve for the equilibria of a land assembly game, and they show that the equilibrium has three important characteristics: the develop′s bid is uninformative. The counteroffers of the landowners depend only on their priors.
89 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the link between the holdout problem and urban sprawl and discuss possible remedies, including the use of eminent domain for urban redevelopment, and examine the possible solutions to solve the problem.
87 citations
Related Topics (5)
Performance Metrics
| Year | Papers |
|---|---|
| 2021 | 2 |
| 2020 | 6 |
| 2019 | 1 |
| 2018 | 3 |
| 2017 | 2 |
| 2016 | 1 |