Gullibility

Abstract: In the last decade considerable research in social sciences has focused on interpersonal trust, treating it as a remedy for most maladies modern democracies suffer from. Yet, if others act dishonestly, trust is turned into gullibility, thus mechanisms linking interpersonal trust with institutional success refer implicitly to honesty and civic morality. This paper investigates the roots of civic morality. It applies hierarchical models to data from 38 countries, and tests the individual, community and structural explanatory factors. The results of the analysis point to the relevance of an institutional dimension, both in the form of individuals' perceptions as well as the quality of governance: confidence in political institutions and their objective quality are the strongest predictors of civic morality. At the same time, the findings show that the recently popular claims about the importance of social capital for citizens' moral standards are largely unfounded.

Abstract: This article critically examines how fears of audience gullibility, ignorance, and exploitation impede media studies’ response to the pressing challenges posed by the growing power of social media ...

Abstract: Social trust reflects an individual’s positive view of humanity, the belief that people generally treat others fairly rather than try to maximize their own gain at others’ expense. Such views of humanity are important foundations for democratic societies because they are positively associated with cooperation, tolerance, volunteering, giving to charity, and participation in public affairs (Putnam, 2000; Uslaner, 2000). Individuals with high levels of social trust assume that even people who are different from them are part of their moral community and that they bear some responsibility for the welfare of these “others” (Flanagan, Gill, & Gallay, 2005; Uslaner, 2002). Scholarly interest in social trust has increased of late due to concerns that it has declined. Trends over the past thirty years show that younger generations today also are less likely than their elders and than earlier cohorts of youth to have faith in humanity, i.e., to feel that “people in general” can be trusted (Pew Research Center, 2007; Rahn & Transue, 1998; Smith, 2005). Our understanding of social trust and its correlates is based primarily on studies of adults and there is some evidence that these beliefs are rather stable in adulthood. For example, one national longitudinal study found that the level of social trust expressed by a high-school senior in 1965 was highly predictive of the faith in humanity s/he reported in his/her mid thirties (Damico, Conway, & Damico, 2000; Jennings & Stoker, 2002;Stolle & Hooghe, 2003; Uslaner, 2002). It seems reasonable to assume that the foundations of our faith in humanity are established prior to adulthood. Yet, there have been no studies of the developmental correlates of social trust. However, research on early adolescents’ lay theories about humanity is relevant. Dweck, Levy, and their colleagues have identified individual differences in early adolescents’ lay theories about humanity with some youth adopting a fixed or entity view and others a view that people are malleable and can change. Although these scholars were not looking specifically at social trust, they did find that youth who believed people could change were less inclined than those holding entity views to judge others (Dweck, 1999; Erdley & Dweck, 1993; Levy & Dweck, 1999) or to stereotype outgroups such as homeless people. Those who believed in people’s capacities for change also were more likely to see similarities between themselves and disadvantaged groups such as the homeless and to have a history of volunteering to help others (Karafantis & Levy, 2004). Thus, by early adolescence it appears that there are identifiable differences in youth’s open-mindedness towards people and that correlates of social trust (tolerance, volunteering) also are correlates of these beliefs about humanity. However, we know little about the factors that contribute to youths’ trust in humanity or how stable those beliefs are prior to adulthood. In the current study we examine factors associated with adolescents’ beliefs that people are generally fair and trustworthy (i.e., their social trust) with data over two years from a sample of early, middle, and late adolescents. First, we explore age differences in levels, stability, and correlates of social trust. Following that we look at patterns of social trust over two years with adolescents’ reports of the relational climates at their school as predictors of changes in these beliefs. The adolescent years are an ideal period to study the formation of social trust. Identity is focal and questions about one’s own authenticity (Harter, 1999) and the trustworthiness of others (Flanagan, 2003) are salient. In addition, both the widening world of social experiences and the growth in socio-cognitive competence that occur during adolescence should affect beliefs about the trustworthiness of humanity. As adolescents age, they engage in a wider world of contexts and with more diverse groups of people. We know that social trust is inversely related to contextual diversity, in part because of the challenges of finding shared interests and norms with diverse others (Hardin, 2004; Phan, 2008). Furthermore, trust reflects social intelligence (Yamagishi, 2001) and differs from gullibility or naivete because it is informed by experience and good judgment and tempered by skepticism (Rotter, 1980). Thus, the wider and more diverse social experiences of older adolescents should mean that they are, on average, less naive and positive than early adolescents in their judgments about people. The lion’s share of the developmental research on trust has focused on interpersonal trust in friendships and it is likely that young people learn about the phenomenon of trust in those relationships since many of the elements of trust (being fair, loyal, true to one’s word and accountable for one’s actions) are issues that friends negotiate (Rotenberg, 1991). People who lack friends have lower levels of social trust (Uslaner, 2002) and are less likely to believe that others trust them, despite reports from peers to the contrary (Rotenberg, 1994). Thus, interpersonal trust between friends should provide a foundation for social trust. However, interpersonal and social trust are distinct: Whereas the former is based on knowledge of and experience with familiars, the latter reflects our beliefs about people in general. The distinction in the literature on social capital is that between thick vs. thin trust, the former rooted in and reinforced by regular contact and dense networks with people we know, the latter a more expansive but less intense trust in people we do not (Putnam, 2000). Between early and late adolescence there is an increasing capacity to conceive of abstract groups (like humanity) and to differentiate aspects of the social world (Eisenberg & Sheffield Morris, 2004; Keating, 2004). Late adolescents, therefore, should be more likely than early adolescents to distinguish their general beliefs about humanity (social trust) from their personal experiences (interpersonal trust). For example, compared to early adolescents, late adolescents are more likely to distinguish their general beliefs in a just world (i.e., that the world is fair and people generally get what they deserve) from their personal situation (i.e., that they themselves are usually treated fairly) (Dalbert & Sally, 2004). Based on a review of relevant literature, we test the following hypotheses concerning developmental changes in the phenomenon of trust. First, we expect that social trust becomes more stable between early and late adolescence as the social representation of a generalized other crystallizes: In early adolescence, beliefs about humanity should be more malleable whereas by late adolescence, reports of social trust should be more stable. Second, based on the literature on friendship and trust, we expect that interpersonal trust will be positively but weakly related to social trust but that this relationship will diminish with age, i.e., late adolescents will be more likely to distinguish trust in humanity from trust in their friendships. The latter hypothesis is based on the growth between early and late adolescence in the capacity to differentiate aspects of the social world and to distinguish general beliefs from personal experience. Our third hypothesis concerns developmental differences in levels of interpersonal and social trust. In light of the widening social world of late when compared to early adolescents, we expect to find an age related decline in social trust as youth mature and their beliefs about humanity are less naive, informed by some skepticism about people. However, we do not hypothesize any age-related changes in interpersonal trust since interpersonal trust should vary based on the quality of one’s personal relationships. Our final hypotheses concern the effects of school climates and transitions to new school settings on social trust. We argue that, when students’ experiences at school a) make them feel like they’re part of something larger than themselves and b) show them that they are trusted and respected by persons in authority, those experiences should have a positive impact on adolescents’ social trust. We assess two dimensions of the school climate as reported by students: a) school solidarity and b) a democratic climate in which teachers encourage students to voice their opinions and respect the views of others. These have been identified as key elements of schools as caring communities that promote students’ integration into the institution (Battistich, Solomon, Watson, & Schaps, 1997). Likewise, in research on effective schools, teachers identify similar dimensions of the organizational climate at school which Bryk and Schneider (2002) have labeled “relational trust”. Teachers in more effective schools report: a) a sense of identification with the school and solidarity with fellow teachers and b) encouragement from the principal or authority figure to express their opinions (see also Tschannen-Moran & Hoy, 2000). Bryk and Schneider contend that relational trust enables innovation because it reflects an environment in which individuals share a moral commitment to act in the interests of the collective.