TL;DR: In this paper, the authors find no significant association between non-audit service fees and impaired auditor independence, where auditor independence is surrogated by auditors propensity to issue going concern audit opinions.
Abstract: We find no significant association between non–audit service fees and impaired auditor independence, where auditor independence is surrogated by auditors’ propensity to issue going concern audit opinions. We also find no association between going concern opinions and either total fees or audit fees. In addition, our findings are robust to controlling for unexpected fees, to controlling for endogeneity among our variables, and to several alternative research design specifications. Our results are consistent with market–based incentives, such as loss of reputation and litigation costs, dominating the expected benefits from compromising auditor independence.
TL;DR: The authors found no evidence that non-audit service fees impair auditor independence, where independence is surrogated by auditors' propensity to issue going concern audit opinions, suggesting that auditors behave with relatively greater independence towards these clients.
Abstract: We find no evidence that non-audit service fees impair auditor independence, where independence is surrogated by auditors' propensity to issue going concern audit opinions. We do find, however, that auditors are more likely to issue going concern opinions to clients paying higher audit fees, suggesting that auditors behave with relatively greater independence towards these clients. Our findings are consistent with Reynolds and Francis (2001) and suggest that market-based incentives, such as loss of reputation and litigation costs, dominate the benefits auditors are likely to receive from compromising their independence to retain clients that pay larger fees. Overall, our findings indicate that recent SEC regulations based on concerns that non-audit services impair auditor independence, are unfounded.
TL;DR: In this paper, a large sample of U.S. publicly listed companies was used to test if high-accrual firms in the United States, are more likely to receive modified audit reports for asset realization uncertainties and going concern problems.
Abstract: Accounting accruals are managers' subjective estimates of future outcomes and cannot, by definition, be objectively verified by auditors prior to occurrence. This causes audits of high-accrual firms to pose more uncertainty than audits of low-accrual firms because of potential estimation error and a greater chance that high-accrual firms have undetected asset realization and/or going concern problems that are related to the high level of accruals. One way that auditors can compensate for this risk exposure is to lower their threshold for issuing modified audit reports, an action that will increase modified reports and, therefore, lessen the likelihood of failing to issue a modified report when appropriate. We call this auditor reporting conservatism and test if high-accrual firms in the United States, are more likely to receive modified audit reports for asset realization uncertainties and going concern problems. Empirical results for a large sample of U.S. publicly listed companies support the hypothesis that auditors are more conservative, that is, more likely to issue both types of modified audit reports for high-accrual firms. Further analyses show that income-increasing accruals are somewhat more likely to result in reporting conservatism than income-decreasing accruals, and that only the Big Six group of auditors show evidence of reporting conservatism. These findings add to our understanding of the audit report formation process and the potentially important role played by accounting accruals in that process.
TL;DR: The authors explored the relationship between franchise value and risk taking from 1986 to 1994 using both balance-sheet data and stock returns and found that banks with high franchise value operate more safely than those with low franchise value.
Abstract: As protectors of the safety and soundness of the banking system, banking supervisors are responsible for keeping banks' risk taking in check The authors explain that franchise value - the present value of the stream of profits that a firm is expected to earn as a going concern - makes the supervisor's job easier by reducing banks' incentives to take risks The authors explore the relationship between franchise value and risk taking from 1986 to 1994 using both balance-sheet data and stock returns They find that banks with high franchise value operate more safely than those with low franchise value In particular, high-franchise-value banks hold more capital and take on less portfolio risk, primarily by diversifying their lending activities
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a review of the research in the area of modified audit opinions (GCOs) and develop a framework to categorize this research into three major areas of research: (1) determinants of GCOs that include client factors, auditor factors and auditor-client relationships, and other environmental factors; (2) accuracy of the GCO; and (3) consequences arising from GCO.
Abstract: SUMMARY: In this synthesis we review research on going-concern modified audit opinions (GCOs) and develop a framework to categorize this research. We identify three major areas of research: (1) determinants of GCOs that include client factors, auditor factors, auditor-client relationships, and other environmental factors; (2) accuracy of GCOs; and (3) consequences arising from GCOs. We identify method-related considerations for researchers working in the area and identify future research opportunities.