Topic
Gerrymandering
About: Gerrymandering is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 645 publications have been published within this topic receiving 10502 citations. The topic is also known as: gerrymander.
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Papers
Book•
1 Jan 1983
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the relationship between money and success in Congressional elections and the importance of candidates' money in the process of winning an election, as well as the effect of money on candidates' success.
Abstract: 1. Introduction. 2. The Context. The Constitutional Framework. Congressional Districts. Partisan Gerrymandering. Racial Gerrymandering. States as Electoral Units. Election Laws. Political Parties. Social and Political Contexts. 3. Congressional Candidates. The Incumbency Factor. Measuring the Value of Incumbency. The Vanishing Marginals. Sources of the Incumbency Advantage. The Institutional Characteristics of Congress. Changes in Voting Behavior. Constituency Service. The Variability of the Incumbency Advantage. Discouraging the Opposition. Money in Congressional Elections. The Connection between Money and Success. Why Campaign Money Is More Important to Challengers. The Career in the District. Motivating Challengers. 4. Congressional Campaigns. Campaign Money. Political Action Committees. Party Money. Self-Financing by Candidates. Fundraising Tactics. Campaign Organizations. Campaign Strategies. Campaign Media. Personal Campaigning. Campaign Messages. Challengers' Campaigns. Going Negative. Incumbents' Campaigns. Candidates for Open Seats. Senate Campaigns. "Voter Education" and "Issue Advocacy" Campaigns. Concluding Observations. 5. Congressional Voters. Turnout in Congressional Elections. Partisanship in Congressional Elections. Alternative Interpretations of Party Identification. Partisanship and Voting. Information and Voting. Recall and Recognition of Candidates. Contacting Voters. The Effects of Campaign Spending. Models of Voting Behavior. Evaluating Incumbents. Winning Challengers. Issues in Congressional Elections. 6. National Politics and Congressional Elections. Political Interpretations of Congressional Elections. Models of Aggregate Congressional Election Results. Presidential Coattails. National Conditions and Strategic Politics. Campaign Themes. House Elections, 1980-1998. The Clinton Problem. Nationalizing the Vote. The Campaigns. The Scandal and the Campaigns. House Election Patterns, 1980-1998. Senate Elections, 1980-1998. 7. Elections and The Politics of Congress. The Congressional Parties. The Committee Systems. Making Policy. Particularism. Serving the Organized. Immobility. Symbolism. Doing the Right Thing. Building Coalitions. The Budgetary Process. 8. Representation, Responsibility, Impeachment Politics, and the Future of Congressional Elections. Representation. Policy Congruence. Beyond Policy Congruence. Descriptive Representation. Responsiveness without Responsibility. The Revival of Party Cohesion. Ideological Polarization in Congress and the Electorate. Party Polarization: The Electoral Connection. Diverging Electoral Constituencies. Chicken or Egg? Party Polarization and the Politics of Impeachment. Divided Government in the 1990s. Reforming Congress. Term Limits. The Public's Evaluation of Congress. Toward the Millennium. Bibliography. Index.
1,759 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors test three models describing the inflation of the legislative power of the victorious party and then develop explanations of the observed differences in the swing ratio and the partisan bias of an electoral system.
Abstract: An enduring fact of life in democratic electoral systems is that the party winning the largest share of the votes almost always receives a still larger share of the seats. This paper tests three models describing the inflation of the legislative power of the victorious party and then develops explanations of the observed differences in the swing ratio and the partisan bias of an electoral system. The “cube law” is rejected as a description, since it assumes uniformity (which is not observed in the data) across electoral systems. Explanations for differences in swing ratio and bias are found in variations in turnout over districts, the extent of the “nationalization” of politics, and, most importantly, in who does the districting or reapportionment. The measures of swing ratio and partisan bias appear useful for the judicial evaluation of redistricting schemes and may contribute to the reduction of partisan and incumbent gerrymandering.
499 citations
TL;DR: This article showed that in many states, Democrats are inefficiently concentrated in large cities and smaller industrial agglomerations such that they can expect to win fewer than 50% of the seats when they win 50% votes.
Abstract: While conventional wisdom holds that partisan bias in U.S. legislative elections results from intentional partisan and racial gerrymandering, we demonstrate that substantial bias can also emerge from patterns of human geography. We show that in many states, Democrats are inefficiently concentrated in large cities and smaller industrial agglomerations such that they can expect to win fewer than 50% of the seats when they win 50% of the votes. To measure this "unintentional gerrymandering," we use automated districting simulations based on precinct-level 2000 presidential election results in several states. Our results illustrate a strong relationship between the geographic concentration of Democratic voters and electoral bias favoring Republicans.
445 citations
TL;DR: Scholarshave et al. as discussed by the authors found that congressional polarization is primarily a function of the differences in how Democrats and Republicans represent the same districts rather than a function on which districts each party represents or the distribution of constituency preferences.
Abstract: Both pundits and scholars have blamed increasing levels of partisan conflict and polarization in Congress on the effects of partisan gerrymandering. We assess whether there is a strong causal relationship between congressional districting and polarization. We find very little evidence for such a link. First, we show that congressional polarization is primarily a function of the differences in how Democrats and Republicans represent the same districts rather than a function of which districts each party represents or the distribution of constituency preferences. Second, we conduct simulations to gauge the level of polarization under various “neutral” districting procedures. We find that the actual levels of polarization are not much higher than those produced by the simulations. We do find that gerrymandering has increased the Republican seat share in the House; however, this increase is not an important source of polarization. C ontemporary politics in the United States is historically distinctive in at least two respects. The first is the ever-increasing polarization of political elites. As McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006) have documented, partisan differences in congressional voting behavior have grown dramatically to levels not seen since the early twentieth century. The second distinction is the historically low levels of competition in congressional elections. This is especially true of the House of Representatives, where 99% of incumbents standing for reelection were successful in the 2002 and 2004 elections. In the swing to the Democrats in 2006, no individual Democrats were defeated and even 89% of standing Republicans were reelected. Given the conjunction of these two patterns, it seems natural to draw a link; namely, the increased polarization of Congress is a direct result of the increasing ease of reelection. Presumably in an era of declining competition politicians no longer feel the need to reach out to moderate and independent voters. Instead politicians are free to pander to their base. Politicians who do not pander may face primary challenges by ideologically purer candidates. Istherealinkbetweenincreasedpolarizationanddecliningcompetition?Scholarshaveyettoestablishacom
345 citations
Book•
4 Mar 2002TL;DR: In this article, the authors describe a unique episode in the long history of American gerrymandering, the Supreme Court's landmark reapportionment decisions in the early 1960s and their electoral consequences.
Abstract: [Preface] Elbridge Gerry was governor of Massachusetts from 1810 to 1812. During his term, his party produced an artful electoral map intended to maximize the number of seats it could eke out of its expected vote share. Contemporary observers latched onto one district in particular, in the shape of a salamander, and pronounced it a Gerry-mander. This book is about a unique episode in the long history of American gerrymandering – the Supreme Court’s landmark reapportionment decisions in the early 1960s and their electoral consequences. The dramatis personae of our story are the state politicians who drew congressional district lines, the judges on the courts supervising their handiwork, and the candidates competing for congressional office. The plot of our story concerns the strategic adaptation of these actors to the new electoral playing field created by the Court’s decisions.
322 citations
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Performance Metrics
| Year | Papers |
|---|---|
| 2025 | 23 |
| 2024 | 39 |
| 2023 | 48 |
| 2022 | 99 |
| 2021 | 24 |
| 2020 | 158 |