TL;DR: A comprehensive framework for the theory of probabilistic mental models (PMM theory) is proposed, which explains both the overconfidence effect and the hard-easy effect and predicts conditions under which both effects appear, disappear, or invert.
Abstract: Research on people's confidence in their general knowledge has to date produced two fairly stable effects, many inconsistent results, and no comprehensive theory. We propose such a comprehensive framework, the theory of probabilistic mental models (PMM theory). The theory (a) explains both the overconfidence effect (mean confidence is higher than percentage of answers correct) and the hard-easy effect (overconfidence increases with item difficulty) reported in the literature and (b) predicts conditions under which both effects appear, disappear, or invert. In addition, (c) it predicts a new phenomenon, the confidence-frequency effect, a systematic difference between a judgment of confidence in a single event (i.e., that any given answer is correct) and a judgment of the frequency of correct answers in the long run. Two experiments are reported that support PMM theory by confirming these predictions, and several apparent anomalies reported in the literature are explained and integrated into the present framework. Do people think they know more than they really do? In the last 15 years, cognitive psychologists have amassed a large and apparently damning body of experimental evidence on overconfidence in knowledge, evidence that is in turn part of an even larger and more damning literature on so-called cognitive biases. The cognitive bias research claims that people are naturally prone to making mistakes in reasoning and memory, including the mistake of overestimating their knowledge. In this article, we propose a new theoretical model for confidence in knowledge based on the more charitable assumption that people are good judges of the reliability of their knowledge, provided that the knowledge is representatively sampled from a specified reference class. We claim that this model both predicts new experimental results (that we have tested) and explains a wide range of extant experimental findings on confidence, including some perplexing inconsistencies.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the Metacognitive knowledge category and its implications for learning, teaching, and assessing in the classroom, and discuss the impact of the MetACognitive Knowledge category on teaching, assessment, and assessment.
Abstract: A s KRATHWOHL (THIS ISSUE) STATES, the reA vised Taxonomy contains four general knowledge categories: Factual, Conceptual, Procedural, and Metacognitive. While the first three categories were included in the original Taxonomy, the Metacognitive Knowledge category was added. The purpose of this article is to discuss the Metacognitive Knowledge category and its implications for learning, teaching, and assessing in the classroom.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the problem of delegating decision rights in both the economy and in firms, which creates two problems: the rights assignment problem (determining who should exercise a decision right), and the control or agency problem (ensuring that selfinterested decision agents exercise their rights in a way that contributes to the organizational objective).
Abstract: Specific knowledge is knowledge that is costly to transfer among agents and general knowledge is knowledge that is inexpensive to transmit. Because specific knowledge is costly to transfer, getting it used in decision-making requires decentralizing many decision rights in both the economy and in firms. Such delegation in turn creates two problems: the rights assignment problem (determining who should exercise a decision right), and the control or agency problem (ensuring that self-interested decision agents exercise their rights in a way that contributes to the organizational objective).
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze the relations between knowledge, control and organizational structure both in the market system as a whole and in private organizations and define the Organizational Rules of the Game that provide: 1) a system for partitioning decision rights out to agents in the organization, 2) a performance measurement and evaluation system, and 3) a reward and punishment system.
Abstract: This paper analyzes the relations between knowledge, control and organizational structure both in the market system as a whole and in private organizations. Limitations on the mental capacity of the human mind and the costs of producing and transferring knowledge means that knowledge relevant to all decisions can never be collected in the mind of a single individual or a small body of experts. This means that if the knowledge valuable to a particular decision is to be used in making that decision, there must be a system for partitioning out decision rights to individuals who already have the relevant knowledge and abilities or who can acquire or produce them at the lowest cost. Self interest on the part of individual decision-makers means a control system is required to motivate individuals with the decision rights and the relevant knowledge to use those decision rights appropriately. This control problem is solved in a capitalist economy by a system of alienable property rights.Alienable rights cannot generally solve the control problem in firms, and the assignment of decision rights in firms does not generally include the assignment of alienability. Indeed, this is one of the major distinctions between firms and markets. The inalienability of rights within an organization means control problems must be solved by alternative means. Organizations solve these problems by establishing what we define to be the Organizational Rules of the Game that provide:(1) a system for partitioning decision rights out to agents in the organization,(2) a performance measurement and evaluation system, and (3) a reward and punishment systemThe inherent inefficiency of organizational control systems as compared to alienability means firms cannot survive unless they provide other offsetting advantages such as economies of scale, scope or riskbearing.
TL;DR: The chapter presents a number of studies that illustrate some of the interplay between linguistic inputs and extralinguistic knowledge and suggests a general orientation toward the problem of linguistic comprehension that places it squarely within the domain of cognitive psychology, and that generates questions for future research.
Abstract: Publisher Summary This chapter discusses some of the contributions made by listeners while comprehending and remembering. The ability to understand linguistic symbols is based not only on the comprehender's knowledge of his language but also on his general knowledge of the world. Much of the extralinguistic knowledge affecting comprehension and memory may come from visually presented information. The chapter presents a number of studies that illustrate some of the interplay between linguistic inputs and extralinguistic knowledge. It highlights various implications of these studies with respect to the problem of characterizing the thought processes involved in comprehending language, and of characterizing the role of comprehension factors in learning and memory. The results of the studies reported do not dictate a detailed model of comprehension, but they suggest a general orientation toward the problem of linguistic comprehension that places it squarely within the domain of cognitive psychology, and that generates questions for future research. The aspects of the comprehension process may involve mental operations on knowledge structures and the realization of the implications of these operations. Information about the consequences of such operations—rather than information only about the input itself—may be necessary for comprehending subsequent inputs and may be an important part of what is available in memory tasks.