About: Formal fallacy is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 170 publications have been published within this topic receiving 5416 citations. The topic is also known as: Non sequitur.
TL;DR: The conjunction rule as mentioned in this paper states that the probability of a conjunction cannot exceed the probabilities of its constituents, P (A) and P (B), because the extension (or the possibility set) of the conjunction is included in the extension of their constituents.
Abstract: Perhaps the simplest and the most basic qualitative law of probability is the conjunction rule: The probability of a conjunction, P (A&B) cannot exceed the probabilities of its constituents, P (A) and P (B), because the extension (or the possibility set) of the conjunction is included in the extension of its constituents. Judgments under uncertainty, however, are often mediated by intuitive heuristics that are not bound by the conjunction rule. A conjunction can be more representative than one of its constituents, and instances of a specific category can be easier to imagine or to retrieve than instances of a more inclusive category. The representativeness and availability heuristics therefore can make a conjunction appear more probable than one of its constituents. This phenomenon is demonstrated in a variety of contexts including estimation of word frequency, personality judgment, medical prognosis, decision under risk, suspicion of criminal acts, and political forecasting. Systematic violations of the conjunction rule are observed in judgments of lay people and of experts in both between-subjects and within-subjects comparisons. Alternative interpretations of the conjunction fallacy are discussed and attempts to combat it are explored.
TL;DR: In this paper, a confirmation-theoretic account of the conjunction effect has been proposed, which is shown to be robust to various alternative ways of measuring degrees of confirmation in conjunction problems.
Abstract: The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Despite extensive inquiry, however, the attempt of providing a satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proven challenging. Here, we elaborate the suggestion (first discussed by Sides et al., 2001) that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious probability judgments experimentally observed are typically guided by sound assessments of confirmation relations, meant in terms of contemporary Bayesian confirmation theory. Our main formal result is a confirmation-theoretic account of the conjuntion fallacy which is proven robust (i.e., not depending on various alternative ways of measuring degrees of confirmation). The proposed analysis is shown distinct from contentions that the conjunction effect is in fact not a fallacy and is compared with major competing explanations of the phenomenon, including earlier references to a confirmation-theoretic account.
TL;DR: The group fallacy as mentioned in this paper consists in substituting the group for the individual as a principle of explanation, and the group concept may be phrased in either psychological or purely social terms.
Abstract: The manner of thinking in terms of the obsolete crowd-mind theory still persists. Speaking in terms of collectivity is alluring; but it is description, not explanation. Social organism metaphors, group-mind theories, and the like never lead beyond themselves, nor serve to reveal causation. The group fallacy defined.-This fallacy consists in substituting the group for the individual as a principle of explanation. The group concept may be phrased in either psychological or "purely social" terms. Illustrations are drawn from the following fields. I. Social conflict. Freudian repression and dissociation are terms applicable only to individuals. There is a wide divergence of meaning between mental conflict and social conflict. 2. Revolution. Here the fallacy is expressed in such group terms as immobility of society and breakdown of "social habits." These terms are merely descriptive, drawing attention away from the truly causal behavior of individuals. 3. The theory of the super-organic. The concept of a causa...
TL;DR: The Overlooked Strategy in Practice: Moral Discourse 7.5.1 as discussed by the authors The Problem of Representational Fallacy: Or How Not to do Ontology 4.1.
Abstract: Introduction 1. Metaphysics and the Origins of the Representational Fallacy 2. A New Metaphysical Strategy: Lessons Learned from the Philosophy of Time 3. The Representational Fallacy: Or How Not to do Ontology 4. The Relationship Between Language and Reality 5. The Methodological Map 6. The Overlooked Strategy in Practice: Moral Discourse 7. Some Further Applications of the Overlooked Strategy