Flashbulb memory

Abstract: We have reviewed research on the effects of stress on LTP in the hippocampus, amygdala and prefrontal cortex (PFC) and present new findings which provide insight into how the attention and memory-related functions of these structures are influenced by strong emotionality. We have incorporated the stress-LTP findings into our “temporal dynamics” model, which provides a framework for understanding the neurobiological basis of flashbulb and traumatic memories, as well as stress-induced amnesia. An important feature of the model is the idea that endogenous mechanisms of plasticity in the hippocampus and amygdala are rapidly activated for a relatively short period of time by a strong emotional learning experience. Following this activational period, both structures undergo a state in which the induction of new plasticity is suppressed, which facilitates the memory consolidation process. We further propose that with the onset of strong emotionality, the hippocampus rapidly shifts from a “configural/cognitive map” mode to a “flashbulb memory” mode, which underlies the long-lasting, but fragmented, nature of traumatic memories. Finally, we have speculated on the significance of stress-LTP interactions in the context of the Yerkes-Dodson Law, a well-cited, but misunderstood, century-old principle which states that the relationship between arousal and behavioral performance can be linear or curvilinear, depending on the difficulty of the task.

Abstract: Episodic memory is reconceived as a memory system that retains highly detailed sensory perceptual knowledge of recent experience over retention intervals measured in minutes and hours. Episodic knowledge has yet to be integrated with the autobiographical memory knowledge base and so takes as its context or referent the immediate past of the experiencing self (or the 'I'). When recalled it can be accessed independently of content and is recollectively experienced. Autobiographical memory, in contrast, retains knowledge over retention intervals measured in weeks, months, years, decades and across the life span. Autobiographical knowledge represents the experienced self (or the 'me'), is always accessed by its content and, when accessed, does not necessarily give rise to recollective experience. Instead, recollective experience occurs when autobiographical knowledge retains access to associated episodic memories. In this reworking of the 'episodic memory' concept autobiographical memory provides the instantiating context for sensory-perceptual episodic memory.

Abstract: The purpose of this chapter is ( a ) to describe the forms of autobiographical memory and contrast them with other forms of memory; ( b ) to give a theoretical account of autobiographical memory in terms of the self; (c) to argue for the importance of phenomenal reports in the study of autobiographical memory; ( d ) to examine some of the experimental findings on autobiographical memory in the context of this analysis; ( e ) to give a detailed account of personal memory, one of the important forms of autobiographical memory; and ( f ) to outline a partially reconstructive view of personal memory. The problem The study of autobiographical memory is one of the least well-developed areas in the study of human memory; there is considerable divergence both in what is being investigated and in the terminology used to describe what is being investigated. There is still much work to be done in describing and classifying the basic phenomena in the area. In order to gain an immediate impression of the complexities involved in studying this topic, I want to examine a concrete example. Currently the most popular technique for studying autobiographical memory is a method developed by Sir Francis Galton (1879 a , 1879 b ) in which the subject is presented with a word and asked to find a memory related to that word. This simple task nicely reveals one of the major problems that will be addressed in this chapter – the multiple forms of autobiographical and non-autobiographical memory.

Abstract: On September 12, 2001, 54 Duke students recorded their memory of first hearing about the terrorist attacks of September 11 and of a recent everyday event. They were tested again either 1, 6, or 32 weeks later. Consistency for the flashbulb and everyday memories did not differ, in both cases declining over time. However, ratings of vividness, recollection, and belief in the accuracy of memory declined only for everyday memories. Initial visceral emotion ratings correlated with later belief in accuracy, but not consistency, for flashbulb memories. Initial visceral emotion ratings predicted later posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms. Flashbulb memories are not special in their accuracy, as previously claimed, but only in their perceived accuracy.