TL;DR: In the United Kingdom, both Scot- land and Wales have opted under the Blair government for their own regional parliaments and in Italy the movement toward decentralization has gone so far as to encompass a serious proposal for the separation of the nation into two in-dependent countries as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: vogue. Both in the industrialized and in the developing world, nations are turning to devolution to improve the per- formance of their public sectors. In the United States, the central government has turned back significant portions of federal authority to the states for a wide range of major programs, including wel- fare, Medicaid, legal services, housing, and job training. The hope is that state and local governments, being closer to the people, will be more responsive to the particular preferences of their con- stituencies and will be able to find new and better ways to provide these ser- vices. In the United Kingdom, both Scot- land and Wales have opted under the Blair government for their own regional parliaments. And in Italy the movement toward decentralization has gone so far as to encompass a serious proposal for the separation of the nation into two in- dependent countries. In the developing world, we likewise see widespread inter- est in fiscal decentralization with the ob- jective of breaking the grip of central planning that, in the view of many, has failed to bring these nations onto a path of self-sustaining growth. But the proper goal of restructuring the public sector cannot simply be de- centralization. The public sector in nearly all countries consists of several different levels. The basic issue is one of aligning responsibilities and fiscal in- struments with the proper levels of gov- ernment. As Alexis de Toqueville ob- served more than a centuty ago, "The federal system was created with the in- tention of combining the different ad- vantages which result from the magni- tude and the littleness of nations" (1980, v. I, p. 163). But to realize these "dif- ferent advantages," we need to under- stand which functions and instruments are best centralized and which are best placed in the sphere of decentralized levels of government. This is the sub- ject matter of fiscal federalism. As a subfield of public finance, fiscal feder- alism addresses the vertical structure of the public sector. It explores, both in normative and positive terms, the roles of the different levels of government and the ways in which they relate to one another through such instruments as intergovernmental grants.2
TL;DR: In this paper, the empirical regularities relating fiscal policy variables, the level of development and the rate of growth are described, and they employ historical data, recent cross-section data, and newly constructed public investment series.
Abstract: This paper describes the empirical regularities relating fiscal policy variables, the level of development and the rate of growth. We employ historical data, recent cross-section data, and newly constructed public investment series. Our main findings are: (i) there is a strong association between the development level and the fiscal structure: poor countries rely heavily on international trade taxes, while income taxes are only important in developed economies; (ii) fiscal policy is influenced by the scale of the economy, measured by its population; (iii) investment in transport and communication is consistently correlated with growth while the effects of taxation are difficult to isolate empirically.
TL;DR: A second-generation theory of fiscal federalism is emerging that provides new insights into the structure and working of federal systems and its implications for the design of fiscal institutions as discussed by the authors...
Abstract: Drawing on a wide range of literature and ideas, a new “second-generation theory of fiscal federalism” is emerging that provides new insights into the structure and working of federal systems. After a restatement and review of the first-generation theory, this paper surveys this new body of work and offers some thoughts on the ways in which it is extending our understanding of fiscal federalism and on its implications for the design of fiscal institutions.
TL;DR: In this paper, the dynamics of state taxes and spending during the late 1980s, when regional economic downturns and increased expenditure demands led to substantial state budget deficits, were explored, and more restrictive state fiscal institutions, such as "no-deficit-carryover" rules and tax and expenditure limitations, are correlated with more rapid fiscal adjustment to unexpected deficits.
Abstract: This paper explores the dynamics of state taxes and spending during the late 1980s, when regional economic downturns and increased expenditure demands led to substantial state budget deficits. More restrictive state fiscal institutions, such as "no-deficit-carryover" rules and tax and expenditure limitations, are correlated with more rapid fiscal adjustment to unexpected deficits. Political factors are also important. When a single party controls the state house and the governorship, deficit adjustment is much faster than when party control is divided. In gubernatorial election years, tax increases and spending cuts are both significantly smaller than at other times.