Fire support

Abstract: This article was solicited from the author by the editor in chief of Military Review subsequent to a briefing the author presented to the Information Operations Symposium II held at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on 15 December 2005. The text is an edited version of a transcript from that briefing. It includes additional material and clarification of facts and events provided by the author. DUTY IN IRAQ has a way of debunking myths and countering Ivory Tower theories with hard facts on the ground. I admit that while I was preparing to serve in Iraq as a brigade commander, I was among the skeptics who doubted the value of integrating information operations (IO) into my concept of operations. Most of the officers on my combat team shared my doubts about the relative importance of information operations. Of course, in current Army literature there is a great deal of discussion about IO theory. There is significantly less practical information, however, that details how theory can be effectively translated into practice by tactical units. My purpose in writing this article is to provide commanders the insights I gleaned from my experience. Soon after taking command of my brigade, I quickly discovered that IO was going to be one of the two most vital tools (along with human intelligence) I would need to be successful in a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. COIN operations meant competing daily to favorably influence the perceptions of the Iraqi population in our area of operations (AO). I quickly concluded that, without IO, I could not hope to shape and set conditions for my battalions or my Soldiers to be successful. It certainly did not take long to discover that the traditional tools in my military kit bag were insufficient to successfully compete in this new operational environment. As a brigade commander, I was somewhat surprised to find myself spending 70 percent of my time working and managing my intelligence and IO systems and a relatively small amount of my time directly involved with the traditional maneuver and fire support activities. This was a paradigm shift for me. The reality I confronted was far different from what I had professionally prepared for over a lifetime of conventional training and experience. Background My brigade, the 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), was part of the 1st Armored Division. For the first 12 months in Iraq, we were task organized in Baghdad with up to eight battalions, roughly 5,000 strong, all trained for conventional combat. The BCT consisted of two mechanized infantry battalions, a cavalry squadron, an armor battalion, a field artillery battalion, an engineer battalion, a support battalion, and a military police battalion. At headquarters were staff enablers such as psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs (CA) detachments. At one point, my task organization also included 12 U.S. Army National Guard or Reserve Component companies. My brigade's AO covered roughly 400 square kilometers and encompassed 2 of the 9 major districts in Baghdad: Karkh and Karada. In those 2 heavily populated and congested districts lived between 700,000 to a million citizens. The area contained at least 72 mosques and churches. In the northwest part of our AO, the population was predominantly Sunni. This area also contained a small neighborhood called Kaddamiya, where Saddam Hussein had grown up. Not surprisingly, that community was a bastion of staunchly pro-Baath sentiment and was steadfastly loyal to Saddam. Such demographic factors made that part of our AO particularly volatile and problematic. In contrast, our area also contained the Karada district, one of the most affluent parts of the city. Three universities are located there, Baghdad University being at the very southeastern tip. Many Western-trained and educated elites live in Karada, and many of Baghdad's banks and headquarters for major businesses are there. The population in this area is characteristically more secular in its views and somewhat more receptive to outside ideas and influence. …

Abstract: : The study develops simplified manual rules and procedures for management of the airspace over a division's tactical operational area. The study presents manual procedures for managing and coordinating the utilization of this airspace by Army ground fire support systems, air defense systems, Army aviation and the aircraft of other Services in a mid-intensity conflict in a European environment during the 1970-1972 time frame. (Author)

Abstract: : This study uses a comparative analysis of the Malayan Emergency, the American experience in Vietnam, and Operation Iraqi Freedom to examine the role and effectiveness of artillery units in complex counterinsurgency environments Through this analysis, four factors emerge which impact the employment of artillery units: the counterinsurgency effort's requirement for indirect fires, constraints and limitations on indirect fires, the counterinsurgency effort's force organization, and the conversion cost of non-standard roles for artillery units In conclusion, the study offers five broadly descriptive fundamentals for employing artillery units in a counterinsurgency environment: invest in tactical leadership, exploit lessons learned, support the operational approach and strategic framework, maintain a pragmatic fire support capability, and minimize collateral damage Finally, the study examines the role of education for leaders in a counterinsurgency, and its influence on these imperative fundamentals

Abstract: The ultimate goal is simple: give the battlefield commander access to all the information needed to win the war. And give it to him when he wants it and how he wants it. GENERAL COLIN L. POWELL (1) 1 Interoperability General Powell's ambitious vision statement, in July 1992, heralded a new era for interoperability: an era of budget cuts, multinational services, and public clamor for congressional efficiency. At the same time, specialized, regionally based conflicts took the place of vast ocean and huge land-mass battlefields. Interoperability has many facets. Its definition encompasses two radios talking to each other, an Ocean Venture exercise, hardware and software matching, and cross-service training. It is "equipment, procedures, doctrine, and training" and "the ability of people, organizations, and equipment to operate together effectively." (2) During the Storm Desert Storm typified the new era with its successful melding of many units from many services and many countries. But a lack of interoperability caused enough tactical problems to give any seasoned observer pause. "Communications for artillery fire support were a particular problem because the (radio) equipment lacked sufficient range or frequencies," according to one Marine General. Some platoon leaders could not talk on the radio to squad leaders "a mere 75 feet away," (3) said one Army battalion Commander. These problems were part of a broader category including hardware and software systems, functions, and processes, all comprising an element of [C.sup.4]I system's interoperability, or the compatibility of communications hardware, as formulated by Dr. Stuart Starr (see below). Policy decisions on role assignments were to blame for other interoperability breakdowns. The Gulf anti-air warfare ships, for example, could not exchange data directly with the on-station E-3As (airborne warning and control systems) assigned to cover the land-related portion of the Kuwaiti theater. In contrast, the Gulf-based ships received airborne early-warning data from shore-based Marine Corps tactical air operation and command centers. These circumstances hampered early detection and tracking efforts in that target-rich domain. (4) Admittedly, this illustration is more in the domain of Command and Control wherein a Commander "assigns forces in the accomplishment of a mission." But whenever time is a factor, interoperability is, too. In a similar sense, problems of operating procedure were associated with the Air Tasking Order (ATO). The Gulf ATO was an intricate, computerized, daily list of all air assets in a Joint Task Force (JTF) environment (see Appendix A for a facsimile). From the ATO, strike mission planners could obtain information about numbers of missions, squadrons assigned, targets, restricted operating zones, low-level transit routes, drop/landing/extraction zones, and air refueling areas. It did not specify tactics or flight plans. During Desert Storm ATO was an unusually effective system yet not without imperfections. From one Naval officer's vantage point, while the Air Force considers the ATO "the playbook for the vastly successful Air Bowl ... We in the surface Navy, from our more parochial perspective, remember it simply as the 300-page, 'Personal For,' flash-precedence, randomly sorted message, rarely received before the middle of the day to which it applied. The sheer bulk of the document implies that the Air Force--whose own composers designed it--expected a lot more people around who could make sense of it. The JFACC's (Joint Force Air Component Commander) six-pound Air Tasking Order had to be picked up in Riyadh at 0200, delivered to the carrier, and transferred to the surface ships (usually a three to four hour mission). The people who published this tome probably never envisioned that a couple of junior enlisted air controllers on a three-week caffeine high in the back of a combat information center would have to flip through this six-pound chunk of fanfold paper on their knees to find the whereabouts of a tanker for their combat air patrol. …