Expressivism

Abstract: Classic introduction to objectives and methods of schools of empiricism and linguistic analysis, especially of the logical positivism derived from the Vienna Circle, [i]Language, Truth, and Logic[/i] is a work of philosophy by Alfred Jules Ayer, published in 1936 when Ayer was only 26 (though it was in fact completed by age 24). It was crucial in bringing some of the ideas of the Vienna Circle and the logical empiricists to the attention of the English-speaking world. – This book defines, explains, and argues for the verification principle of logical positivism, sometimes referred to as the "criterion of significance" or "criterion of meaning". It explains how the principle of verifiability may be applied to the problems of philosophy. – Eight chapters: – I. The Elimination of Metaphysics; – II. The Function of Philosophy; – III. The Nature of Philosophical Analysis; – IV. The [i]A Priori[/i]; – V. Truth and Probability; – VI. Critique of Ethics and Theology; – VII. The Self and the Common World; – VIII. Solutions of Outstanding Philosophical Disputes.� M.-M. V.

Abstract: 1. Introduction: Reasons Fundamentalism 2. Metaphysical Objections 3. Motivation and the Appeal of Expressivism 4. Epistemology and Determinateness 5. Reasons and their Strength Bibliography Index

Abstract: David Copp: Introduction: Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics PART I: Meta-Ethics 1: Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill: Moral Realism 2: Philip Quinn, University of Notre Dame: Theological Voluntarism 3: Nick Sturgeon, Cornell University: Ethical Naturalism 4: Jonathan Dancy, University of Reading and University of Texas at Austin: Non-Naturalism 5: Simon Blackburn, University of Cambridge: Anti-Realist Expressivism and Quasi-Realism 6: Philip Kitcher, Columbia University: Biology and Ethics 7: Justin D'Arms, The Ohio State University, and Dan Jacobson, Bowling Green State University: Sensibility Theory and Projectivism 8: Michael Slote, University of Miami: Moral Sentimentalism and Moral Psychology 9: Jamie Dreier, Brown University: Moral Relativism and Moral Nihilism 10: Peter Railton, University of Michigan: Human Theory of Practical Rationality 11: Stephen Darwall, University of Michigan: Morality and Practical Reason: A Kantian Approach 12: John Martin Fischer, University of California, Riverside : Free Will and Moral Responsibility PART II: Normative Ethical Theory 13: Thomas Hurka, University of Toronto: Value Theory 14: David Brink, University of California, San Diego and University of San Diego Law School: Some Forms and Limits of Consequentialism 15: David McNaughton, Florida State University, and Piers Rawling, Florida State University: Deontology 16: Hillel Steiner, University of Manchester and British Academy: Moral Rights 17: Thomas E Hill, Jr, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill: Kantian Normative Ethics 18: Julia Annas, University of Arizona: Virtue Ethics 19: Virginia Held, City University of New York, Graduate School: The Ethics of Care 20: Mark Lance, Georgetown University, and Margaret Little, Georgetown University: Particularism and Anti-Theory 21: Michael DePaul, University of Notre Dame: Intuitions in Moral Inquiry 22: Gerald Dworkin, University of California, Davis: Theory, Practice, and Moral Reasoning

Abstract: This volume collects together some influential essays in which Simon Blackburn explores one of the most profound and fertile of philosophical problems: the way in which our judgements relate to the world. This debate has centered on realism, or the view that what we say is validated by the way things stand in the world, and a variety of oppositions to it. Prominent among the latter are expressive and projective theories, but also a relaxed pluralism that discourages the view that there are substantial issues at stake. The figure of the 'quasi-realist' dramatizes the difficulty of conducting these debates. Typically philosophers thinking of themselves as realists will believe that they alone can give a proper or literal account of some of our attachments - to truth, to facts, to the independent world, to knowledge, and to certainty. The quasi-realist challenge, developed by Blackburn in this volume, is that we can have those attachments without any metaphysic that deserves calling realism, so that the metaphysical picture that goes with our practices is quite idle. The cases treated here include the theory of value, of knowledge, modality, probability, causation, intentionality and rule-following, and explanation. A substantial new introduction has been added, drawing together some of the central themes. The essays articulate a fresh alternative to a primitive realist/anti-realist opposition, and their cumulative effect is to yield a new appreciation of the delicacy of the debate in these central areas.