Endoxa

Abstract: Introduction 1. The endoxa: eros and the good life 2. Socrates' speech: the nature of eros 3. Socrates' speech: the aims of eros 4. Socrates' speech: the activity of eros 5. Socrates' speech: concern for others 6. 'Nothing to do with human affairs?' Alcibiades' response to Socrates 7. Shadow lovers Conclusion

Abstract: Several of the so-called “fallacies” in Aristotle are not in fact mistaken inference-types, but mistakes or breaches of rules in the questioning games which were practiced in the Academy and in the Lyceum. Hence the entire Aristotelian theory of “fallacies” ought to be studied by reference to the author's interrogative model of inquiry, based on his theory of questions and answers, rather than as a part of the theory of inference. Most of the “fallacies” mentioned by Aristotle can in fact be diagnosed by means of the interrogative model, including petitio principii, multiple questions, “babbling’, etc., and so can Aristotle's alleged anticipation of the fallacy of argumentum ad hominem. The entire Aristotelian conception of inquiry is an interrogative one. Deductive conclusions caught Aristotle's attention in the form of answers that every rational interlocutor must give, assuming only his own earlier answers. Several features of Aristotle's methodology can be understood by means of the interrogative model, including the role of endoxa in it. Theoretically, there is also considerable leeway as to whether “fallacies” are conceived of as mistakes in questioning or as breaches of the rules that govern questioning games.

Abstract: There is now wide acceptance of the following pair of views: (1) Aristot elian dialectic was a technique of arguing from 'common beliefs', 'ac cepted opinions', or 'reputable views'; and (2) Aristotle thought that dialectic provided the way to the first principles of the sciences, or at any rate of some of them.11 want to argue that each of these is at best a half-truth. To begin with, although Aristotle does say that dialectical arguments are from endoxa, emphasizing this feature as its defining characteristic omits others that are equally important and so distorts our conception of dialectic and its powers. Next, one of these distortions is that if we do not take account of the full picture of dialectic and of Aristotle's specific purposes in the Topics, we will not understand what the endoxa are and why they are important to him. Finally, Topics 1.2, the text in which Irwin and others see Aristotle's declaration that dialectic 'has a road to the first principles of all disciplines', actually makes no such claim. If my arguments are sound, then a good deal of recent work on Aristotle at least needs reconsideration.