TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on applications where the latency of the computation should be minimized, i.e., the time from submitting the query until receiving the outcome of the computations should be as small as possible.
Abstract: Secure outsourcing of computation to an untrusted (cloud) service provider is becoming more and more important. Pure cryptographic solutions based on fully homomorphic and verifiable encryption, recently proposed, are promising but suffer from very high latency. Other proposals perform the whole computation on tamper-proof hardware and usually suffer from the the same problem. Trusted computing (TC) is another promising approach that uses trusted software and hardware components on computing platforms to provide useful mechanisms such as attestation allowing the data owner to verify the integrity of the cloud and its computation. However, on the one hand these solutions require trust in hardware (CPU, trusted computing modules) that are under the physical control of the cloud provider, and on the other hand they still have to face the challenge of run-time attestation.
In this paper we focus on applications where the latency of the computation should be minimized, i.e., the time from submitting the query until receiving the outcome of the computation should be as small as possible. To achieve this we show how to combine a trusted hardware token (e.g., a cryptographic coprocessor or provided by the customer) with Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) to compute arbitrary functions on secret (encrypted) data where the computation leaks no information and is verifiable. The token is used in the setup phase only whereas in the time-critical online phase the cloud computes the encrypted function on encrypted data using symmetric encryption primitives only and without any interaction with other entities.
TL;DR: proxy signature scheme is applied to the mobile agent system to enhance security and eciency and a one-time proxy signature scheme to limit the signing power of the server is suggested.
Abstract: As an application for electronic commerce, a mobile agent is now used to search for special products or services and is executed for a specific job designated by a customer in the server's environment on behalf of a customer. On the way of performing its role, a mobile agent can be vulnerable to several cryptographic attacks. These attacks can be more serious when done by malicious servers. Among schemes to resolve this problem, the concept of encrypted function for secret computation was proposed in (ST97, KBC00). However, schemes that employ such encrypted functions enforce the server(host) to execute the functions of customer before verifying the mobile codes even in the case that the codes are maliciously modified. In this paper, we apply proxy signature scheme to the mobile agent system to enhance security and eciency. Also, we suggest one-time proxy signature scheme to limit the signing power of the server.
TL;DR: The photon-counting imaging technique is applied to the multifactor encrypted function so that a sparse phase-only distribution is generated for the encrypted data, increasing the security level of the overall process.
Abstract: The multifactor optical encryption authentication method [Opt. Lett., 31 721-3 (2006)] reinforces optical security by allowing the simultaneous authentication of up to four factors. In this work, the photon-counting imaging technique is applied to the multifactor encrypted function so that a sparse phase-only distribution is generated for the encrypted data. The integration of both techniques permits an increased capacity for signal hiding with simultaneous data reduction for better fulfilling the general requirements of protection, storage and transmission. Cryptanalysis of the proposed method is carried out in terms of chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext attacks. Although the multifactor authentication process is not substantially altered by those attacks, its integration with the photon-counting imaging technique prevents from possible partial disclosure of any encrypted factor, thus increasing the security level of the overall process. Numerical experiments and results are provided and discussed.
TL;DR: In this article, a client queries a set of encrypted data instances located at a server with a query attribute of the client, and the client decrypts the ciphertext from the set of ciphertexts based on a distance function of the query attribute and the data instance attribute to produce the representation and accesses the corresponding data instance using the representation.
Abstract: A client queries a set of encrypted data instances located at a server with a query attribute of the client. The set of encrypted data instances is associated with a set of ciphertexts, wherein a ciphertext is an encrypted function of a representation of a corresponding data instance and a data instance attribute extracted from the corresponding data instance. The client decrypts the ciphertext from the set of ciphertexts based on a distance function of the query attribute and the data instance attribute to produce the representation, and accesses the corresponding data instance using the representation.
TL;DR: In this article, authentication data is communicated and checked between a transponder device and a reader unit (2) of a vehicle in order to authorise access to the vehicle.
Abstract: The method enables authentication data to be communicated and checked between a transponder device ( 1 ) and a reader unit ( 2 ) of a vehicle in order to authorise access to the vehicle. The device includes a logic circuit ( 11 ), a non-volatile memory ( 13 ), an encryption and/or decryption circuit ( 12 ) and a first transmission and reception module ( 14, 16 ) of data signals (S D ). The reader unit includes a microprocessor unit ( 21 ), a memory ( 22 ), a random number generator ( 24 ) and a second module ( 23, 25 ) for transmitting and receiving data signals (S D ). A random number (RN 1 ) generated in the reader unit is transmitted with a first encrypted function obtained using the random number and a secret key. The transponder device receives the random number and the first encrypted function. A new first encrypted function is calculated in the transponder device using a secret key identical to the secret key of the reader unit. This new first function is compared with the first received encrypted function. A second encrypted function is also calculated in the transponder device in order to be transmitted to the reader unit solely if the new first encrypted function is equal to the first received encrypted function. The validity of the second encrypted function is checked in the reader unit in order to authorize access to the vehicle. The number of bits of the random number, of the first and second encrypted functions can be configured in the transponder device and/or in the reader unit with a determined length.