TL;DR: In this paper, the authors report data on terms and conditions of share-cropping contracts collected in 1975-6 from 334 randomly chosen villages in four states in India, and suggest some evidence of higher crop share for the tenant positively associated with higher yielding varieties of grains and negatively with cost sharing by the landlord.
Abstract: This paper reports data on terms and conditions of share‐cropping contracts collected in 1975–6 from 334 randomly chosen villages in four states in India. Among other things, it suggests some evidence of higher crop share for the tenant positively associated with higher‐yielding varieties of grains and negatively with cost‐sharing by the landlord. Unpaid and obligatory service by the tenant for the landlord is quite uncommon; even less common is the phenomenon of a tenant being tied to a particular landlord. The landlord quite often gives production loans to the tenant, shares in costs of seeds, fertilizers, etc., participates in decision‐making about the use of these inputs and in general takes a lot of interest in productive investments on the tenant farm, quite contrary to the traditional image of rentier or usurious landlords associated with “semi‐feudalism”
TL;DR: In this article, the authors evaluate the profitability and risk efficiency of no-till management in Arkansas rice production from both the perspective of the tenant and the landlord using simulation and stochastic efficiency with respect to a function.
Abstract: Rice is a major cash crop for eastern Arkansas and generally involves intensive cultivation. Sediment is the primary pollutant identified for most eastern Arkansas waterways, and conservation practices like no-till are commonly recommended as remedial mechanisms. The profitability of no-till rice has been investigated, but the main emphasis has been on comparing mean returns of no-till to conventional till without consideration for return variability. Profitability in these studies is also evaluated from the prospective of the producer only, despite the fact that most cropland is owned by someone other than the producer. This study evaluates the profitability and risk efficiency of no-till management in Arkansas rice production from both the perspective of the tenant and the landlord using simulation and stochastic efficiency with respect to a function. Crop yields and prices are simulated for a typical two-year rice-soybean rotation, and tenant and landlord net return distributions are constructed for popular rental arrangements used in eastern Arkansas rice production. The results indicate that both the tenant and the landlord can benefit monetarily from no-till management. Risk-neutral and risk-averse tenants would both benefit from no-till management as no-till increases mean (expected) returns for risk-neutral tenants and results in large risk premiums over conventional till for risk-averse tenants. Risk-neutral landlords would be indifferent between either no-till or conventional till management because mean returns are essentially the same for both tillage methods. Risk-averse landlords would have a slight preference for no-till, since no-till risk premiums tend to be positive with increasing levels of risk aversion. However, no-till risk premiums are modest for risk-averse landlords, implying that risk would play less of a role for the landlord than for the tenant when considering the use of no-till management on rented land.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined how different lease structures affect the behavioural and attitudinal characteristics of landlords and tenants including: landlord/tenant perceptions of a lease, the operation and maintenance procedures, landlord-tenant relationship, and ultimately, overall satisfaction.
Abstract: The commercial property market in New Zealand is characterized by two standard but distinct lease environments. In Auckland, the commercial core of the economy, net leases dominate, whereas in Wellington, the political capital, gross leases are dominant. These different lease environments have the potential to strongly influence the nature of landlord and tenant relationships in these markets. Using in-depth interviews with key industry personnel, this study examines the perceptions, behaviours, experiences and key issues confronting landlords and tenants under net and gross leases. The paper examines how different lease structures affect the behavioural and attitudinal characteristics of landlords and tenants including: landlord/tenant perceptions of a lease, the operation and maintenance procedures, landlord-tenant relationship, and ultimately, overall satisfaction.
TL;DR: In this article, a simple model of the housing rental relationship capturing the impact which both landlord and tenant have on housing quality is developed, showing that, because of the moral hazard problem, the non-co-operative equilibrium of the model is inefficient in that, in the absence of any regulation, both parties invest too little in maintaining the quality of the unit.
Abstract: Court decisions in the 1970s dramatically changed the distribution of legal rights in the landlord-tenant relationship in seeking to improve the welfare of tenants, thought to be at a disadvantage in their search for housing Both landlords and tenants contribute to the quality of services but the fact that the rights of ownership and use are separated prevents both parties from fully internalising the benefits of their efforts The paper develops a simple model of the housing rental relationship capturing the impact which both landlord and tenant have on housing quality It shows that, because of the moral hazard problem, the non-co-operative equilibrium of the model is inefficient in that, in the absence of any regulation, both parties invest too little in maintaining the quality of the unit The model, assessing the relationship between the two parties, indicates that (i) increased landlord maintenance raises tenant utility and lowers landlord profits, (ii) the joint benefits of landlords and tenants f
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the contract forms for optimal tenant protection in rental-land and rental-housing agreements and show that the optimal contract has a fixed-term tenant protection for both contracts.