Topic
Emanationism
About: Emanationism is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 7 publications have been published within this topic receiving 81 citations. The topic is also known as: doctrine of emanation.
Papers
Journal Article•
TL;DR: Cooper as discussed by the authors presents a survey of the philosophical theology of panentheism from Plato and Plotinus to Pannenberg and Boff and concludes that "the difference between the two has resulted in a variety of differing solutions to key theological questions such as Theology Proper (the existence and nature of God); immanence and transcendence; divine passion and passivity; creationism and emanationism; cosmology and anthropology; Christology and Pneumatology; incarnation and hypostatization; the temporality and eternity of God and humans; eschatology
Abstract: PANENTHEISM, THE OTHER GOD OF THE PHILOSOPHERS, FROM PLATO TO THE PRESENT. John W. Cooper. Grand Rapids, ML Baker Academic Press, 2006. Cloth. Pp. 359, npi. Reviewed by J. Harold Ellens. If Professor John W. Cooper of Calvin Theological Seminary had not written this book, someone would urgently need to do so. This is an analytic survey of the philosophical theology of Panentheism from Plato and Plotinus to Pannenberg and Boff. It is an awesome tour de in scholarship on the History of Ideas, thoroughly comprehensive, highly readable, felicitous in its description of the centuries of the human truth-quest, and gracious in its assessment of every scholar and scholarly work treated. This currency of this book will endure for at least a century in its field. Every scholar who addresses the questions of orthodox theological tradition in the field of human faith and thought, and its variety of continuing contestants, will need to begin and end with Cooper's work. It has fourteen chapters and all of them except the last are profound. Just a simple last of his chapters reveals the depth and scope of this volume: (1) Panentheism, The Other God of the Philosophers; (2) Plato through Christian Neoplatonism; (3) Pantheism and Panentheism from Renaissance to Romanticism; (4) Schelling and Hegel; (5) Nineteenth-Century Panentheism; (6) Teilhard's Christocentric Panentheism; (7) Process Theology; (8) Tillch's Existentialism; (9) Twentieth Century Diversity; Moltmann; Pannenberg; Liberation and Ecological Theologies; (10) Panentheism in Theological Cosmology; and finally, (11) Why Cooper is not a Panentheist. Cooper defines Panentheism as a philosophical theology that emphasizes some form of the relationship of God and creation involving the notion of God infusing the material world with God's self, nature, and spirit; thereby explaining the nature and existence of both God and the material/spiritual world. He sets forth carefully the radical distinction between this Panentheistic perspective and Augustinianism. The former he sees as derived from Christian Neo-Platonism, the latter from the objective creationism promoted by Aurelius Augustine. Neo-Platonism was shaped by the thought of Plato, particularly his Timaeus, and the Plotinus-Proclus-Porphyry tradition, while the Augustinian tradition has generally held to a rather literal orthodox or creedal Christianity. The difference between the two has resulted in a variety of differing solutions to key theological questions such as Theology Proper (the existence and nature of God); immanence and transcendence; divine passion and passivity; creationism and emanationism; cosmology and anthropology; Christology and Pneumatology; incarnation and hypostatization; the temporality and eternity of God and humans; eschatology; and the like. Cooper not only wades through the deepest and most turbulent waters in this philosophical and theological debate, but makes the reader feel like anyone can swim in them enjoyably. This author's approach to every faith tradition, philosophical school, form of spirituality, and innovative or nuanced thought and worldview, is consistently congenial, affirming, and appreciative of the motives and integrity of the quest engaged in by the philosophers and theologians he analyzes. Cooper is never condescending, argumentative, apologetic, insensitive, or lacking in grace. Clearly he has a distinctive ability to enter into the inner spirit of the persons and worldviews he analyzes and genuinely appreciate their quest and achievements from the inside. He has a gentle way of laying the dynamic so that as little damage as possible is done to the foundations, and he takes as constructive a view as possible of the superstructure of each ideology. Cooper points out that Plato offered two options for panentheistic thought. The first took the form of Plotinus' Great Chain of Being. "The One God generates the Mind, which generates the World-Soul, which generates the world, which exists in the World-Soul, which exists in the Mind, which exists in the One. …
51 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In the Enneads of Plotinus, Proclus and Proclus as discussed by the authors, Proclus used noun and verb forms of [unkeyable] to describe the activity of the One in relation to complex entities for the purpose of answering the question of how from the One, if it is such as we say it is, anything else, whether a multiplicity or a dyad or a number, came into existence, and why it did not on the contrary remain by itself, but such a great multiplicity flowed from it as that which is seen to exist in beings,
Abstract: ONE FREQUENTLY READS CASUAL REFERENCES to Neo-Platonic metaphysics as emanationist It is somewhat less common to find analyses of the term "emanation" so used In this paper I shall be concerned solely with Plotinus I hereby set aside all questions regarding any common denominator one might suppose between Plotinus and, say, Proclus There are several texts in the Enneads which employ noun and verb forms of [unkeyable] to describe the activity of the One in relation to complex entities For example, For the soul now knows that these things must be, but longs to answer the question repeatedly discussed also by the ancient philosophers, how from the One, if it is such as we say it is, anything else, whether a multiplicity or a dyad or a number, came into existence, and why it did not on the contrary remain by itself, but such a great multiplicity flowed [unkeyable] from it as that which is seen to exist in beings, but which we think it right to refer back to the One (5162-8)(1) This, we may say, is the first act of generation: the One, perfect because it seeks nothing, has nothing, and needs nothing, overflows [[unkeyable]], as it were, and its superabundance makes something other than itself (5215-10) The first remark I wish to make about these passages is the obvious one that to think of emanating or flowing in contrast to creating is to make a sort of category mistake For metaphors are not properly contrasted with technical terminology(2) If one wants convincing on this point, we need only recall that Aquinas sometimes uses the same metaphor in behalf of an explanation of creation, not in contrast to it(3) Conceding this, there is still the reasonable suspicion that some fundamental difference remains between Plotinus' metaphysics and a creation metaphysics such as that of Aquinas I conjecture that the reason for this suspicion is that Plotinus is supposed to be the faithful inheritor of the Parmenidean legacy which lays down the axiom that ex nihilo nihil fit Aquinas, however, understands creation as ex nihilo So it would seem just incorrect to construe the metaphors of emanation in a manner which would make Plotinus contradict that axiom This reasoning seems less cogent when we begin to explicate the term ex nihilo; for one thing Aquinas does not mean by creatio ex nihilo is temporal origin That God is the creator of all Aquinas believes he can demonstrate; that the world did not always exist is held by faith alone(4) Thus, the philosophical core of the notion of creation is casual dependence of being: Deus est causa universalis totius esse The proper effect of God's casual activity is the being of everything(5) Let us compare this with a text of Plotinus: But how is that One the principle of all things? Is it because as principle it keeps them in being, making each one of them to be? Yes, and because it caused them to be (531528-30)(6) A good question for proponents of emanationism in Plotinus to ask themselves at this point is how this passage and similar ones express a noncreationist metaphysics One proposal sometimes made in order to differentiate a non-creationist from a creationist metaphysics is that in the former creatures exist of necessity whereas in the latter they do not Indeed, Plotinus does say that what exists does so necessarily and not as a result of the discursive reasoning [unkeyable] of the [unkeyable] of all(7) By contrast, Aquinas says in many places that Deus produxit creaturas, non ex necessitate, sed per intellectum et voluntatem(8) Of course, Aquinas also says that God's knowledge is not discursive, and one of the reasons for this is that discursive knowing implies imperfection(9) But Plotinus, too, says that the One is perfect and that it acts according to its will [unkeyable](10) So, whereas Aquinas contrasts the alternatives of acting by necessity and acting by will (and intellect), Plotinus contrasts acting by necessity and acting on the basis of discursive reasoning …
39 citations
TL;DR: In this article, Insole argues that Kant's critical project was, in part, generated by an "irreducibly theological" problem: how can we coherently explain human freedom, given the assertion that human beings are created by God?
Abstract: Kant and the Creation of Freedom: A Theological Problem. By Christopher J. Insole. Changing Paradigms in Historical and Systematic Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. xiv + 264 pp. $125.00 (cloth).In this clear and well-organized volume, Insole argues that Kant's critical project was, in part, generated by an "irreducibly theological" problem (p. 1). How can we coherently explain human freedom, given the assertion that human beings are created by God?Chapters 2 through 5 provide the core exposition of Insole's exegetical claim. Kant's view of divine freedom, despite shifting epistemic status, is constant across the pre-critical and critical periods. Like Anselm, in Kants view "Gods perfect freedom is compatible with God being unable to do other than the good" (p. 26), where God is constrained by the moral-metaphysical necessities internal to God's own nature. Kant, Insole remarks, has a positive and teleological conception of freedom simpliciter "in his bones ... where what matters for freedom is that an agent wills the good" (p. 57).Kant's view of what constitutes meaningful human freedom continues to develop throughout his life. Originally a compatibilist, Insole argues, Kant comes to believe that human freedom requires both ultimate responsibility and the ability to do otherwise (although this later "feature" of freedom is conceived of as a human failing). By Insole's reading, transcendental idealism develops to protect the possibility of human freedom from physical determinism Newtonian science demands while protecting divine impassability from emanationism. Kant, Insole notes, comes to distinguish between human dependence on God (which does not threaten freedom) and human dependence on other created substances (which does). The possibility of meaningful human freedom, ultimately realized in the Kingdom of Ends in Kant's mature view, is where the noumenal self is dependent upon God alone, who enables reciprocal and nondependent interaction within a community of noumenal selves.Insole anticipates and replies to objections to more controversial aspects of this eonstrual of Kant. He addresses atemporal noumenal first causation and the inexplicability of the origins of evil when human freedom is construed as outside of space-time (chap. 6), and worries about the status of the Kant's belief in God after 1770 (chap. 7). These are significant obstacles, but Insole presents his case in a clear and well-cited way and even those who are not convinced by his reading will find Insole an articulate and well-versed opponent.In the last three chapters, Insole turns to a fuller theological evaluation of Kant's mature position on divine-human interaction. Insole recites the well-established evaluation that Kant's rational theology is hamstrung by the limits Kant's epistemic discipline places on grace and atonement. Furthermore, Insole argues that Kant highlights "the problem with the problem" (p. 226) when Insole considers what more can be known or hoped about divine action than creation and conservation, given Kant's articulation of human freedom within transcendental idealism. The argument between concurrentism and mere conservation stems from concerns about the metaphysical possibility of meaningful human causality of events which are directly and sufficiently caused by divine agency. …
5 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this article, it is argued that the first group need to familiarize themselves with the emanationism that Darwin only dimly grasped; for the latter, a suitably modified version of evolution is actually their best hope for retrieving the ethos of positive psychological transformation in the context of an over-arching sense of the cosmos in which that transformation is meaningful.
Abstract: PREFATORY COMMENTS The first point relates to the context of this contribution. Were it fully committed to the academic process, certain things are lost and gained. What is lost is its obligation to base itself in forces in the larger society, as these are set aside in the academic context to afford intellectuals a sharper focus. Intellectuals in academia have no obligation to be comprehensible to the masses, and are asked in return to address current topical issues with increased precision; the state has been happy to provide them with the gain of financial and indeed physical security for this--at least up to recently. If the state continues to withdraw from this role in providing a venue for free inquiry, it is likely that other entities (including an initially "hedge school" coalition of scholars) will fill the vacuum--and historically resources have followed This paper addresses many current issues, some directly, and others more obliquely. In the first section, starting from Kauffman's recent expedition in the area, we consider how the immanence of order has caused even "hard" science--indeed, particularly "hard" science--to consider schemes so outlandish for explanation of the anthropic thrust of the constants of nature that the old saw "God does it on Tuesdays" now seems like a relatively reasonable explanation. This paper is paradoxically being written at a time when believers in "evolution" (limited to an outdated NeoDarwinian ethos) are at odds, politically as well as epistemologically, with "Creationists". It is argued that the first group need to familiarize themselves with the emanationism that Darwin only dimly grasped; for the latter, it is argued that a suitably modified emanationism/evolution is actually their best hope for retrieving the ethos of positive psychological transformation in the context of an over-arching sense of the cosmos in which that transformation is meaningful. This process has led to many of humanity's finest moments. We find a recent effort in this direction in the work of Gurdjieff. But wait! Surely we are not going to countenance a worldview incompatible with modern science in order to generate an emotional frenzy that we then called sacred, the intensity of which will increase as it is contradicted by the facts? Of course not; but neither are we going to commit to a worldview that--in the past century--has variously and absurdly outlawed talk of mental process, trivialized biological inheritance, and announced that some stars are older than the universe. Thus, the paper ends with a tentative cosmogony in which the next step in evolution is seen in a larger context. Moreover, it is proposed that if it is granted that the unfolding of the cosmos, as Paul Davies concluded in his book on the subject, can be seen to point toward humans interacting with it and each other in a meaningful way, we do not need the gear supplied by the Abrahamic religions to transcend ourselves in the manner that the religious have done. In fact, we can work toward preservation of that which we see as sacred. In our case, it is argued that enacting legislation preserving the environment and human well-being in general, fighting corruption, preserving freedom of inquiry and speech, as well as action preserving true methods of inquiry into the real in science and art are examples of such work. Sankara, Ramanuja, Milarepa in the East as well as Marcus Aurelius, Eckhart, John of the Cross and others in the West and scores of others have indicated a state of being in which the transcendent somehow exemplifies itself in a suitably transformed human psyche. This state of Being was available also to those in the active life; as the founder of the Vincentian order put it, pray that its recipients do not experience giving as mere charity. Religious formation, unlike academic formation, is mainly about the transformation of the subject; selflessness is induced, by greater (Mahayana) or lesser (Hinayana) vehicles. …
4 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a new reading of intellectualism based on Brickhouse and Smith's power approach to causality is proposed to resolve the problematic passage of Enneads I: 8.14.
Abstract: Enneads I: 8.14 poses significant problems for scholars working in the Plotinian secondary literature. In that passage, Plotinus gives the impression that the body and not the soul is causally responsible for vice. The difficulty is that in many other sections of the same text, Plotinus makes it abundantly clear that the body, as matter, is a mere privation of being and therefore represents the lowest rung on the proverbial metaphysical ladder. A crucial aspect to Plotinus's emanationism, however, is that lower levels of a metaphysical hierarchy cannot causally influence higher ones and, thus, there is an inconsistency in the Egyptian's magnum opus, or so it would seem. Scholars have sought to work through this paradox by positing that Plotinus is a "paleolithic Platonist" or Socratic. The advantage of this approach is that one may be able to resolve the tension by invoking Socrates's eliminativist solution to the problem of weakness of will, as found in The Protagoras. In the following article, I argue that such attempts are not wrong-headed just underdetermined. They take up the standard reading of Socratic moral intellectualism, namely the "informational" interpretation and, therefore, fail to render a coherent view of Plotinus's moral philosophy. The following paper, in contrast, utilizes a new reading of intellectualism advanced by Brickhouse and Smith, which, when subtended with a "powers approach" to causality, resolves the aforementioned, problematic passage of Enneads.
3 citations
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| Year | Papers |
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| 2020 | 2 |
| 2015 | 1 |
| 2012 | 1 |
| 2010 | 1 |
| 1993 | 1 |
| 1974 | 1 |