Ebidding

Abstract: Auction theory is used to analyze the potential benefits of auctions in allocating contracts for the provision of nonmarket goods in the countryside. A model of optimal bidding for conservation contracts is developed and applied to a hypothetical conservation program. Competitive bidding, compared to fixed-rate payments, can increase the cost effectiveness of conservation contracting significantly. The cost revelation mechanism inherent in the bidding process makes auctions a powerful means by which to reduce the problems of information asymmetry. Strategic bidding behavior, which may adversely affect the performance of sequential auctions, is difficult to address by means of auction design.

Abstract: The invention presents a method for conducting an on-line bidding session to accumulate a collective bid for a property. The bidding session is conducted over a computer network that includes a central computer, a number of remote computers, and communication lines connecting the remote computers to the central computer. According to the method, at least one bidding group is registered in the central computer. The bidding group can be an association, institution, or group of investors formed for the purpose of bidding together for the property. The bidding group has a total bid for the property which is tracked in the central computer. The central computer receives bids entered from the remote computers by members of the bidding group. Each bid includes an individual bid amount which is contributed to the total bid of the group to accumulate the collective bid for the property.

Abstract: Participants in a competitive electricity market develop bidding strategies in order to maximize their own profits. On the other hand, it is necessary for regulators to investigate strategic bidding behavior in order to identify possible market power abuse and to limit such abuse by introducing appropriate market management rules. An interesting body of work has been done on this subject, and this paper presents a literature survey based on more than 30 research publications.

Abstract: While traditional information systems research emphasizes understanding of end users from perspectives such as cognitive fit and technology acceptance, it fails to consider the economic dimensions of their interactions with a system. When viewed as economic agents who participate in electronic markets, it is easy to see that users' preferences, behaviors, personalities, and ultimately their economic welfare are intricately linked to the design of information systems. We use a data-driven, inductive approach to develop a taxonomy of bidding behavior in online auctions. Our analysis indicates significant heterogeneity exists in the user base of these representative electronic markets. Using online auction data from 1999 and 2000, we find a stable taxonomy of bidder behavior containing five types of bidding strategies. Bidders pursue different bidding strategies that, in aggregate, realize different winning likelihoods and consumer surplus. We find that technological evolution has an impact on bidders' strategies. We demonstrate how the taxonomy of bidder behavior can be used to enhance the design of some types of information systems. These enhancements include developing user-centric bidding agents, inferring bidders' underlying valuations to facilitate real-time auction calibration, and creating low-risk computational platforms for decision making.