Easement

Abstract: Land trusts, partnered with government agencies or acting alone, are working to conserve habitat, open space, and working landscapes on private land. Spending both public and private funds, such institutions frequently acquire less than full title by purchasing or accepting donations of conservation easements. These title and organizational arrangements are evolving so fast that it is difficult to assess their conservation accom- plishments and long-term viability. To understand the contribution of these arrangements to the preservation and restoration of biodiversity, conservation biologists need to identify the biological resources likely to be conserved and those likely to be left unprotected through easements held by land trusts. We describe land trusts and conservation easements and why they are currently an attractive approach to land protection. Our review of the literature showed that little information is available on (1) the resulting pattern of protected lands and resources being conserved, (2) the emerging institutions that hold conservation easements and the landowners they work with, and (3) the distribution of costs and benefits of land trusts and easements to communities and the general public. The prescriptive literature on how to establish land trusts and negotiate easements is extensive. However, easily available information on protected resources is too aggregated to determine what is actually being conserved, and more detailed data is widely scattered and hence difficult to synthesize. The social science literature provides some insight into the motives of landowners who participate but offers little about the variety of institutions or which type of institution works best in particular ecological and political settings. Equally undeveloped is our understanding of the inherent tension between the public and private benefits of this widely used incentive-based conservation strategy. Interdisciplinary research is needed to de- termine the ecological and social consequences of acquiring partial interest in private land for conservation purposes.

Abstract: Conservation easements are one of the primary tools for conserving biodiversity on private land. Despite their increasing use, little quantitative data are available on what species and habitats conservation easements aim to protect, how much structural development they allow, or what types of land use they com- monly permit. To address these knowledge gaps, we surveyed staff responsible for 119 conservation easements established by the largest nonprofit easement holder, The Nature Conservancy, between 1985 and 2004. Most easements (80%) aimed to provide core habitat to protect species or communities on-site, and nearly all were designed to reduce development. Conservation easements also allowed for a wide range of private uses, which may result in additional fragmentation and habitat disturbance. Some residential or commercial use, new structures, or subdivision of the property were permitted on 85% of sampled conservation easements. Over half (56%) allowed some additional buildings, of which 60% restricted structure size or building area. Working landscape easements with ranching, forestry, or farming made up nearly half (46%) of the easement proper- ties sampled and were more likely than easements without these uses to be designated as buffers to enhance biodiversity in the surrounding area. Our results demonstrate the need for clear restrictions on building and subdivision in easements, research on the compatibility of private uses on easement land, and greater public understanding of the trade-offs implicit in the use of conservation easements for biodiversity conservation.

Abstract: Several state legislatures are considering enactment of tight zoning laws to preserve high productivity land for agricultural use. In the vernacular of the day, this land is referred to as "prime" (Raup, pp. 2, 3). Apparently, the myriad of tax preferential policies and other planning devices designed to protect agricultural lands from conversion to other uses have not been very effective (Hansen and Schwartz). Some of our best agricultural land continues to be converted to expanding urbanization, transport, utility easements, and for a variety of public purposes. So it is argued by those who advocate zoning for agricultural land that more drastic measures are now needed to stop this avalanche before "serious" agricultural land shortages occur. Of course, if social action is needed to retain prime land in agricultural use, the land market cannot efficiently allocate land resources among competing uses. The tax preference schemes were enacted to make it less costly to use land for agricultural purposes so that significant quantities of land would be kept in agricultural use that would otherwise shift. But use changes could still occur through the market if value differentials were great enough to offset the production cost advantage created by the tax preference. The crux of the proposed prime land preservation legislation is quite different; it removes the land allocation decisions from the market entirely by using productivity criteria to qualify land for preservation and by granting the power for exemptions and use changes to designated boards. This paper is largely concerned with the economic implications of this drastic policy shift. There must be substantial political pressure for retaining prime agricultural land since proposals are numerous and are being ma e in all sections of the country. It is the thesis of this paper, however, that the economic costs and benefits of such proposals have not been adequately explored and that it is the obligation of agricultural economists to do so. Not even the philosophical rationale for removal of the market from land use decisions has been adequately considered (Ervin et al.). This paper is more of an exploration of this issue than it is an empirical demonstration of ma ket efficiency. The next section discusses the perceived b nefits of prime land preservation; the third section discusses market failure and the alleged justification for social intervention; the fourth section treats the selection criteria that have been proposed to qualify prime land and how the program will be administered; and the final section highlights the major efficiency and equity implications of market removal from land allocation.