Topic
Double auction
About: Double auction is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1302 publications have been published within this topic receiving 26371 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors report market experiments in which human traders are replaced by "zero-intelligence" programs that submit random bids and offers, and show that a budget constraint (i.e., not permitting traders to sell below their costs or buy above their values) is sufficient to raise the allocative efficiency of these auctions close to 100 percent.
Abstract: We report market experiments in which human traders are replaced by "zero-intelligence" programs that submit random bids and offers. Imposing a budget constraint (i.e., not permitting traders to sell below their costs or buy above their values) is sufficient to raise the allocative efficiency of these auctions close to 100 percent. Allocative efficiency of a double auction derives largely from its structure, independent of traders' motivation, intelligence, or learning. Adam Smith's invisible hand may be more powerful than some may have thought; it can generate aggregate rationality not only from individual rationality but also from individual irrationality.
1,900 citations
TL;DR: Numerical results indicate that the double auction mechanism can achieve social welfare maximization while protecting privacy of the PHEVs and security analysis shows that the proposed PETCON improves transaction security and privacy protection.
Abstract: We propose a localized peer-to-peer (P2P) electricity trading model for locally buying and selling electricity among plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) in smart grids Unlike traditional schemes, which transport electricity over long distances and through complex electricity transportation meshes, our proposed model achieves demand response by providing incentives to discharging PHEVs to balance local electricity demand out of their own self-interests However, since transaction security and privacy protection issues present serious challenges, we explore a promising consortium blockchain technology to improve transaction security without reliance on a trusted third party A localized P 2P E lectricity T rading system with CO nsortium blockchai N (PETCON) method is proposed to illustrate detailed operations of localized P2P electricity trading Moreover, the electricity pricing and the amount of traded electricity among PHEVs are solved by an iterative double auction mechanism to maximize social welfare in this electricity trading Security analysis shows that our proposed PETCON improves transaction security and privacy protection Numerical results based on a real map of Texas indicate that the double auction mechanism can achieve social welfare maximization while protecting privacy of the PHEVs
1,186 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a double auction mechanism that provides dominant strategies for both buyers and sellers is analyzed, and the mechanism satisfies the 1n convergence to efficiency of the buyer's bid double auction.
690 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors report on three series of experiments all of which were predicted to have performed identically by the theory of rational expectations, and demonstrate the importance of market institutions and trading instruments in achievement of equilibrium.
Abstract: The idea that markets might aggregate and disseminate information and also resolve conflicts is central to the literature on decentralization (Hurwicz, 1972) and rational expectations (Lucas, 1972). We report on three series of experiments all of which were predicted to have performed identically by the theory of rational expectations. In two of the three series (one in which participants trade a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities and a second in which all participants have identical preferences), double auction trading leads to efficient aggregation of diverse information and rational expectations equilibrium. Failure of the third series to exhibit such convergence demonstrates the importance of market institutions and trading instruments in achievement of equilibrium.
659 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a model of information processing and strategy choice for participants in a double auction, where sellers form beliefs that an offer will be accepted by some buyer, and buyers form belief that a bid will not be accepted, and then traders choose an action that maximizes their own expected surplus.
428 citations
Related Topics (5)
Performance Metrics
| Year | Papers |
|---|---|
| 2025 | 11 |
| 2024 | 22 |
| 2023 | 21 |
| 2022 | 48 |
| 2021 | 59 |
| 2020 | 61 |