Topic
Doomsday argument
About: Doomsday argument is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 90 publications have been published within this topic receiving 1367 citations. The topic is also known as: Carter catastrophe & DA.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
Book•
1 Jan 2002
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present an anthropic theory of observation selection effects in cosmology and its application to other scientific problems, such as traffic analysis and quantum physics, with a focus on the reference class problem.
Abstract: Preface Content Acknowledgements Chapter1: Introduction Observation selection effects A brief history of anthropic reasoning Synopsis of this book Chapter 2: Fine- Tuning Arguments in Cosmology Does fine-tuning need explaining? No "Inverse Gambler's Fallacy" Roger White and Phil Dowe's analysis Surprising vs. unsurprising improbable events Modeling observation selection effects: the angel parable Preliminary conclusions Chapter 3: Anthropic Principles, the Motley Family The anthropic principle as expressing an observation selection effect Anthropic hodgepodge Freak observers and why earlier formulations are inadequate The Self-Sampling Assumption Chapter 4: Thought Experiments Supporting the Self-Sampling Assumption The Dungeon gedanken Two thought experiments by John Leslie The Incubator gedanken The reference class problem Chapter 5: The Self-Sampling Assumption in Science SSA in cosmology SSA in thermodynamics SSA in evolutionary biology SSA in traffic analysis SSA in quantum physics Summary of the case for SSA Chapter 6: The Doomsday Argument Background Doomsday a la Gottv The incorrectness of Gott's argument Doomsday a la Leslie The premisses of DA, and the Old evidence problem Leslie's views on the reference class problem Alternative conclusions of DA Chapter 7: Invalid Objections Against the Doomsday Argument Doesn't the Doomsday argument fail to "target the truth"? (Korb and Oliver) The "baby-paradox" (Delahaye Korb and Oliver) Isn't a sample size of one too small? (Korb and Oliver) Couldn't a Cro-Magnon man have used the Doomsday argument? (Various) We can make the effect go away simply by considering a larger hypothesis space (Dieks Eastmond Korb and Oliver) Aren't we necessarily alive now? (Mark Greenberg) Sliding reference of "soon" and "late"? (Mark Greenberg) How could I have been a 16th century human? (Mark Greenberg) Doesn't your theory presuppose that what happens in causally disconnected regions affects what happens here? (Ken Olum) But we know so much more about ourselves than our birth ranks! (Various) The Self-Indication Assumption - Is there safety in numbers? (Various) Chapter 8: Observer-Relative Chances in Anthropic Reasoning? Leslie's argument, and why it fails Observer-relative chances: another go Discussion: indexical facts - no conflict with physicalism In conclusion Appendix: the no-betting results Chapter 9: Paradoxes of the Self-Sampling Assumption The Adam & Eve experiments Analysis of Lazy Adam: predictions and counterfactuals The UN++ gedanken: reasons and abilities Quantum Joe: SSA and the Principal Principle Upshot Appendix: The Meta-Newcomb problem Chapter 10: Observation Selection Theory: A Methodology for Anthropic Reasoning Building blocks, theory constraints and desiderata The outline of a solution SSSA: Taking account of indexical information of observer-moments Reassessing Incubator How the reference class may be observer-moment relative Formalizing the theory: the Observation Equation A quantum generalization of OE Non-triviality of the reference class: why must be rejected A subjective factor in the choice of reference class? Chapter 11: Observation Selection Theory Applied Cosmological theorizing: fine-tuning and freak observers The freak-observer problem places only lax demands on the reference class The Sleeping Beauty problem: modeling imperfect recall The case of no outsiders The case with outsiders Synthesis of the 1/2- and the 1/3-views Observation selection theory applied to other scientific problems Robustness of reference class and scientific solidity Wrap-up References
396 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that full non-indexical conditioning (FNC) usually produces the same results as assuming both SSA and SIA, with a sufficiently broad reference class, while avoiding their ad hoc aspects.
Abstract: I consider the puzzles arising from four interrelated problems involving `anthropic' reasoning, and in particular the `Self-Sampling Assumption' (SSA) - that one should reason as if one were randomly chosen from the set of all observers in a suitable reference class. The problem of Freak Observers might appear to force acceptance of SSA if any empirical evidence is to be credited. The Sleeping Beauty problem arguably shows that one should also accept the `Self-Indication Assumption' (SIA) - that one should take one's own existence as evidence that the number of observers is more likely to be large than small. But this assumption produces apparently absurd results in the Presumptuous Philosopher problem. Without SIA, however, a definitive refutation of the counterintuitive Doomsday Argument seems difficult. I show that these problems are satisfyingly resolved by applying the principle that one should always condition on all evidence - not just on the fact that you are an intelligent observer, or that you are human, but on the fact that you are a human with a specific set of memories. This `Full Non-indexical Conditioning' (FNC) approach usually produces the same results as assuming both SSA and SIA, with a sufficiently broad reference class, while avoiding their ad hoc aspects. I argue that the results of FNC are correct using the device of hypothetical ``companion'' observers, whose existence clarifies what principles of reasoning are valid. I conclude by discussing how one can use FNC to infer how densely we should expect intelligent species to occur, and by examining recent anthropic arguments in inflationary and string theory cosmology.
52 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that the doomsday argument applies only to effects which change the average lifetime of all civilizations, and not those which affect our civilization alone, and the implications of this conclusion for ethical theory and for the Doomsday argument were explored.
Abstract: Recent developments in cosmology indicate that every history having a nonzero probability is realized in infinitely many distinct regions of spacetime. Thus, it appears that the universe contains infinitely many civilizations exactly like our own, as well as infinitely many civilizations that differ from our own in any way permitted by physical laws. We explore the implications of this conclusion for ethical theory and for the doomsday argument. In the infinite universe, we find that the doomsday argument applies only to effects which change the average lifetime of all civilizations, and not those which affect our civilization alone.
42 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: The authors analyzed the intellectual background behind various misconceptions about Bayesian statistics, without aiming at a complete historical coverage of the reasons for this dismissal, and concluded that "the missionary zeal of many Bayesians of old has been matched, in the other direction, by a view among some theoreticians that Bayesian methods are absurd-not merely misguided but obviously wrong in principle".
Abstract: The missionary zeal of many Bayesians of old has been matched, in the other direction, by a view among some theoreticians that Bayesian methods are absurd-not merely misguided but obviously wrong in principle. We consider several examples, beginning with Feller's classic text on probability theory and continuing with more recent cases such as the perceived Bayesian nature of the so-called doomsday argument. We analyze in this note the intellectual background behind various misconceptions about Bayesian statistics, without aiming at a complete historical coverage of the reasons for this dismissal.
22 citations
Dissertation•
1 Jan 2000
TL;DR: The Self-Sampling Assumption (SSA) as mentioned in this paper is a theory of how to reason when our evidence has been subjected to observational selection effects and it has applications in cosmology, evolutionary biology, thermodynamics and the problem of time's arrow, game theoretic problems with imperfect recall, the philosophical evaluation of the manyworlds and many-minds interpretations of quantum mechanics and David Lewis' modal realism, and even for traffic planning.
Abstract: This thesis develops a theory of how to reason when our evidence has been subjected to observational selection effects. It has applications in cosmology, evolutionary biology, thermodynamics and the problem of time's arrow, game theoretic problems with imperfect recall, the philosophical evaluation of the many-worlds and many-minds interpretations of quantum mechanics and David Lewis' modal realism, and even for traffic planning. After refuting several popular doctrines about the implications of cosmological fine-tuning, we present an informal model of the observational selection effects involved. Next, we evaluate attempts that have been made to codify the correct way of reasoning about such effects - in the form of so-called "anthropic principles" - and find them wanting. A new principle is proposed to replace them, the Self-Sampling Assumption (SSA). A series of thought experiments are presented showing that SSA should be used in a wide range of contexts. We also show that SSA gives better methodological guidance than rival principles in a number of scientific fields. We then explain how SSA can lead to the infamous Doomsday argument. Identifying what additional assumptions are required to derive this consequence, we suggest alternative conclusions. We refute several objections against the Doomsday argument and show that SSA does not give rise to paradoxical "observer-relative chances" as has been alleged. However, we discover new consequences of SSA that are more counterintuitive than the Doomsday argument. Using these results, we construct a version of SSA that avoids the paradoxes and does not lead to the Doomsday argument but caters to legitimate methodological needs. This modified principle is used as the basis for the first mathematically explicit theory of reasoning under observational selection effects. This observation theory resolves the range of conundrums associated with anthropic reasoning and provides a general framework for evaluating theories about the large-scale structure of the world and the distribution of observers within it.
22 citations
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| Year | Papers |
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| 2021 | 1 |
| 2020 | 3 |
| 2019 | 2 |
| 2018 | 3 |
| 2017 | 1 |
| 2016 | 5 |