DNS blocking

Abstract: The aim of the article is to analyze internet blocking measures provided/not provided by the laws of online gambling in Lithuania and Denmark using comparative method. The author purposefully chose countries because of their very different legal regulation of the researched matter and in order to analyze a wider range of possible legal regulation models. Separate countries and cultures struggled against the harm of gambling by using many well-known measures for gambling control, but online gambling generates additional old, but much more intense and totally new threats; therefore, the old methods and control measures are insufficient. The article presents blocking measures for the internet content that are designed for a partial gambling control, although, even internet content blocking/filtering may cause negative legal consequences (the limitation of human rights, including but not limited to, self-expression and access to information, as well as dissemination of freedom, the right to have a private and family life, and other restrictions). There is a corresponding connection, which is reflected in the case of Denmark, that the blocking of the internet content is legalized at the same time as the legalization of online gambling. In the case of Lithuania, online gambling, as well as the blocking of the internet content, is not permitted.

Abstract: This article explores the problem of collateral damage that blocking measures give rise to. In awarding injunctions against internet service providers (ISPs), courts in the UK and some of the other EU, as well as Nordic, states have preferred to require ISPs to implement Domain Name Service (DNS) blocking, as opposed to blocking of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, in cases where the target website that infringes an intellectual property right shares its IP address with other legitimate websites. This is to avoid the problem of collateral damage associated with IP blocking in such situations. Yet, as this article points out, DNS blocking could also give rise to a different form of collateral damage that must be equally avoided. In the circumstances, courts may be left with the single option of adopting URL blocking, which, although it is highly accurate and entails no collateral damage, could easily be circumvented without any cost being incurred. It is therefore argued that the EU’s injunctive framework for the enforcement of intellectual property rights ought to be utilised in innovative ways in order to target other categories of online intermediaries, including hosts. This would not only transform the injunctive remedy into a more holistic one, but also avoids ISPs being overburdened as a result of having to implement blocking measures.

Abstract: A network security system according to an embodiment may include: a DNS blocking server that is connected to network equipment to which a client terminal is connected and mirrors a DNS query packet going through the network equipment, and that generates and transmits a fake DNS response packet to the client terminal if a DNS query domain address of the DNS query packet is a domain address to be managed; and a proxy server that monitors a request packet from the client terminal generated using the fake DNS response packet.

Abstract: This article explores the problem of collateral damage that blocking measures give rise to. In awarding injunctions against internet service providers (ISPs), courts in the UK and some of the other EU, as well as Nordic, states have preferred to require ISPs to implement Domain Name Service (DNS) blocking, as opposed to blocking of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, in cases where the target website that infringes an intellectual property right shares its IP address with other legitimate websites. This is to avoid the problem of collateral damage associated with IP blocking in such situations. Yet, as this article points out, DNS blocking could also give rise to a different form of collateral damage that must be equally avoided. In the circumstances, courts may be left with the single option of adopting URL blocking, which, although it is highly accurate and entails no collateral damage, could easily be circumvented without any cost being incurred. It is therefore argued that the EU’s injunctive framework for the enforcement of intellectual property rights ought to be utilised in innovative ways in order to target other categories of online intermediaries, including hosts. This would not only transform the injunctive remedy into a more holistic one, but also avoids ISPs being overburdened as a result of having to implement blocking measures.