TL;DR: In this paper, a common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world.
Abstract: A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I argue that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sense-datum theories. In the first part of the paper I explore the form of explanation that an intentional theory of perception can offer of this fact, and I contrast this with an alternative picture labelled naive realism which can also accommodate and explain the fact of transparency. In the second part of the paper I explore the connection between sensory experience and sensory imagining, arguing that various features of sensory imagining support the hypothesis that in visualising a tree one imagines seeing a tree. In the final part of the paper I argue that the conclusion concerning sensory imagination presents an explanatory challenge for intentional theories of perception which parallels the challenge to sense-datum theories.
TL;DR: The disjunctive theory of perception claims that we should understand statements about how things appear to a perceiver to be equivalent to statements of a disjunction that either one is perceiving such and such or one is suffering an illusion (or hallucination).
Abstract: The disjunctive theory of perception claims that we should understand statements about how things appear to a perceiver to be equivalent to statements of a disjunction that either one is perceiving such and such or one is suffering an illusion (or hallucination); and that such statements are not to be viewed as introducing a report of a distinctive mental event or state common to these various disjoint situations. When Michael Hinton first introduced the idea, he suggested that the burden of proof or disproof lay with his opponent, that what was needed was to show that our talk of how things look or appear to one to be introduces more than what he later came to call perceptionillusion disjunctions:
TL;DR: In this paper, Naive Realism: The Theory and its Motivations, Past and Future, Perception, Hallucination, Consciousness and the Brain, and Illusion.
Abstract: 1. Naive Realism: The Theory and its Motivations 2. Naive Realism: Past and Future 3. Perception 4. Hallucination 5. Consciousness and the Brain 6. Illusion
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present two arguments against direct realism -one concerning illusion, and one concerning hallucination, and they propose a direct realism alternative to direct realism based on hallucination.
Abstract: Offers two arguments against direct realism - one concerning illusion, and one concerning hallucination.