About: Differential-linear attack is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 65 publications have been published within this topic receiving 2229 citations.
TL;DR: This book introduces a new cryptographic method, called differential cryptanalysis, which can be applied to analyze cryptosystems, and describes the cryptanalysis of DES, deals with the influence of its building blocks on security, and analyzes modified variants.
Abstract: DES, the Data Encryption Standard, is one of several cryptographic standards. The authors of this text detail their cryptanalytic "attack" upon DES and several other systems, using creative and novel tactics to demonstrate how they broke DES up into 16 rounds of coding. The methodology used offers valuable insights to cryptographers and cryptanalysts alike in creating new encryption standards, strengthening current ones, and exploring new ways to test important data protection schemes. This book introduces a new cryptographic method, called differential cryptanalysis, which can be applied to analyze cryptosystems. It describes the cryptanalysis of DES, deals with the influence of its building blocks on security, and analyzes modified variants. The differential cryptanalysis of "Feal" and several other cryptosystems is also described. This method can also be used to cryptanalyze hash functions, as is exemplified by the cryptanalysis of "Snefru".
TL;DR: This paper introduces a new chosen text attack on iterated cryptosystems, such as the Data Encryption Standard (DES), which is very efficient for 8-round DES, recovering 10 bits of key with 80% probability of success using only 512 chosen plaintexts.
Abstract: This paper introduces a new chosen text attack on iterated cryptosystems, such as the Data Encryption Standard (DES). The attack is very efficient for 8-round DES,2 recovering 10 bits of key with 80% probability of success using only 512 chosen plaintexts. The probability of success increases to 95% using 768 chosen plaintexts. More key can be recovered with reduced probability of success. The attack takes less than 10 seconds on a SUN-4 workstation. While comparable in speed to existing attacks, this 8-round attack represents an order of magnitude improvement in the amount of required text.
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that there is no characteristic with a probability high enough to do a successful differential attack on LOKI91, and the size of the image of the F-function in LokI91 is 8\22*2^32.
Abstract: In this paper we examine the redesign of LOKI, LOKI91 proposed by Brown et al. First it is shown that there is no characteristic with a probability high enough to do a successful differential attack on LOKI91. Secondly we show that the size of the image of the F-function in LOKI91 is 8\22*2^32. Finally we introduce a chosen plaintext attack that reduces an exhaustive key search on LOKI91 by almost a factor 4 using 2^33+2 chosen plaintexts.
TL;DR: This paper formalizes this method of cryptanalysis and shows that although in the details level this method is quite different from differential cryptanalysis, in the structural level they are very similar.
Abstract: In [9] Matsui introduced a new method of cryptanalysis, called Linear Cryptanalysis. This method was used to attack DES using 247 known plaintexts. In this paper we formalize this method and show that although in the details level this method is quite different from differential cryptanalysis, in the structural level they are very similar. For example, characteristics can be defined in linear cryptanalysis, but the concatenation rule has several important differences from the concatenation rule of differential cryptanalysis. We show that the attack of Davies on DES is closely related to linear cryptanalysis. We describe constraints on the size of S boxes caused by linear cryptanalysis. New results to Feal are also described.
TL;DR: Differential cryptanalytic methods are applied to the hash function Snefru and to the cryptosystems Khafre, REDOC-II, LOKI, and Lucifer.
Abstract: In [1,2] we introduced the notion of differential cryptanalysis based an chosen plaintext attacks. In [3,4] we described the application of differential cryptanalysis to Feal[13,12] and extended the method to known plaintext attacks. In this paper we apply differential cryptanalytic methods to the hash function Snefru[10] and to the cryptosystems Khafre[11], REDOC-II[6,7], LOKI[5] and Lucifer[8].