TL;DR: The benefits of decentralization in allocative efficiency are not as obvious as suggested by the standard theory of fiscal federalism as mentioned in this paper, but more empirical research is needed on this point.
Abstract: The author highlights some of the dangers of decentralizations. The benefits of decentralization in allocative efficiency are not as obvious as suggested by the standard theory of fiscal federalism. The assumptions of this theory are fragile. These doubtful benefits might carry a cost in production efficiency, but more empirical research is needed on this point. What is not doubtful is that decentralization runs counter to redistribution and stabilization. Decentralization makes redistributive policies, whether interpersonal or interjurisdictional, more difficult, if not impossible. Decentralization also makes macroeconomic stabilization programs more difficult to implement because subnational government fiscal policies can run counter to national policies. Serious drawbacks or potential drawbacks should be considered in designing any decentralization program. The arguments that the author develops make it easier to understand some of the real choices. These choices are not so much whether to decentralize in general but rather what functions to decentralize - in which sectors, and in which regions. Guidelines can be provided on this. Often, the problem is not so much whether a certain service should be provided by a central, regional, or local government, since the service often has to be provided with the intervention of all three levels of government. The real challenge is how to organize the joint production of the service. Decentralization refers simultaneously to a state and to a process. The virtues and dangers of decentralization are often discussed simultaneously for both concepts. This is a dangerous confusion because decentralization is path-dependent. What is desirable in a given country at a certain point in time depends on the present state of decentralization and the speed at which it has been reached. Much more work, particularly empirical work, is needed -- in review of decentralization (or centralization) experiences in general, as well as those encouraged or supported by the World Bank.
TL;DR: Decentralization has been widely accepted as a way of reducing the role of the state in general, by fragmenting central authority and introducing more intergovernmental competition and checks and balances as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: All around the world in matters of governance, decentralization is the rage. Even apart from the widely debated issues of subsidiarity and devolution in the European Union and states’ rights in the United States, decentralization has been at the center stage of policy experiments in the last two decades in a large number of developing and transition economies in Latin America, Africa and Asia. The World Bank, for example, has embraced it as one of the major governance reforms on its agenda (for example, World Bank, 2000; Burki, Perry and Dillinger, 1999). Take also the examples of the two largest countries of the world, China and India. Decentralization has been regarded as the major institutional framework for the phenomenal industrial growth in the last two decades in China, taking place largely in the nonstate nonprivate sector. India ushered in a landmark constitutional reform in favor of decentralization around the same time it launched a major program of economic reform in the early 1990s. On account of its many failures, the centralized state everywhere has lost a great deal of legitimacy, and decentralization is widely believed to promise a range of benee ts. It is often suggested as a way of reducing the role of the state in general, by fragmenting central authority and introducing more intergovernmental competition and checks and balances. It is viewed as a way to make government more responsive and efe cient. Technological changes have also made it somewhat easier than before to provide public services (like electricity and water supply) relatively efe ciently in smaller market areas, and the lower levels of government have now a greater ability to handle certain tasks. In a world of rampant ethnic cone icts and separatist movements, decentralization is also regarded as a way of diffusing social and political tensions and ensuring local cultural and political autonomy. These potential benee ts of decentralization have attracted a very diverse range
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the whole-of-government movement as a reaction to the negative effects of New Public Management reforms such as structural devolution, single-purpose organizations, and performance management.
Abstract: In this article, the authors discuss “whole-of-government” initiatives as a reaction to the negative effects of New Public Management reforms such as structural devolution, “single-purpose organizations,” and performance management but also as a reaction to a more insecure world. The authors examine what is meant by a “whole-of-government” approach and explore how this concept might be interpreted in analytical terms. The structural approach is contrasted with a cultural perspective and a myth-based perspective. Finally, results, experiences, and lessons from the whole-of-government movement are discussed.
TL;DR: The authors examines the origins and implications of decentralization from a political economy perspective, with a focus on its promise and limitations, and explores why countries have often chosen not to decentralize, even when evidence suggests that doing so would be in the interests of the government.
Abstract: Nearly all countries worldwide are now experimenting with decentralization. Their motivation are diverse. Many countries are decentralizing because they believe this can help stimulate economic growth or reduce rural poverty, goals central government interventions have failed to achieve. Some countries see it as a way to strengthen civil society and deepen democracy. Some perceive it as a way to off-load expensive responsibilities onto lower level governments. Thus, decentralization is seen as a solution to many different kinds of problems. This report examines the origins and implications decentralization from a political economy perspective, with a focus on its promise and limitations. It explores why countries have often chosen not to decentralize, even when evidence suggests that doing so would be in the interests of the government. It seeks to explain why since the early 1980s many countries have undertaken some form of decentralization. This report also evaluates the evidence to understand where decentralization has considerable promise and where it does not. It identifies conditions needed for decentralization to succeed. It identifies the ways in which decentralization can promote rural development. And it names the goals which decentralization will probably not help achieve.
TL;DR: The concept of statehood in international law has been studied extensively in the literature, see as discussed by the authors for a survey of some of the most relevant works on statehood and its application to international law.
Abstract: I THE CONCEPT OF STATEHOOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1. Statehood and Recognition 2. The Criteria for Statehood: Statehood as Effectiveness 3. International Law Conditions for the Creation of States 4. Issues of Statehood Before United Nations Organs 5. The Criteria for Statehood Applied: Some Special Cases II MODES OF THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6. Original Acquisition and Problems of Statehood 7. Dependent States and Other Dependent Entities 8. Devolution 9. Secession 10. Divided States and Reunification 11. Unions and Federations of States III THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 12. International Dispositive Powers 13. Mandates and Trust Territories 14. Non-Self-Governing Territories: the Law and Practice of Decolonialization IV PROBLEMS OF COMMENCEMENT, CONTINUITY, AND EXTINCTION 15. The Commencement of States 16. Problems of Identity, Continuity and Reversion 17. The Extinction of States CONCLUSION APPENDICES APPENDIX 1 List of States and Territorial Entities Proximate to States APPENDIX 2 League Mandates and United Nations Trusteeships APPENDIX 3 The United Nations and Non-Self-Governing Territories 1946-2005 APPENDIX 4 Consideration by the International Law Commission of the Topic of Statehood (1996)