TL;DR: Ostronr as discussed by the authors develops a syntax for institutions by starting from the first principles of deontic logic and makes elegant distinctions between often-confused concepts, such as a strategy determines who achieves what outcomes under which conditions; a norm is a strategy specified with what is permitted, obliged, or forbidden; and a rule is a norm specified with the consequences of not following the norm.
Abstract: Elinor Ostronr s Understanding Institutional Diversity draws an analogy between genetic rules of biological organisms and social rules of communities of humans. Just as natural scientists accumulated knowledge in the human genome project, the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework is presented as the scaffolding for accumulation of knowledge on institutions. It is a framework that many social scientists will appreciate, because of its notion that knowledge about institutions can only be attained in real-life action situations. For Ostrom, social scientists are like engineers facing complex technologies: the recognition of rules does not solve a dilemma but opens up chances for tinkering with the system. Ostrom develops a syntax for institutions by starting from the first principles of deontic logic and makes elegant distinctions between often-confused concepts. For example, a strategy determines who achieves what outcomes under which conditions; a norm is a strategy specified with what is permitted, obliged, or forbidden; and a rule is a norm specified with what are the consequences of not following the norm. These arguments are supported by an impressive pool of empirical work. The focus of empirical analysis is on interaction of participants in action arenas such as a home, a city council, a firm, or an international organisation. It is an appealing focus, because it enables shifting the scale of analysis from local to global and any 'holon' in between a key analytical strength for understanding how nested institutions operate simultaneously at different scales and interact across scales. One fascinating chapter is devoted to controlled laboratory experiments with games. Its findings are used to modify the dominant model of human behaviour: the utility-maximising individual is given its proper role among the other games of life. Bold moves like this are risky. The framework that Ostrom constructs covers a vast territory and is likely to trigger critical questions such as these from other scholars:
TL;DR: In this article, the General Theory of Institutions and Institutional Facts: Language and Social Reality: Free Will, Rationality, Political and Other, is presented as a general theory of institutions and institutional facts.
Abstract: 1. The Purpose of this Book 2. Intentionality 3. Collective Intentionality and the Assignment of Function 4. Language as Bilogical and Social 5. The General Theory of Institutions and Institutional Facts: Language and Social Reality 6. Free Will, Rationality and Institutional Facts 7. Deontic, Background, Political and Other
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine two classes of utterances: (a) first speakers' suggestions for future events and (b) second speakers' responses, which, besides acquiescing to or resisting these plans, also acquiesce to or resist the first speaker's rights to make them.
Abstract: Someone's “deontic authority” is their right to determine others' future actions. It can be acquiesced to or resisted. This article introduces, more systematically than before, the concept to close examination of talk-in-interaction. Drawing on video recordings of planning meetings as data and on conversation analysis as a method, we examine two classes of utterances: (a) first speakers' suggestions for future events and (b) second speakers' responses, which, besides acquiescing to or resisting these plans, also acquiesce to or resist the first speakers' rights to make them. Where the second speakers align with the deontic rights allocated to them by the first speakers, we call this “deontic congruence.” “Deontic incongruence,” on the other hand, is where the second speaker resists the suggested distribution of deontic rights. These are far-reaching claims in social life, and we show how they are displayed in the organization of talk.
TL;DR: The FA analysis as discussed by the authors is based on a deontic connection between the axiological and the notion of attitude towards an object, and it is defined by the stance that should be taken toward the object.
Abstract: According to an influential tradition in value analysis, to be valuable is to be a fitting object of a pro-attitude. If it is fitting to favor an object for its own sake, then, on this view, the object has final value, that is, it is valuable for its own sake. If it is fitting to have a pro-attitude toward an object for the sake of its effects, then its value is instrumental. And so on. Disvalue is connected in an analogous way to contra-attitudes instead. Apart from the linkage between value and attitudes, what is distinctive for this kind of analysis, at least on some of its readings, is that it establishes a connection between the axiological and the deontic notions: value on this approach is explicated in terms of the stance that should be taken toward the object. That it is fitting to have a certain attitude, that there are reasons to have it, or that the attitude in question is appropriate or called for, are different ways to express this deontic claim. Consequently, an important advantage of the “fitting-attitudes” analysis, or the FA analysis for short, is that it removes the air of mystery from the normative ‘compellingness’ of values. (Less)