Demand shock

Abstract: Using a newly developed measure of global real economic activity, a structural decomposition of the real price of crude oil in four components is proposed: oil supply shocks driven by political events in OPEC countries; other oil supply shocks; aggregate shocks to the demand for industrial commodities; and demand shocks that are specific to the crude oil market. The latter shock is designed to capture shifts in the price of oil driven by higher precautionary demand associated with concerns about the availability of future oil supplies. The paper quantifies the magnitude and timing of these shocks, their dynamic effects on the real price of oil and their relative importance in determining the real price of oil during 1975-2005. The analysis also sheds light on the origins of the major oil price shocks since 1979. Distinguishing between the sources of higher oil prices is shown to be crucial for assessing the effect of higher oil prices on U.S. real GDP and CPI inflation. It is shown that policies aimed at dealing with higher oil prices must take careful account of the origins of higher oil prices. The paper also quantifies the extent to which the macroeconomic performance of the U.S. since the mid-1970s has been determined by the external economic shocks driving the real price of oil as opposed to domestic economic factors and policies.

Abstract: Standard models of aggregate demand treat money and credit asymmetrically; money is given a special status, while loans, bonds, and other debt instruments are lumped together in a "bond market" and suppressed by Walras' Law. This makes bank liabilities central to the monetary transmission mechanism, while giving no role to bank assets. We show how to modify a textbook IS-UI model so as to permit a more balanced treatment. As in Tobin (1969) and Brunner-Meltzer (1972), the key assumption is that loans and bonds are imperfect substitutes. In the modified model, credit supply and demand shocks have independent effects on aggregate demand; the nature of the monetary transmission mechanism is also somewhat different. The main policy implication is that the relative value of money and credit as policy indicators depends on the variances of shocks to money and credit demand. We present some evidence that money-demand shocks have become more important relative to credit-demand shocks during the 1980s.

Abstract: It is shown that the reaction of U.S. real stock returns to an oil price shock differs greatly depending on whether the change in the price of oil is driven by demand or supply shocks in the oil market. The demand and supply shocks driving the global crude oil market jointly account for 22% of the long-run variation in U.S. real stock returns. The responses of industry-specific U.S. stock returns to demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market are consistent with accounts of the transmission of oil price shocks that emphasize the reduction in domestic final demand.

Abstract: This paper shows that with (partial) irreversibility higher uncertainty reduces the responsiveness of investment to demand shocks. Uncertainty increases real option values making firms more cautious when investing or disinvesting. This is confirmed both numerically for a model with a rich mix of adjustment costs, time-varying uncertainty, and aggregation over investment decisions and time and also empirically for a panel of manufacturing firms. These “cautionary effects” of uncertainty are large—going from the lower quartile to the upper quartile of the uncertainty distribution typically halves the first year investment response to demand shocks. This implies the responsiveness of firms to any given policy stimulus may be much weaker in periods of high uncertainty, such as after the 1973 oil crisis and September 11, 2001.