TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that a principal prefers to delegate control to a better informed agent rather than to communicate with this agent as long as the incentive conflict is not too large relative to the principal's uncertainty about the environment.
Abstract: This paper studies delegation as an alternative to communication. We show that a principal prefers to delegate control to a better informed agent rather than to communicate with this agent as long as the incentive conflict is not too large relative to the principal's uncertainty about the environment. We further identify cases in which the principal optimally delegates control to an "intermediary", and show that keeping a veto-right typically reduces the expected utility of the principal unless the incentive conflict is extreme. This paper is concerned with the old saying that "knowledge is power". In organizations, much of the information used in decision making is dispersed in the hierarchy. Lower-level managers, for example, are often much better informed about consumer needs, competitive pressures, specialized technologies or market opportunities than their superiors. The financial press is full of stories about how companies have pushed decision rights lower in the hierarchy in order to profit from this local knowledge.1 For the same reason, newly acquired subsidiaries are often left with substantial autonomy. The goal of this paper is to better understand why an uninformed principal (the company owners, senior management) may grant formal decision rights to an agent (senior or middle management) who is better informed but has different objectives. We argue that a principal often delegates authority in order to avoid the noisy communication, and hence the loss of information, which stems from these differences in objectives.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze how organizations can minimize costs of processing and communicating information and show that the number of transits to the top tends to be equalized across individual information items.
Abstract: This paper analyzes how organizations can minimize costs of processing and communicating information. Communication is costly because it takes time for an agent to absorb new information sent by others. Agents can reduce this time by specializing in the processing of particular types of information. When these returns to specialization outweigh costs of communication, it is efficient for several agents to collaborate within a firm. It is shown that efficient networks involve centralization, that individuals delegate tasks to subordinates only if they are overloaded, and that the number of transits to the top tends to be equalized across individual information items.
TL;DR: It is shown that this separation is possible: a "fully homomorphic" encryption scheme is described that keeps data private, but that allows a worker that does not have the secret decryption key to compute any (still encrypted) result of the data, even when the function of theData is very complex.
Abstract: Suppose that you want to delegate the ability to process your data, without giving away access to it. We show that this separation is possible: we describe a "fully homomorphic" encryption scheme that keeps data private, but that allows a worker that does not have the secret decryption key to compute any (still encrypted) result of the data, even when the function of the data is very complex. In short, a third party can perform complicated processing of data without being able to see it. Among other things, this helps make cloud computing compatible with privacy.
TL;DR: FairAccess is introduced as a fully decentralized pseudonymous and privacy preserving authorization management framework that enables users to own and control their data in IoT.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze how organizations can minimize costs of processing and communicating information, and they show that efficient networks involve centralization, that individuals delegate tasks to subordinates only if they are overloaded and that the number of transits to the top tends to be equalized across individual information items.