Topic
Deferred compensation
About: Deferred compensation is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 286 publications have been published within this topic receiving 12838 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
TL;DR: In this article, a review of existing work on the provision of incentives for workers is presented, and the authors evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation from two perspectives: first, an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance.
Abstract: I NCENTIVES ARE the essence of economics. Despite many wide-ranging claims about their supposed importance, there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers. The purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives. Since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned, a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm's interest. This literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers. These include piece rates, options, discretionary bonuses, promotions, profit sharing, efficiency wages, deferred compensation, and so on. My objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation. Where possible, I will address the literature from two perspectives. First, an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance. Accordingly, I consider whether agents behave in this way, and whether these responses are always in the firm's interest. Second, I address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind. In other words, do contracts look like the predictions of the theory? Incentives are provided to workers
3,956 citations
TL;DR: This paper found that higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (vega) implements riskier policy choices, including relatively more investment in R&D, less investment in PPE, more focus, and higher leverage.
3,180 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a theory of agency is presented and empirical evidence which supports the hypothesis is provided, and the contract with mandatory-retirement clauses is Pareto efficient, where the date of mandatory retirement is chosen to correspond to the date for voluntary retirement, but the nature of the optimal wage profile results in a discrepancy between spot wage and spot VMP.
Abstract: This paper offers an explanation of the use of mandatory-retirement clauses in labor contracts. It argues that the date of mandatory retirement is chosen to correspond to the date of voluntary retirement, but the nature of the optimal wage profile results in a discrepancy between spot wage and spot VMP (value of the worker's marginal product). This is because it is preferable to pay workers less than VMP when young and more than VMP when old. By doing so the "agency" problem is solved, so the contract with mandatory retirement is Pareto efficient. A theory of agency is presented and empirical evidence which supports the hypothesis is provided.
2,211 citations
Book•
28 Aug 2011TL;DR: This article found that workers in longer jobs earn significantly more in every year of the job than do workers in shorter jobs and that workers with more experience have had more time to find good jobs and/or good matches, resulting in higher earnings.
Abstract: The stylized fact that seniority and earnings in a cross-section are positively related, even after controlling for total labor market experience, has served as the basis for theoretical analyses of implicit labor contracts suggesting that workers post bonds in the form of deferred compensation in order to ensure their continued performance at an adequate level. An alternative interpretation is that good workers or workers in good jobs or good matches both earn more throughout the job and have longer job durations. Another stylized fact, that labor market experience and earnings in a cross section are positively related, has been taken as evidence of the importance of general human capital accumulation. An alternative interpretation of this evidence is that workers with more experience have had more time to find good jobs and/or good matches, resulting in higher earnings. Earnings functions are estimated including a measure of the completed duration of jobs in order to distinguish between the competing hypotheses regarding both seniority and experience. These yield three main results. First, workers in longer jobs earn significantly more in every year of the job than do workers in shorter jobs. Second, controlling for completed job duration eliminates most of the apparent return to seniority found in standard cross-section models. Thus, it appears that implicit contracts that provide for workers posting bonds through deferred wage payments are less important than has been believed. Third, for blue collar workers there is evidence thata part of the small observed (cross-sectional) return to labor market experience is due to sorting of workers into better jobs over time. There is no evidence of sorting for white collar workers.
549 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors study CEO pension arrangements in 237 large capitalization firms and find that CEO compensation exhibits a balance between debt and equity incentives, and the balance shifts systematically away from equity and toward debt as CEOs grow older.
Abstract: Though widely used in executive compensation, inside debt has been almost entirely overlooked by prior work. We initiate this research by studying CEO pension arrangements in 237 large capitalization firms. Among our findings are that CEO compensation exhibits a balance between debt and equity incentives; the balance shifts systematically away from equity and toward debt as CEOs grow older; annual increases in pension entitlements represent about 10% of overall CEO compensation, and about 13% for CEOs aged 61–65; CEOs with high debt incentives manage their firms conservatively; and pension compensation influences patterns of CEO turnover and cash compensation.
530 citations
Related Topics (5)
Performance Metrics
| Year | Papers |
|---|---|
| 2021 | 7 |
| 2020 | 8 |
| 2019 | 10 |
| 2018 | 11 |
| 2017 | 10 |
| 2016 | 9 |