Declarant

Abstract: For determining the correctness of an import declaration lodged by a declarant within international shipping, customs authorities rely on manual cross-validation of the declaration with other trade documents. However, the sheer volume of import declarations lodged annually makes it impossible to manually cross-validate each declaration. Smart contracts have the potential to automatically aggregate relevant information from blockchain-based ledgers for lodging and cross-validation. In this paper we explore how such smart contract could be implemented. We demonstrate that a smart import declaration can be used to automatically aggregate information from different sources (e.g., pro forma invoice data elements stored on the blockchain ledger). However, technical and organizational considerations that are inherent to blockchain technology need to be addressed for the smart import declaration to be acceptable for both customs authorities and declarants. It is therefore suggested that future work focusses on data standards required to enable automatic aggregation of relevant trade information and the generation of the import declaration and governance of the smart import declaration by customs authorities to assure correctness.

Abstract: The advance directive is a document that enables a competent individual to specify the form of health care he would like to have, in the event that he is unable to make such decisions in the future. This review paper traces the development of the advance directive from 1967, when it was first proposed by Luis Kutner. The Karen Ann Quinlan case and the Nancy Cruzan case are cited as examples of the case for the advance directive. The argument is that advance directives assist doctors, patients, family members and other carers with the increasingly complex health care decision making. Reservations have been expressed about the anticipatory nature of the decision, possible conflict with personal and religious ethics and the risk of cost containment considerations being over-riding concerns. The advance directive in America has undergone changes since the California Natural Death Act 1976 was passed. In the 1980s, "terminal" included permanent unconsciousness and advanced dementia. The declarant was also given a wider choice of treatment procedures that they wish to be withheld. Proxy directives were also introduced. In the 1990s, the declarant is even allowed to request the use of life-prolonging procedures. When appropriately implemented, the advance directive can perform its intended functions of clarifying the patient's perspective on life, death and medical care. When it is vague in terminology or applied to patients with uncertain prognoses, it can cause confusion to the patient's carers; and when improperly used, it can become an instrument not of patient's preferences, but of economic purpose, family bias, or physician's values.

Abstract: INTRODUCTIONA mainstay of the law of evidence is the distinction between admissibility and weight. Judges are tasked with the responsibility of determining whether proffered evidence is admissible and, if it is, jurors must decide what weight to give it.1 This division of responsibility holds across all evidence rules, from basic relevance to hearsay. Hence, a "dying declaration" that is hearsay is only admissible if the judge determines, among other things, that the statement was made by a declarant "while believing that the declarant's death was imminent."2 If admitted, the weight, if any, that should be accorded the particular dying declaration is up to the jury to decide. The predicate issue of whether the defendant believed death was imminent is called a "preliminary fact,"3 one that the judge must determine by a preponderance of the evidence.4 This prerogative belongs to the judge on the assumption that juries are likely to attribute significance to an out-of-court statement even if they were to find that death was not imminent.5This division of responsibilities between judge and jury also applies to scientific evidence presented by experts.6 Indeed, because the distinction between admissibility and weight is endemic to the law of evidence, in theory the issue has existed for scientific evidence since experts were first introduced at trial in the nineteenth century.7 Yet the distinction received little attention until the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.8 The Daubert Court, interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 702, held that judges are "gatekeepers" and obligated to determine whether the methods and principles underlying proffered expert testimony are-more likely than not-reliable and valid.9 In other words, the Court treated the "evidentiary reliability" of the scientific evidence proffered in the case as a preliminary fact and thus within the judge's purview to determine. Consistent with the preliminary fact rule in other types of cases, the rationale for this requirement is that requiring juries to parse unvetted scientific information and disregard those aspects of it they consider suspect is likely to lead to ill-considered verdicts.10In contrast to the usual preliminary fact determination, however, the complex nature of scientific evidence has created substantial confusion among courts about just where the judge's authority to decide admissibility ends and the jury's responsibility to assess weight begins. The key variable in the latter setting, according to Daubert's original formulation, is whether the fact is a "conclusion" or something else. Under Daubert, in assessing admissibility, the judge's "focus . . . must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate."11 This distinction between methodology and principles on the one hand and case-specific conclusions on the other (which we will refer to as the methodology- conclusions distinction for ease of reference)12 has assumed major significance. While the Court abandoned the distinction just four years later in General Electric Co. v. Joiner,13 and while the amendments to Rule 702 three years after Joiner made no mention of it,14 many courts continue to put considerable emphasis on whether the preliminary fact is about "methodology" or instead describes "conclusions."15 Only a minority of courts have required that the judge preliminarily determine that the expert's conclusion was reliably reached using a reliable methodology.16 Most courts hold that the judge's sole concern is whether the expert followed an acceptable methodology, and other decisions have even punted some types of methodological issues to the jury.17In this Article, we argue that the methodology-conclusions distinction has no principled basis in science and thus should have none in law. Since the distinction does not align with the nature of the evidence that scientists proffer in court, it is destined to fail and should be explicitly jettisoned. …

Abstract: John E.B. Myers (*) Ingrid Cordon (**) Simona Ghetti (***) Gail S. Goodman (****) I INTRODUCTION Exceptions to the hearsay rule grew out of intuitive beliefs about human nature. (1) Thus, dying declarations were thought to be reliable because dying declarants hesitate to meet their Maker with a lie upon their lips. (2) Excited utterances are reliable because traumatic stress is believed to still the capacity to lie. Statements to doctors are trustworthy because patients are believed to have an incentive to tell the truth to the doctor. Psychological science based on empirical study of human behavior played no role in the origin of most hearsay exceptions. The exceptions, after all, came into being long before William James and Wilhem Wundt established their laboratories in 1875 and 1879. (3) Today, psychological science has made tremendous progress, and it is appropriate to ask whether modern psychology supports or undermines the intuitive foundations of hearsay exceptions. This paper explores this issue by examining three exceptions: excited utterances, statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, and the residual hearsay exception. These selections are appropriate because the focus is child declarants, and these exceptions play key roles in child abuse litigation. II THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION The origins of the excited utterance exception can be traced to the eighteenth century. (4) The exception is invoked frequently in child abuse litigation. (5) The exception is codified in Rule 803(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provides that the hearsay rule does not exclude statements "relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." (6) The primary rationale for the exception is that statements are trustworthy when made shortly following a startling event and while the declarant remains affected by the stress caused by the event. Traumatic stress is thought to lower the probability that statements are a product of conscious fabrication. (7) The excited utterance exception has three requirements. First, there must be an exciting event. Second, the out-of-court statement must relate to the event. Third, the statement must be made while the declarant is under the stress of excitement induced by the event. Courts consider several factors to determine whether hearsay statements were made under the stress of excitement caused by a startling event. We discuss these factors below, employing a two-step process. We begin by outlining legal principles. The legal analysis will then be followed by relevant psychological principles. We conclude the discussion of excited utterances by grappling with the fundamental question: Does traumatic stress still the capacity to lie? Some of the legal factors involved in this determination include: Spontaneity. For many courts, spontaneity is the most important factor in determining whether a statement was a product of reflective thought or a spontaneous reaction to a startling event. The more spontaneous the statement, the more likely the court is to apply the excited utterance exception. If a child had an opportunity to reflect, the balance tips away from admissibility. Questioning. A child may make a statement in response to questions about a startling event. Courts agree that questioning does not necessarily destroy the excitement required for this exception. Thus, simple questions like "What happened?" do not destroy excitement or spontaneity. As questioning increases, however, and especially as questions become suggestive, the odds decrease that the child's statement is a spontaneous reaction to a startling event. Lapse of time. The longer the delay between a startling event and an out-of-court statement, the less likely the declarant was excited when the statement was made. …