Data Integrity Field

Abstract: Systems and methods for providing data integrity for stored data are disclosed. A method may include, in connection with the receipt of a read command at a storage resource, reading a data block from the storage resource, the data block including a data field, a data integrity field indicating the integrity the data field, and an encryption indicator field indicating whether the data block is encrypted with a current cryptographic key for the storage resource. The method may further include determining whether the data field is encrypted with the current cryptographic key based at least on the encryption indicator field. The method may additionally include returning at least a portion of the data block in reply to the read command in response to determining that the data field is encrypted with a cryptographic key other than the current cryptographic key.

Abstract: When a compatibility standard is adapted, extended, or selectively implemented, its purpose is likely to be undermined. Its value declines sharply because interoperability between the standard-compliant implementations becomes uncertain. The integrity of the standard is at stake. This article discusses the strategies intended to safeguard the standards' integrity. The examples are set in the context of Java development, a de facto standard. The paper also discussed the manner and the degree of protecting the standard's integrity

Abstract: A hierarchical compression tester and associated method employs a grid-based storage capacity wherein a storage unit is defined by a grouping of data blocks. Each data block is stored in one of a plurality of storage devices. Each stored data block has a data portion and a data integrity field (DIF) including a data reliability qualifier (DRQ) indicating whether the respective data portion is valid. The tester also has a logical device allocation map that includes a storage unit descriptor array that identifies one or more storage units corresponding to a selected logical address. The logical device allocation map has a DIF array that identifies whether any of the data blocks in the one or more storage units corresponding to the selected logical address includes invalid data.

Abstract: Computer security concerns have been rapidly increasing because of repeated security breaches and leakages of sensitive personal information. Such security breaches are mainly caused by an inappropriate management of the PCs, so maintaining integrity of the platform configuration is essential, and, verifying the integrity of the computer platform and software becomes more significant. To address these problems, the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) has developed various specifications that are used to measure the integrity of the platform based on hardware trust. In the trusted computing technology, the integrity data of each component running on the platform is recorded in the security chip and they are securely checked by a remote attestation. The infrastructure working group in the TCG is trying to define an Integrity Management Infrastructure in which the Platform Trust Services (PTS) is a new key component which deals with an Integrity Report. When we use the PTS in the target platform, it is a service component that collects and measures the runtime integrity of the target platform in a secure way. The PTS can also be used to validate the Integrity Reports. We introduce the notion of the Platform Validation Authority, a trusted third party, which verifies the composition of the integrity measurement of the target platform in the Integrity Reports. The Platform Validation Authority complements the role of the current Certificate Authority in the Public Key Infrastructure which attests to the integrity of the user identity as well as to related artifacts such as digital signatures. In this paper, we cover the research topics in this new area, the relevant technologies and open issues of the trusted computing, and the detail of our PTS implementation.