TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the price adjustment practices and provide quantita- tive measurement of the managerial and customer costs of price adjust- ment using data from a large U.S. industrial manufacturer and its custom- ers.
Abstract: We study the price adjustment practices and provide quantita- tive measurement of the managerial and customer costs of price adjust- ment using data from a large U.S. industrial manufacturer and its custom- ers. We e nd that price adjustment costs are a much more complex construct than the existing industrial-organization or macroeconomics literature recognizes. In addition to physical costs ( menu costs), we identify and measure three types of managerial costs (information gath- ering, decision-making, and communication costs) and two types of customer costs (communication and negotiation costs). We e nd that the managerial costs are more than 6 times, and customer costs are more than 20 times, the menu costs. In total, the price adjustment costs comprise 1.22% of the company' s revenue and 20.03% of the company' s net margin. We show that many components of the managerial and customer costs are convex, whereas the menu costs are not. We also document the link between price adjustment costs and price rigidity. Finally, we provide evidence of managers' fear of antagonizing customers. I have no answer to the questionof how to measure these menu change costs, but these (menu cost) theories will never be taken seriously until an answer is provided. Edward Prescott (1987, p. 113)
TL;DR: A survey of the techniques available for estimating customer interruption costs, the rationale of those that are currently popular is discussed, and the application of such cost data in creating a composite customer damage function is explored as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: An approach often used to estimate power-system reliability worth is to determine consumers' monetary losses resulting from service interruptions, i.e. the cost of unreliability. Previously, studies have been conducted to provide estimates of customer interruption costs, and a wide range of methodologies has evolved. There is no universal agreement on the appropriateness of methodologies to particular situations nor on the interpretation of the results obtained, but some appear to be more acceptable and useful to the industry than others. A survey is presented of the techniques available for estimating customer interruption costs, the rationale of those that are currently popular is discussed, and the application of such cost data in creating a composite customer damage function is explored. >
TL;DR: Existing utility data can be used to predict customer demand management behavior and it is shown how estimated customer cost functions can be calibrated to help in designing efficient demand management contracts.
Abstract: In times of stress customers can help a utility by means of voluntary demand management programs if they are offered the right incentives. The incentives offered can be optimized if the utility can estimate the outage or substitution costs of its customers. This paper illustrates how existing utility data can be used to predict customer demand management behavior. More specifically, it shows how estimated customer cost functions can be calibrated to help in designing efficient demand management contracts.
TL;DR: In this article, the mediator effect of network structural embeddedness between customer experience and consumer purchase intention in the context of cross-border e-commerce is investigated, and the structural equation model is built to analyze the mediators effect of structural embeddings.
TL;DR: It is demonstrated that the cost saving provided by cooperation between the decision makers is usually significant and the implications of this work for how manufacturers and distributors negotiate, coordinate, and implement their supply chain schedules in practice are discussed.
Abstract: We study conflict and cooperation issues arising in a supply chain where a manufacturer makes products which are shipped to customers by a distributor. The manufacturer and the distributor each has an ideal schedule, determined by cost and capacity considerations. However, these two schedules are in general not well coordinated, which leads to poor overall performance. In this context, we study two practical problems. In both problems, the manufacturer focuses on minimizing unproductive time. The distributor minimizes customer cost measures in the first problem and minimizes inventory holding cost in the second problem. We first evaluate each party’s conflict, which is the relative increase in cost that results from using the other party’s optimal schedule. Since this conflict is often significant, we consider several practical scenarios about the level of cooperation between the manufacturer and the distributor. These scenarios define various scheduling problems for the manufacturer, the distributor, and the overall system. For each of these scheduling problems, we provide an algorithm. We demonstrate that the cost saving provided by cooperation between the decision makers is usually significant. Finally, we discuss the implications of our work for how manufacturers and distributors negotiate, coordinate, and implement their supply chain schedules in practice.