About: Cross-collateralization is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1658 publications have been published within this topic receiving 58953 citations.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors determine when a debt contract will be monitored by lenders, which is the choice between borrowing directly (issuing a bond, without monitoring) and borrowing through a bank that monitors to alleviate moral hazard.
Abstract: This paper determines when a debt contract will be monitored by lenders. This is the choice between borrowing directly (issuing a bond, without monitoring) and borrowing through a bank that monitors to alleviate moral hazard. This provides a theory of bank loan demand and of the role of monitoring in circumstances in which reputation effects are important. A key result is that borrowers with credit ratings toward the middle of the spectrum rely on bank loans, and in periods of high interest rates or low future profitability, higher-rated borrowers choose to borrow from banks.
TL;DR: In this paper, a formula is derived to evaluate the cost of issuing a guarantee of a loan by a third party, and the method used is to demonstrate an isomorphic correspondence between loan guarantees and common stock put options and then to use the well developed theory of option pricing to derive the formula.
Abstract: It is not uncommon in the arrangement of a loan to include as part of the financial package a guarantee of the loan by a third party. Examples are guarantees by a parent company of loans made to its subsidiaries or government guarantees of loans made to private corporations. Also included would be guarantees of bank deposits by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. As with other forms of insurance, the issuing of a guarantee imposes a liability or cost on the guarantor. In this paper, a formula is derived to evaluate this cost. The method used is to demonstrate an isomorphic correspondence between loan guarantees and common stock put options, and then to use the well developed theory of option pricing to derive the formula.
TL;DR: The authors employed Granger-causality techniques to test four hypotheses regarding the relationships among loan quality, cost efficiency, and bank capital, and found that problem loans precede reductions in measured cost efficiency.
Abstract: This paper addresses a little examined intersection between the problem loan literature and the bank efficiency literature. We employ Granger-causality techniques to test four hypotheses regarding the relationships among loan quality, cost efficiency, and bank capital. The data suggest that problem loans precede reductions in measured cost efficiency; that measured cost efficiency precedes reductions in problem loans; and the reductions in capital at thinly capitalized banks precede increases in problem loans. Hence, cost efficiency may be an important indicator of future problem loans and problem banks. Our results are ambiguous concerning whether or not researchers should control for problem loans in efficiency estimation.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study the effect on loan conditions of geographical distance between firms, the lending bank, and all other banks in the vicinity, and report the first comprehensive evidence on the occurrence of spatial price discrimination in bank lending.
Abstract: We study the effect on loan conditions of geographical distance between firms, the lending bank, and all other banks in the vicinity. For our study, we employ detailed contract information from more than 15,000 bank loans to small firms comprising the entire loan portfolio of a large Belgian bank. We report the first comprehensive evidence on the occurrence of spatial price discrimination in bank lending. Loan rates decrease with the distance between the firm and the lending bank and increase with the distance between the firm and competing banks. Transportation costs cause the spatial price discrimination we observe.
TL;DR: In this paper, the impact of monetary policy on the supply of bank credit is analyzed and the authors find that tighter monetary and worse economic conditions substantially reduce loan granting, especially from banks with lower capital or liquidity ratios.
Abstract: We analyze the impact of monetary policy on the supply of bank credit. Monetary policy affects both loan supply and demand, thus making identification a steep challenge. We therefore analyze a novel, supervisory dataset with loan applications from Spain. Accounting for time-varying firm heterogeneity in loan demand, we find that tighter monetary and worse economic conditions substantially reduce loan granting, especially from banks with lower capital or liquidity ratios; responding to applications for the same loan, weak banks are less likely to grant the loan. Finally, firms cannot offset the resultant credit restriction by applying to other banks. (JEL E32, E44, E52, G21, G32)