TL;DR: This article studied the behavior of money, credit, and macroeconomic indicators over the long run based on a new historical dataset for 14 countries over the years 1870-2008 and found that credit growth is a powerful predictor of financial crises, suggesting that policymakers ignore credit at their peril.
Abstract: The financial crisis has refocused attention on money and credit fluctuations, financial crises, and policy responses. We study the behavior of money, credit, and macroeconomic indicators over the long run based on a new historical dataset for 14 countries over the years 1870-2008. Total credit has increased strongly relative to output and money in the second half of the twentieth century. Monetary policy responses to financial crises have also been more aggressive, but the output costs of crises have remained large. Credit growth is a powerful predictor of financial crises, suggesting that policymakers ignore credit at their peril. (JEL E32, E44, E52, G01, N10, N20)
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present an overview of the history of business cycle analysis and its application in the context of demand analysis, including a discussion of the data-theory gap in demand analysis and the evolution of identification questions.
Abstract: List of figures Preface Acknowledgements Introduction Part I. Business Cycles: Introduction to business cycles 1. Sunspot and Venus theories of the business cycle: 1.1. Jevons' sunspot theory 1.2. Moore's Venus theory 1.3. The decline of periodic cycle analysis 2. Measuring and representing business cycles: 2.1. Juglar's credit cycle 2.2. The statistical approach of W. C. Mitchell 2.3. Persons and business barometers 2.4. The business cycle research institutes 2.5. Statistical economics and econometrics Addendum: graphs and graphic methods 3. Random shocks enter the business cycle scene: 3.1. The experiments of Yule and Slutsky 3.2. Frisch's time-series analysis 3.3. Frisch's rocking horse model of the business cycle 4. Tinbergen and macrodynamic models: 4.1. The Dutch model 4.2. The first League of Nations' report 4.3. The second League of Nations' report 4.4. the critical reaction to Tinbergen's work Part II. Demand Analysis: Introduction to demand analysis 5. Narrowing the data-theory gap in demand analysis: 5.1. Difficulties in early statistical measurements of demand 5.2. Static theory and time-series data 5.3. Econometric models of demand 5.4. The data-theory gap under review 6. The evolution of identification questions: 6.1. The emergence of correspondence problems 6.2. Identifying the demand curve 6.3. The identification of two relationships 6.4. Back to the single demand curve Part III. Formal models in econometrics: Introduction to formal models 7. Errors-in-variables and errors-in equations models: 7.1. Errors and the single equation 7.2. Errors and interdependent relationships 7.3. Postscript: measurement errors and the method of instrumental variables 8. Haavelmo's probability model: 8.1. Statistics without probability 8.2. Signs of change 8.3. Haavelmo's probabilistic revolution in econometrics 8.4. The new consensus Conclusion References Index.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined micro evidence on the effect of bank capital requirements on loan supply by regulated banks and on the ability of substitute sources of credit to offset changes in credit supply by affected banks.
Abstract: The regulation of bank capital as a means of smoothing the credit cycle is a central element of forthcoming macro-prudential regimes internationally. For such regulation to be effective in controlling the aggregate supply of credit it must be the case that: (i) changes in capital requirements affect loan supply by regulated banks, and (ii) unregulated substitute sources of credit are unable to offset changes in credit supply by affected banks. This paper examines micro evidence—lacking to date—on both questions, using a unique data set. In the UK, regulators have imposed time-varying, bank-specific minimum capital requirements since Basel I. It is found that regulated banks (UK-owned banks and resident foreign subsidiaries) reduce lending in response to tighter capital requirements. But unregulated banks (resident foreign branches) increase lending in response to tighter capital requirements on a relevant reference group of regulated banks. This “leakage” is substantial, amounting to about one-third of the initial impulse from the regulatory change.
TL;DR: In this article, a macro-prudential policy could curb these credit cycles, both through raising the cost of maintaining risky portfolios and through an expectations channel that operates via banks' perceptions of other banks' actions.
Abstract: Credit cycles have been a characteristic of advanced economies for over 100 years On average, a sustained pick-up in the ratio of credit to GDP has been highly correlated with banking crises The boom phases of the cycle are characterised by large deviations in credit from trend A range of mechanisms can generate these effects, each of which has strategic complementarity between banks at its core Macro-prudential policy could curb these credit cycles, both through raising the cost of maintaining risky portfolios and through an expectations channel that operates via banks' perceptions of other banks' actions
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors conduct face-to-face interviews with bank CEOs to classify 397 banks across 21 countries as either relationship or transaction lenders, and then use the geographic coordinates of these banks' branches and of 14,100 businesses to analyze how the lending techniques of banks in the vicinity of firms are related to credit constraints at two contrasting points of the credit cycle.