Counterattack

Abstract: This study aimed to compare the technical and tactical aspects between winning and losing teams in close (i.e., 1-3 goals of difference) and unbalanced (i.e., >3 goals of difference) elite women's water polo games. A notational analysis was performed on 45 games to evaluate occurrence of action, mean duration, action outcome, origin and execution of shot, offensive and defensive role, and arrangement of even, counterattack, power play, and transition situations. Independent 2-sided t-tests were applied to show differences (p than 2 fakes; power play: drive shots) of shots, offensive even arrangements (6 vs. 6/5 vs. 5; 2 vs. 2/1 vs. 1), and role. Regarding unbalanced games, differences emerged for the occurrence of action (even, counterattack), duration (even; power play), action outcome (even: goals, penalties; counterattack: goals, no goal shots, penalties; power play: goals, no goal shots; transition: lost possessions), origin (even: zone 2, zone 4; counterattack: zone 5) and execution (even: free throws, drive shots; counterattack: drive shots, shots after > 2 fakes; power play: drive shots, shots after 1 fake) of shots; offensive even arrangements (2 vs. 2/1 vs. 1), and role; and defensive even arrangements (pressing, zones 1-2, zone M, zones 2-3-4). Differences between close and unbalanced games underlining that water polo performance should be analyzed in relation to specific margins of victory. Therefore, water polo coaches and physical trainers can plan a sound training session according to the most important aspects of close (opponent's exclusion, center forward play, and power play actions) and unbalanced (defensive skills) games.

Abstract: This paper models the early dynamics of insurgency using an agent-based computer simulation of civilians, insurgents, and soldiers. In the simulation, insurgents choose to attack government forces, which then strike back. Such government counterattacks may result in the capture or killing of insurgents, may make nearby civilians afraid to become insurgents, but may also increase the anger of surrounding civilians if there is significant collateral damage. If civilians become angry enough, they become new insurgents. I simulate the dynamics of these interactions, focusing on the effectiveness of government forces at capturing insurgents vs. their accuracy in avoiding collateral damage. The simulations suggest that accuracy (avoidance of collateral damage) is more important for the long-term defeat of insurgency than is effectiveness at capturing insurgents in any given counterattack. There also may be a critical 'tipping point' for accuracy below which the length of insurgencies increases dramatically. The dynamics of how insurgencies grow or decline in response to various combinations of government accuracy and effectiveness illustrate the tradeoffs faced by governments in dealing with the early stages of an insurgency.

Abstract: THE CHINESE "SELF-DEFENSE counterattack" into the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) on February 17, 1979 may prove to be a turning point in -the history of the Marxist-Leninist movement. It was the first invasion of a communist country by another without any pretence of an ideological justification, or "invitation" by that country's people. Moreover, it flies in the face of the Maoist doctrine of Third World solidarity.1 Such long-ranging issues deserve careful consideration, and will be touched on in this article. The events are still so recent, however, and so many critical facts remain unknown, that the full political implications cannot yet be discerned. Instead, this article will concentrate on a single issue: What does the Sino-Vietnamese war of February-March 1979 indicate about the military capabilities of the People's Republic of China (PRC)? This issue needs to be addressed, if for no other reason, because a widening circle of writers and decision-makers seem to regard the PRC as one leg of the global "superpower triangle."2 This study will consider three main topics: China's military-strategic objectives; the actual conduct of military operations; and, finally, what the military results indicate about Chinese military capabilities and prospects.

Abstract: This study aimed to detect and analyse regular patterns of play in football teams during their offensive phase, through the combination of the sequential analysis technique and semi-structured inte...