Conventional weapon

Abstract: In 2013, Obama administration spokesmen stated that all U.S. nuclear war plans “apply the principles of distinction and proportionality and seek to minimize collateral damage to civilian populations and civilian objects.” We analyze U.S. nuclear policy documents and argue that major changes must be made if U.S. nuclear war plans are to conform to these principles of just war doctrine and the law of armed conflict. We propose that the U.S. president announce a commitment to a “principle of necessity,” committing the United States not to use nuclear weapons against any military target that can be destroyed with reasonable probability of success by a conventional weapon. Such a doctrinal change would reduce collateral damage from any nuclear strike or retaliation by the United States and would, we argue, make our deterrent threats more credible and thus more effective.

Abstract: If contemporary terrorism is assumed to be increasing in lethality, and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons theoretically are assumed to provide interested groups with the ability to achieve a higher kill ratio per incident, why have terrorist organizations, specifically those seeking to produce large amounts of casualties, continued to predominantly employ conventional weapon systems instead of chemical and biological ones? Not negating the possibility of such occurrences, I found that missions and groups specifically seeking to produce large amounts of casualties will prefer employing conventional weapons systems, while others predominantly focusing on inciting fear, panic and general disruption – regardless of the amount of resultant casualties, may be more tempted to use unconventional weapons.

Abstract: The Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) concept calls for a U.S. capability to deliver conventional strikes anywhere in the world in approximately an hour. The logic of the CPGS concept is straight-forward. The United States has global security commitments to deter and respond to a diverse spectrum of threats, ranging from terrorist organizations to near-peer competitors. The United States might need to strike a time-sensitive target protected by formidable air defenses or located deep inside enemy territory. Small, high-value targets might pop up without warning in remote or sensitive areas, potentially precluding the United States from responding to the situation by employing other conventional weapons systems, deploying Special Operations Forces (SOF), or relying on the host country. A long-range nuclear-armed ballistic missile has the speed and global reach to overcome these obstacles. But a President would probably prefer a conventional strike option as an alternative to nuclear weapons in most contingencies. In fact, many advocates of the CPGS concept argue that it would provide a new capability for scenarios in which existing conventional systems would be insufficient but the use of nuclear weapons would be inappropriate. Additionally, in many potential crises, a nuclear threat might lack credibility in the eyes of U.S. allies and adversaries regardless of a U.S. President's willingness to employ nuclear force. At the same time, U.S. allies and potential adversaries might question whether existing U.S. conventional weapons would be effective against some emerging threats. A long-range conventional strike capability might enhance deterrence and assurance by providing an effective and usable (and thus more credible) strike option. For these reasons, a conventional weapon that is faster, travels farther, and is more effective against antiaccess capabilities than existing conventional forces would be a valuable strategic asset. The most commonly discussed CPGS systems envision mating a conventional warhead with either a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) or a modified intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). If successful, this would provide a conventional weapon with the same rapid speed, global reach, and ability to penetrate air defenses as U.S. nuclear-armed SLBMs and ICBMs. Because the United States has thus far only deployed nuclear-armed ICBMs and SLBMs, some argue that U.S. conventional SLBMs or ICBMs would be destabilizing weapons. For instance, Congress withheld the funding necessary for the George W. Bush administration to develop and deploy conventional Trident D-5 missiles on Ohio-class submarines due to concerns that Russian officials might misinterpret a U.S. CPGS launch as a nuclear attack. Additionally, since long-range ballistic missiles possess unparalleled speed and reach, some analysts worry that U.S. leaders will be tempted to launch CPGS missiles quickly without fully assessing the potential risks of using military force. Finally, Russian and Chinese officials have suggested that they perceive the CPGS concept as part of a U.S. effort to achieve a first strike capability. Skeptics also argue that CPGS weapons would likely be unusable because the United States would lack the necessary intelligence to employ them against fleeting targets. If the United States does possess actionable intelligence, they reason, other conventional assets will be within range of the target. As a result, there is no clear consensus within Congress and the U.S. national security policy community about whether the United States should develop and deploy CPGS capabilities. This Strategic Forum examines the conceptual and policy issues surrounding CPGS missiles. It concludes that, on balance, a CPGS capability would be a valuable strategic asset for some fleeting and difficult-to-reach targets. It would fill a gap in the U.S. conventional strike capability in some circumstances, contribute to a more versatile and credible U. …

Abstract: : The Objective Individual Combat Weapon (OICW) is a revolutionary weapon system. It is being developed to satisfy Department of Defense requirements for individual and crew served weapons with improved range, penetration, and combat effectiveness capabilities. It is a remarkable weapons system which will substantially increase the lethality and survivability of United States service members on the modern battlefield. The objective of this research paper to identify a comprehensive training simulation design/system, capable of adequately addressing the operational needs for training the unique, interactive, simulation training requirements of the OICW. Specifically, it identifies industrial capability and related technology to provide state-of-the-art solutions to support personnel training on the revolutionary weapons system known as the Objective Individual Combat Weapon and its ancillary munitions. Though the enhanced capabilities of the OICW are indeed revolutionary, so too are the multifaceted challenges ushered in with this new weapons system. Perhaps the biggest challenges facing the OICW are the training and associated cost considerations. These cost factors are further complicated by the time requirements involved in training this unique and highly sophisticated weapon system. The focus must not be limited to simply establishing the best means for achieving training proficiency, but on the long term goal of determining the best means for maintaining and sustaining that desired level of proficiency. As with any sophisticated system, more cognitive skills are required (in addition to the basic motor skills of the conventional weapon system). Similarly, when learning a more sophisticated system, comes a higher degree of perishability, the decay or memory loss associated with these learned skills if not properly or frequently exercised.