Contractualism

Abstract: The term ''neo-liberalism'' denotes new forms of political-economic governance premised on the extension of market relationships. In critical social science literatures, the term has usurped labels referring to specific political projects (Thatcherism, Regeanomics, Rogernomics), and is more widely used than its counterparts including, for example, economic rationalism, monetarism, neo-conservatism, managerialism and contractualism.

Abstract: Preface Part I 1 The Main Ideas I 2 The Main Ideas II 3 The Second-Person Stance and Second-Personal Reasons Part II 4 Accountability and the Second Person 5 Moral Obligation and Accountability 6 Respect and the Second Person Part III 7 The Psychology of the Second Person 8 Interlude: Hume Versus Reid on Justice (with Contemporary Resonances) Part IV 9 Morality and Autonomy in Kant 10 The Second Person and Dignity: Variations on Fichtean Themes 11 Freedom and Practical Reason 12 A Foundation for Contractualism Works Cited Index

Abstract: PART FOUR: COMMENTARIES HIKING THE RANGE HUMANITY AS AN END IN ITSELF A MISMATCH OF METHODS HOW I AM NOT A KANTIAN PART FIVE: RESPONSES ON HIKING THE RANGE ON HUMANITY AS AN END IN ITSELF ON A MISMATCH OF METHODS HOW THE NUMBERS COUNT SCANLONIAN CONTRACTUALISM THE TRIPLE THEORY PART SIX: NORMATIVITY ANALYTICAL NATURALISM AND SUBJECTIVISM NON-ANALYTICAL NATURALISM THE TRIVIALITY OBJECTION NATURALISM AND NIHILISM NON-COGNITIVISM AND QUASI-REALISM NORMATIVITY NORMATIVE TRUTHS METAPHYSICS EPISTEMOLOGY RATIONALISM AGREEMENT NIETZSCHE WHAT MATTERS MOST APPENDICES WHY ANYTHING? WHY THIS? THE FAIR WARNING VIEW SOME OF KANT'S ARGUMENTS FOR HIS FORMULA OF UNIVERSAL LAW KANT'S CLAIMS ABOUT THE GOOD AUTONOMY AND CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES KANT'S MOTIVATIONAL ARGUMENT ON WHAT THERE IS Notes to Volume Two References Bibliography Index

Abstract: Utilitarianism occupies a central place in the moral philosophy of our time. It is not the view which most people hold; certainly there are very few who would claim to be act utilitarians. But for a much wider range of people it is the view towards which they find themselves pressed when they try to give a theoretical account of their moral beliefs. Within moral philosophy it represents a position one must struggle against if one wishes to avoid it. This is so in spite of the fact that the implications of act utilitarianism are wildly at variance with firmly held moral convictions, while rule utilitarianism, the most common alternative formulation, strikes most people as an unstable compromise. The wide appeal of utilitarianism is due, I think, to philosophical considerations of a more or less sophisticated kind which pull us in a quite different direction than our first order moral beliefs. In particular, utilitarianism derives much of its appeal from alleged difficulties about the foundations of rival views. What a successful alternative to utilitarianism must do, first and foremost, is to sap this source of strength by providing a clear account of the foundations of non-utilitarian moral reasoning. In what follows I will first describe the problem in more detail by setting out the questions which a philosophical account of the foundations of morality must answer. I will then put forward a version of contractualism which, I will argue, offers a better set of responses to these questions than that supplied by straightforward versions of utilitarianism. Finally I will explain why contractualism, as I understand it, does not lead back to some utilitarian formula as its normative outcome.