TL;DR: In this paper, an attempt has been made to obtain the optimum order quantity of deteriorating items under a permissible delay in payments, where it is found that the supplier allows a certain fixed period to settle the account, but beyond this period interest is charged under the terms and conditions agreed upon and moreover, interest can be earned on the revenue received during the credit period.
Abstract: In developing mathematical models in inventory control it is assumed that payment will be made to the supplier for the goods immediately after receiving the consignment. However, in practice, it is found that the supplier allows a certain fixed period to settle the account. During this fixed period no interest is charged by the supplier, but beyond this period interest is charged under the terms and conditions agreed upon and, moreover, interest can be earned on the revenue received during the credit period. In this paper an attempt has been made to obtain the optimum order quantity of deteriorating items under a permissible delay in payments. A numerical example is also given. Over the last two decades a lot of work has been published for controlling the inventory of deteriorating items. The analysis of decaying inventory problems began with Ghare and Schrader1, who developed a simple economic order quantity model with a constant rate of decay. Covert and Philip2 extended Ghare and Schrader's model and obtained an economic order quantity model for a variable rate of deterioration by assuming a two-parameter Weibull distribution. Misra3 developed the first production lot size model in which both a constant and variable rate of deterioration were considered and obtained approximate expressions for the production lot size with no backlogging. Furthermore, while developing a mathematical model in inventory control, it is assumed that the payment will be made to the suppliers for the goods immediately after receiving the consignment. However, in day-to-day dealing, it is found that a supplier allows a certain fixed period to settle the account. During this fixed period no interest is charged by the supplier, but beyond this period interest is charged by the supplier under the terms and conditions agreed upon, since inventories are usually financed through debt or equity. In case of debt financing, it is often a short-term financing. Thus, interest paid here is nothing but the cost of capital or opportunity cost. Also, short-term loans can be thought of as having been taken from the suppliers on the expiry of the credit period. However, before the account has to be settled, the customer can sell the goods and continues to accumulate revenue and earn interest instead of paying the overdraft that is necessary if the supplier requires settlement of the account after replenishment. Interest earned can be thought of as a return on investment since the money generated through revenue can be ploughed back into the business. Therefore, it makes economic sense for the customer to delay the settlement of the replenishment account up to the last day of the credit period allowed by the supplier. If the credit period is less than the cycle length, the customer continues to accumulate revenue and earn interest on it for the rest of the period in the cycle, from the stock remaining beyond the credit period. This point was not considered by Goyal4. The primary benefit of taking trade credit is that one can have savings in purchase cost and opportunity cost, which become quite relevant for deteriorating items. In such cases one has to procure more units than required in the given cycle to account for the deteriorating effect. In particular, when the unit purchase cost is high and decay is continuous, the saving due to delayed payment appears to be more significant than when the decay is continuous but
TL;DR: It is found that the efficiency of a single wholesale price contract is considerably higher than previously thought as long as firms consider both push and pull contracts.
Abstract: While every firm in a supply chain bears supply risk (the cost of insufficient supply), some firms may, even with wholesale price contracts, completely avoid inventory risk (the cost of unsold inventory). With a push contract there is a single wholesale price and the retailer, by ordering his entire supply before the selling season, bears all of the supply chain's inventory risk. A pull contract also has a single wholesale price, but the supplier bears the supply chain's inventory risk because only the supplier holds inventory while the retailer replenishes as needed during the season. (Examples include Vendor Managed Inventory with consignment and drop shipping.) An advance-purchase discount has two wholesale prices: a discounted price for inventory purchased before the season, and a regular price for replenishments during the selling season. Advance-purchase discounts allow for intermediate allocations of inventory risk: The retailer bears the risk on inventory ordered before the season while the supplier bears the risk on any production in excess of that amount. This research studies how the allocation of inventory risk (via these three types of wholesale price contracts) impacts supply chain efficiency (the ratio of the supply chain's profit to its maximum profit). It is found that the efficiency of a single wholesale price contract is considerably higher than previously thought as long as firms consider both push and pull contracts. In other words, the literature has exaggerated the value of implementing coordinating contracts (i.e., contracts that achieve 100% efficiency, such as buy-backs or revenue sharing) because coordinating contracts are compared against an inappropriate benchmark (often just a push contract). Furthermore, if firms also consider advance-purchase discounts, which are also simple to administer, then the coordination of the supply chain and the arbitrary allocation of its profit is possible. Several limitations of advance-purchase discounts are discussed.
TL;DR: A good is something you buy and consume, and a service is something that someone does for you, which means you are paying for a service.
Abstract: A good is something you buy and consume. Goods are things that you can keep, eat, or use. If you go to the store and buy an apple, you get to keep the apple and take it home with you, so it is a good. A service is something that someone does for you. When you buy a service, you hire people to perform work. You are not buying something you can touch or hold. If your car is broken, you might hire someone to fix it. You are paying for a service.
TL;DR: In this paper, the impact of financial constraint on the performance of a supply chain was examined under pre-order, consignment and combination of these two modes and the authors showed that with financial constraint, the combination mode is the most efficient mode even if the retailer earns zero internal capital.
Abstract: A supply chain may operate under either preorder mode, consignment mode or the combination of these two modes. Under preorder, the retailer procures before the sale and takes full inventory risk during the sale, while under consignment, the retailer sells the product for the supplier with the supplier taking the inventory risk. The combination mode shares the risk in the supply chain. The existing research has examined the supply chain modes from various operational aspects. However, the impact of financial constraint is neglected. This paper examines the impact of financial constraint and investigates the supply chain efficiency under each mode. Based on a Stackelberg game with the supplier being the leader, we show that without financial constraint the supplier always prefers the consignment mode, taking full inventory risk. Whereas, in the presence of financial constraint, the supplier will sell part of the inventory to the retailer through preorder, which shares the inventory risk in the supply chain. We show that with financial constraint, the combination mode is the most efficient mode even if the retailer earns zero internal capital.
TL;DR: In this article, the allocation of responsibility for unsold inventory, provision for which is made in practically every distribution contract, is studied and the authors identify six main factors affecting this choice: optimal inventory policy in a stochastic retail demand environment, relative advantage in disposing of the unsell inventory, optimal risk allocation, incentives to invest in promotions and provide services to increase consumer demand, information asymmetry, and costs associated with the consignment contract per se.
Abstract: This article studies the allocation of responsibility for unsold inventory, provision for which is made in practically every distribution contract. The two extreme cases are the consignment contract, which allocates all the burden to the manufacturer, and the no-return contract, in which retailers purchase the merchandise outright and assume responsibility for unsold inventory. Contract choices are shown to vary across countries, industries, products and types of transactions. The article identifies six main factors affecting this choice: optimal inventory policy in a stochastic retail demand environment, relative advantage in disposing of the unsold inventory, optimal risk allocation, incentives to invest in promotions and provide services to increase consumer demand, information asymmetry, and costs associated with the consignment contract per se. Several testable implications are presented, and the choice of contracts in the publishing industry is shown to be consistent with the predictions of the model.