Topic
Condorcet method
About: Condorcet method is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1844 publications have been published within this topic receiving 47928 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
1 / 2
Papers
Book•
1 Jan 1958
TL;DR: In this paper, Dodgson's Third Pamphlet 'A Method...' (1876) was used to discuss the Elasticity of Committee Decisions with an Altering Size of Majority.
Abstract: I The Theory of Committees and Elections.- I. A Committee and Motions.- II. Independent Valuation.- III. Can a Motion be Represented by the same Symbol on Different Schedules?.- IV. A Committee using a Simple Majority: Single-peaked Preference Curves.- V. A Committee using a Simple Majority: other Shapes of Preference Curves.- 1. Curves either single-peaked or single-peaked with a plateau on top.- 2. Other classes of curves.- VI. A Committee using a Simple Majority: any Shapes of Preference Curves, Number of Motions Finite.- VII. Cyclical Majorities.- VIII. When the Ordinary Committee Procedure is in use the Members' Scales of Valuation may be Incomplete.- IX. Which Candidate ought to be Elected?.- X. Examination of some Methods of Election in Single-member Constituencies.- XI. Proportional Representation.- XII. The Decisions of a Committee using a Special Majority.- 1. When the members' preference curves are single-peaked.- 2. When the members' preference curves are subject to no restriction.- XIII. The Elasticity of Committee Decisions with an Altering Size of Majority.- 1. When the members' preference curves are single-peaked.- 2. When the members' preference curves are subject to no restriction.- XIV. The Elasticity of Committee Decisions with Alterations in the Members' Preference Schedules.- 1. When the members' preference curves are single-peaked.- 2. When the members' preference curves are subject to no restriction.- XV. The Converse Problem: the Group of Schedules to Correspond to a Given Voting Matrix.- XVI. A Committee using a Simple Majority: Complementary Motions.- XVII. International Agreements, Sovereignty and the Cabinet.- II History of the Mathematical Theory of Committees and Elections (Excluding Proportional Representation).- XVIII. Borda, Condorcet and Laplace.- 1. Jean-Charles de Borda (1733-1799).- 2. Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet (1743-1794).- 3. Pierre-Simon, Marquis de Laplace (1749-1827).- 4. Conclusions.- XIX. E. J. Nanson and Francis Galton.- XX. The Circumstances in which Rev. C. L. Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) wrote his Three Pamphlets.- Appendix. Text of Dodgson's Three Pamphlets and of 'The Cyclostyled Sheet'.- A Discussion of the Various Methods of Procedure in Conducting Elections (1873).- Suggestions as to the Best Method of Taking Votes, Where More than Two Issues are to be Voted on (1874).- A Method of Taking Votes on More than Two Issues (1876) 'The Cyclostyled Sheet' (7 Dec. 1877).- Notes on Dodgson's Third Pamphlet 'A Method...' (1876).
2,914 citations
Book•
4 Mar 2009
TL;DR: Condorcet's paradox (the non-transitivity of majority preferences) is seen as the direct ancestor of Arrow's paradox as discussed by the authors, and it was rediscovered as a foundational work in the theory of voting and societal preferences.
Abstract: A central figure in the early years of the French Revolution, Nicolas de Condorcet (1743–94) was active as a mathematician, philosopher, politician and economist. He argued for the values of the Enlightenment, from religious toleration to the abolition of slavery, believing that society could be improved by the application of rational thought. In this essay, first published in 1785, Condorcet analyses mathematically the process of making majority decisions, and seeks methods to improve the likelihood of their success. The work was largely forgotten in the nineteenth century, while those who did comment on it tended to find the arguments obscure. In the second half of the twentieth century, however, it was rediscovered as a foundational work in the theory of voting and societal preferences. Condorcet presents several significant results, among which Condorcet's paradox (the non-transitivity of majority preferences) is now seen as the direct ancestor of Arrow's paradox.
1,903 citations
TL;DR: In the case of a single good to be allocated politically, standard assumptions lead to'single-peakedness' of voter preferences over the set of alternatives as mentioned in this paper, which is not the case when the setter has monopoly power over the proposal placed before the electorate.
Abstract: Economic analysis requires modelling political as well as market resource allocation. Voting institutions, in particular two-candidate majority rule elections and voting on motions, have been a primary focus of recent analytical developments. In the case of a single good to be allocated politically, standard assumptions lead to 'single-peakedness' of voter preferences over the set of alternatives. When, in choosing between a pair of available alternatives, every voter votes for his preferred alternative, the allocative equilibrium is the 'Condorcet point' or political allocation most desired by the median voter (Bowen, 1943; Black, 1958; Riker and Ordeshook, 1973). This result concerning the dominance of the median voter's ideal allocation depends importantly on the nature of competition in the allocation process. In the context of the political allocation of economic goods, the 'median voter' outcome is typically justified on the basis of an underlying but usually unmodeled process of political competition between two candidates for elective office, wherein the dominant strategy for each candidate is to offer to provide the level of public spending that corresponds to the median voter's ideal expenditure. Such a view of equilibrium under majority rule (when equilibrium exists) may be very unrepresentative of political processes. Many such processes, particularly those related to collective expenditure determination, may be more appropriately characterized as ones in which some group has the power to make a proposal to the voters, and thereby set the agenda. This group, which we call the agenda setter, by having monopoly power over the proposal placed before the electorate, can confront the voters with a 'take it or leave it' choice. Because 'competitive' substitutes to the setter's proposal are not offered, the median voter cannot simply 'hold out' until the Condorcet point is proposed. When the setter has monopoly power, voters are forced to choose between
1,211 citations
Book•
1 Aug 2006
TL;DR: The following Essay owes its origin to a conversation with a friend, on the subject of Mr Godwin's essay on 'Avarice and Profusion' in his Enquirer as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The following Essay owes its origin to a conversation with a friend, on the subject of Mr Godwin's essay on 'Avarice and Profusion' in his Enquirer. The discussion started the general question of the future improvement of society and the Author at first sat down with an intention of merely stating his thoughts to his friend, upon paper, in a clearer manner than he thought he could do in conversation. But as the subject opened upon him, some ideas occurred, which he did not recollect to have met with before; and as he conceived that every least light, on a topic so generally interesting, might be received with candour, he determined to put his thoughts in a form for publication.
1,088 citations
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that all strategy-proof anonymous and efficient voting schemes can be derived from the Condorcet procedure by simply adding some fixed ballots to the agent's ballots, with the only restriction that the number of fixed ballots is strictly less than the total number of agents.
Abstract: This paper investigates one of the possible weakening of the (too demanding) assumptions of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. Namely we deal with a class of voting schemes where at the same time the domain of possible preference preordering of any agent is limited to single-peaked preferences, and the message that this agent sends to the central authority is simply its ‘peak’ — his best preferred alternative. In this context we have shown that strategic considerations justify the central role given to the Condorcet procedure which amounts to elect the ‘median’ peak: namely all strategy-proof anonymous and efficient voting schemes can be derived from the Condorcet procedure by simply adding some fixed ballots to the agent's ballots (with the only restriction that the number of fixed ballots is strictly less than the number of agents).
903 citations
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Performance Metrics
| Year | Papers |
|---|---|
| 2025 | 26 |
| 2024 | 30 |
| 2023 | 91 |
| 2022 | 86 |
| 2021 | 54 |
| 2020 | 53 |