TL;DR: This paper first presents a linguistic analysis of conditional sentences, and then builds some supervised learning models to determine if sentiments expressed on different topics in a conditional sentence are positive, negative or neutral.
Abstract: This paper studies sentiment analysis of conditional sentences. The aim is to determine whether opinions expressed on different topics in a conditional sentence are positive, negative or neutral. Conditional sentences are one of the commonly used language constructs in text. In a typical document, there are around 8% of such sentences. Due to the condition clause, sentiments expressed in a conditional sentence can be hard to determine. For example, in the sentence, if your Nokia phone is not good, buy this great Samsung phone, the author is positive about "Samsung phone" but does not express an opinion on "Nokia phone" (although the owner of the "Nokia phone" may be negative about it). However, if the sentence does not have "if', the first clause is clearly negative. Although "if' commonly signifies a conditional sentence, there are many other words and constructs that can express conditions. This paper first presents a linguistic analysis of such sentences, and then builds some supervised learning models to determine if sentiments expressed on different topics in a conditional sentence are positive, negative or neutral. Experimental results on conditional sentences from 5 diverse domains are given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
TL;DR: A compositional model-theoretic account of the way the interpretation of indicative conditionals is determined and constrained by the temporal and modal expressions in their constituents, which sheds new light on the relationship between ‘non-predictive’ and ‘epistemic’ readings of indicative Conditionals.
Abstract: This paper proposes a compositional model-theoretic account of the way the interpretation of indicative conditionals is determined and constrained by the temporal and modal expressions in their constituents. The main claim is that the tenses in both the antecedent and the consequent of an indicative conditional are interpreted in the same way as in isolation. This is controversial for the antecedents of predictive conditionals like ‘If he arrives tomorrow, she will leave’, whose Present tense is often claimed to differ semantically from that in their stand-alone counterparts, such as ‘He arrives tomorrow’. Under the unified analysis developed in this paper, the differences observed in pairs like these are explained by interactions between the temporal and modal dimensions of interpretation. This perspective also sheds new light on the relationship between ‘non-predictive’ and ‘epistemic’ readings of indicative conditionals.
TL;DR: In this paper, a developmental dual-process theory of the understanding of conditionals is presented, which integrates Evans' heuristic-analytic theory within the revised mental model theory of conditional proposed by Barrouillet, Gauffroy, and Lecas.
TL;DR: In this article, a cartographic implementation of this analysis predicts that conditional clauses will be incompatible with speaker-oriented modal expressions and that they will lack the low-construal reading found in temporal clauses.
Abstract: By analogy with the movement analysis of temporal clauses, some authors have proposed that conditional clauses be derived by leftward operator movement (Bhatt and Pancheva 2002, 2006, Arsenijevic 2009, Tomaszewicz 2009). This movement analysis of conditional clauses is shown to account for the incompatibility of main clause phenomena and conditional clauses in terms of intervention effects. The cartographic implementation of this analysis predicts that conditional clauses will be incompatible with speaker-oriented modal expressions and that conditional clauses will lack the low-construal reading found in temporal clauses (Bhatt and Pancheva 2002, 2006). Thus, the absence of low construal in conditional clauses, which was initially taken to be an obstacle for the movement account of conditional clauses (see Citko 2000), becomes an argument in its favor.
TL;DR: This paper argues that three types of conditional perfection have to be distinguished: two specific ones (only if p, q and only if not p, not q), and a more general one (ifNot p, then not q).