TL;DR: In this article, a more comprehensive theoretical basis for analyzing tax compliance, and illustrate it with a simple model, is presented. But, unlike prior models, they also explicitly include the law enforcement agency, in this case the Internal Revenue Service as an important interactive element.
Abstract: The existing paradigm for the economic analysis of tax compliance provides an inadequate theory of the revenue collection process. Even as a purely economic model, its exclusive focus on individual taxpayers' decision-making promotes an unduly restrictive vision of the compliance problem and potential responses to it. In this paper we outline a more comprehensive theoretical basis for analyzing tax compliance, and illustrate it with a simple model. We believe our approach to be a significant improvement in the economic theory of law enforcement because it views the noncompliance problem as an interactive system. In our theoretical construct, individual decision-making not only depends upon and responds to the detection and punishment structure, but, unlike prior models, we also explicitly include the law enforcement agency--in this case the Internal Revenue Service--as an important interactive element. Initially we outline our general approach and its differences from the existing economic law enforcement paradigm. We then detail a simple model and its results and compare these results both to the prior literature and to some of our ongoing research in an effort to illustrate how our theoretical construct may affect predictions. Finally, we describe potential extensions of the model, examine its robustness with respect to various underlying assumptions and offer suggestions for further research, including possible applications to other law enforcement contexts.
TL;DR: The survey results reveal that mostly compliance management approaches centre around three distinct categories, namely design-time, run-time and auditing, which are based on different compliance management strategies in the context of formulated research questions.
Abstract: Literature on business process compliance (BPC) has predominantly focused on the alignment of the regulatory rules with the design, verification and validation of business processes. Previously surveys on BPC have been conducted with specific context in mind; however, the literature on BPC management research is largely sparse and does not accumulate a detailed understanding on existing literature and related issues faced by the domain. This survey provides a holistic view of the literature on existing BPC management approaches, and categories them based on different compliance management strategies in the context of formulated research questions. A systematic literature approach is used where search terms pertaining keywords were used to identify literature related to the research questions from scholarly databases. From initially 183 papers, we selected 79 papers related to the themes of this survey published between 2000{2015. The survey results reveal that mostly compliance management approaches center around three distinct categories namely: design-time (28%), run-time (32%) and auditing (10%). Also, organisational and internal control based compliance management frameworks (21%) and hybrid approaches make (9%) of the surveyed approaches. Furthermore, open research challenges and gaps are identified and discussed with respect to the compliance problem.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors introduce the concept of the first-order problem of knowledge and the second-order problems of knowledge, and the Third-order Problem of Knowledge, respectively.
Abstract: 1: Introduction: Liberty vs. License. PART I: THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE. 2: Using Resources: The First-Order Problem of Knowledge. 3: Two Methods of Social Ordering. 4: The Liberal Conception of Justice. 5: Communicating Justice: The Second-Order Problem of Knowledge. 6: Specifying Conventions: The Third-Order Problem of Knowledge. PART II: THE PROBLEMS OF INTEREST. 7: The Partiality Problem. 8: The Incentive Problem. 9: The Compliance Problem. PART III: THE PROBLEMS OF POWER. 10: The Problem of Enforcement Error. 11: Fighting Crime Without Punishment. 12: The Problem of Enforcement Abuse. 13: Polycentric Constitutional Constraints on Power. 14: Imagining a Polycentric Constitutional Order: A Short Fable. PART IV: RESPONSES TO OBJECTIONS. 15: Beyond Justice and the Rule of Law?
TL;DR: A more practical method of multi-material topology optimization is presented to overcome the limitations of compliance minimization and seeks the optimized balance among materials by minimizing the total weight while satisfying performance constraints.
Abstract: Topology optimization is one of the most effective tools for conducting lightweight design and has been implemented across multiple industries to enhance product development. The typical topology optimization problem statement is to minimize system compliance while constraining the design space to an assumed volume fraction. The traditional single-material compliance problem has been extended to include multiple materials, which allows increased design freedom for potentially better solutions. However, compliance minimization has the limitations for practical lightweight design because compliance lacks useful physical meanings and has never been a design criterion in industry. Additionally, the traditional compliance minimization problem statement requires volume fraction constraints to be selected a priori; however, designers do not know the optimized balance among materials. In this paper, a more practical method of multi-material topology optimization is presented to overcome the limitations. This method seeks the optimized balance among materials by minimizing the total weight while satisfying performance constraints. This paper also compares the weight minimization approach to compliance minimization. Several numerical examples prove the success of weight minimization and demonstrate its benefit over compliance minimization.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the effect of information that helps the IRS predict tax evasion on the strategic choices made by the taxpayer and the IRS, and the optimal level of information acquisition was also examined.
Abstract: SYNOPSIS AND INTRODUCTION: The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) relies increasingly on its ability to detect taxpayer noncompliance without engaging in a comprehensive individual audit. The IRS's compliance initiative, Compliance 2000, emphasizes the targeting of noncompliant taxpayers rather than relying on random audits to enforce the tax laws. For example, the IRS uses a model developed from the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) to help it choose which returns to audit. The treatment of losses from tax shelter partnerships presents a difficult compliance problem for the IRS. It is not evident from the face of either the partnership return or the partner's return whether the losses from the partnership can be legitimately deducted. A plausible audit strategy is for the IRS to develop models that can predict when an individual is improperly deducting a loss. The tax shelter disclosure rules in l.R.C. ?6111 and ?6112 provide information to the IRS that helps it detect taxpayers investing in abusive tax shelters. Previous work has modeled tax compliance as a game between a wealth-maximizing taxpayer and a tax enforcement agency trying to maximize government revenues, net of audit costs (Graetz et al. 1986; Reinganum and Wilde 1986; Beck and Jung 1989). In these papers, the IRS uses the taxpayer's declaration of income when it decides whether to audit that taxpayer. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of information that helps the IRS predict tax evasion on the strategic choices made by the taxpayer and the IRS. The information has a direct effect by giving the IRS information that can improve its audit decision. It also has an indirect effect by changing the taxpayer's incentives to engage in tax evasion, which in turn changes the IRS's incentives to audit taxpayers. The optimal level of information acquisition is also examined. The analysis yields four important results regarding the effect of information on tax compliance. First, it can induce an increase in tax evasion.