TL;DR: The principle of alternate possibilities as discussed by the authors states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise, and its exact meaning is a subject of controversy, particularly concerning whether someone who accepts it is thereby committed to believing that moral responsibility and determinism are incompatible.
Abstract: A dominant role in nearly all recent inquiries into the free-will problem has been played by a principle which the author shall call ‘the principle of alternate possibilities.’ This principle states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. Its exact meaning is a subject of controversy, particularly concerning whether someone who accepts it is thereby committed to believing that moral responsibility and determinism are incompatible. In seeking illustrations of the principle of alternate possibilities, it is most natural to think of situations in which the same circumstances both bring it about that a person does something and make it impossible for him to avoid doing it. The two main concepts employed in the principle of alternate possibilities are ‘morally responsible’ and ‘could have done otherwise.’ To discuss the principle without analyzing either of these concepts may well seem like an attempt at piracy.
TL;DR: Hard incompatibilism and criminal behavior as mentioned in this paper has been studied in the context of agent-causal libertarianism, and the contours of hard incompatiblism have been discussed.
Abstract: Acknowledgments Introduction: Hard incompatibilism 1. Alternative possibilities and causal histories 2. Coherence objections to libertarianism 3. Empirical objections to agent-causal libertarianism 4. Problems for compatibilism 5. The contours of hard incompatibilism 6. Hard incompatibilism and criminal behavior 7. Hard incompatibilism and meaning in life Bibliography Index.
TL;DR: In this paper, the author defends the thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism and argues that determinism is not necessary for moral responsibility, and concludes that such determinism should be rejected.
Abstract: In this stimulating and thought-provoking book, the author defends the thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism. He disputes the view that determinism is necessary for moral responsbility. Finding no good reason for accepting determinism, but believing moral responsibility to be indubitable, he concludes that determinism should be rejected.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors defend a source view and present a Manipulation Argument against Compatibilism and Blame without Basic Desert 7. Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Behavior 8. Personal Relationships and Meaning in Life
Abstract: Acknowledgments Introduction 1. Defending a Source View 2. Problems for Event-Causal and Non-Causal Libertarianisms 3. The Prospects for Agent Causal Libertarianism 4. A Manipulation Argument against Compatibilism 5. Free Will Skepticism and Rational Deliberation 6. Blame without Basic Desert 7. Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Behavior 8. Personal Relationships and Meaning in Life Bibliography
TL;DR: The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates, RobERT KANE as discussed by the authors, and the New Compatibilists: Rethinking causes and POSSIBILITIES, CHRISTOPHER TAYLOR and DANIEL DENNETT 12 Frankfurt-type Examples and Semi-compatibiliism, JOHN MARTIN FISCHER 13 Libertarianism and Frankfurtstyle Cases, Laura WADDELL EKSTROM 14 Responsibility and Frankfurt-style Examples, David WIDERKER 15 Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent-Cause THEORIES, TIM
Abstract: 1 The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates, ROBERT KANE 2 Recent Work on Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will, LINDA ZAGZEBSKI 3 Fatalism, Mark Bernstein 4 Physics, Consciousness and Free Will, David Hodgson 5 Chaos, Indeterminsm and Free Will, Robert Bishop 6 A Master Argument for Incompatibilism? Tomis Kapitan 7 Free Will Remains a Mystery, Peter van Inwagen 8 Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues, Bernard BEROFSKY 9 Compatibilist Views of Freedom and Responsibility, ISHTIYAQUE HAJI 10 Pessimists, Pollyannas and the New Compatibilists, PAUL RUSSELL 11 11 Who's Afraid of Determinism: Rethinking Causes AND POSSIBILITIES, CHRISTOPHER TAYLOR AND DANIEL DENNETT 12 Frankfurt-type Examples and Semi-compatibilism, JOHN MARTIN FISCHER 13 Libertarianism and Frankfurt-style Cases, Laura WADDELL EKSTROM 14 Responsibility and Frankfurt-style Examples, David WIDERKER 15 Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent-Cause THEORIES, TIMOTHY O'CONNOR 16 Libertarian Views: Noncausal and Event-Causal ACCOUNTS OF FREE AGENCY, RANDOLPH CLARKE 17 Reasons and Explanations of Action: Causalist VERSUS NONCAUSALIST ACCOUNTS, CARL GINET 18 Some Neglected Pathways in the Free Will Labyrinth, ROBERT KANE 19 Dreams of Final Responsibility, Galen Strawson 20 Determinism as True, Compatibilism and INCOMPATIBILISM AS BOTH FALSE, AND THE REAL PROBLEM, TED HONDERICH 21 Living Without Free Will: The Case for Hard INCOMPATIBILISM, DERK PEREBOOM 22 Free Will, Fundamental Dualism, and Centrality of ILLUSION, SAUL SMILANSKY 23 Metaethics, Metaphilosophy and Free Will SUBJECTIVISM, RICHARD DOUBLE 24 Autonomy, Self-control and Weakness of Will, Alfred MELE 25 Do We Have Free Will? Benjamin Libet 26 Neurophilosophy of Free Will, Henrik Walter