Common knowledge

Abstract: The paper examines managing knowledge across boundaries in settings where innovation is desired. Innovation is a useful context because it allows us to explore the negative consequences of the path-dependent nature of knowledge. A framework is developed that describes three progressively complex boundaries--syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic--and three progressively complex processes--transfer, translation, and transformation. The framework is used to specify the practical and political mismatches that occur when innovation is desired and how this relates to the common knowledge that actors use to share and assess each other's domain-specific knowledge. The development and use of a collaborative engineering tool in the early stages of a vehicle's development is presented to illustrate the conceptual and prescriptive value of the framework. The implication of this framework on key topics in the organization theory and strategy literatures is then discussed.

Abstract: The author shows how a group of individuals can learn to play a coordination game without any common knowledge and with only a small amount of rationality. The game is repeated many times by different players. Each player chooses an optimal reply based on incomplete information about what other players have done in the past. Occasionally they make mistakes. When the likelihood of mistakes is very small, typically one coordination equilibrium will be played almost all of the time over the long run. This stochastically stable equilibrium can be computed analytically using a general theorem the author proves on perturbed Markov processes. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.

Abstract: Two people, 1 and 2, are said to have common knowledge of an event E if both know it, 1 knows that 2 knows it, 2 knows that 1 knows it, 1 knows that 2 knows that 1 knows it, and so on.