Abstract: The “modernization” reforms of European antitrust are summarized and interpreted. The article uses principal–agent analysis enhanced by socio-institutional insights. The reforms in policy implementation are of historic importance. While they appear to promise decentralization to national competition authorities, more sophisticated analysis points to an increase in the centralized power of the Commission. The novel instrument of a supranational European Competition Network creates a redesigned relationship between the Commission and the member states that carries high risks of incoherence. Modernization driven by a legal epistemic community carries a less obvious risk that increased power of competition policy will unduly reinforce liberal market disciplines through a juridification of the European competition regime.

Abstract: In a 5-year study of the San Francisco Bay Area Metropolitan Transportation Commission, we found four planning styles at work: technical/bureaucratic, political influence, social movement, and collaborative. Each involved differing assumptions about knowledge, participation, and the nature of a good plan. Players using one style were often mistrustful or contemptuous of those working in others. Regional actions—as opposed to packages of projects for parochial interests—were rare. The few regional initiatives emerged from collaborative planning and social movements. We argue that where diversity and interdependence of interests are high, collaboration is the most effective approach. Key barriers to collaboration included state and federal funding formulas, earmarking, and the substantial documentation required by state and federal regulations.

Abstract: �This article attempts to provide answers to one specific and one general question: How should we evaluate the performance of the World Commission on Dams in terms of its democratic legitimacy? And what does the evaluation of the commission’s performance tell us about the legitimacy of global rule making in more general terms? Based on these questions, the article comes to two main conclusions. First (measured in terms of its inclusiveness, transparency, and accountability), the democratic legitimacy of the World Commission on Dams’ standardsetting process can be challenged in several ways. Second, the difficulties in determining the commission’s legitimacy in relation to other mechanisms of rule making demonstrate that we still lack a theoretical understanding of what the idea of democratic governance beyond the nation-state would entail in practice. Achieving a better understanding of this normative aspect of world politics will remain a major task for contemporary political theory. KEYWORDS: global governance, World Commission on Dams, rule making, democracy, accountability.

Abstract: Introduction : setting the scene -- Competition law, citizenship rights, and social solidarity -- The UK approach to competition law and public services -- Regulation and the new UK public service law -- The continental tradition of public service -- Public service and European Community law -- Services of general interest, the commission, and reform -- European liberalization and public service obligations -- Public service broadcasting : a special case.

Abstract: Two recent failures of the U.S. intelligence system have led to the creation of high-level investigative commissions. The failure to prevent the terrorist attacks of 9/11 prompted the creation of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004), or 9/11 Commission.The mistaken belief that Saddam Hussein had retained weapons of mass destruction prompted the creation of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (2005), or the WMD Commission. In this paper, we use insights from organizational economics to analyze the principal organizational issues these commissions have raised in the ongoing discussion about how to prevent intelligence failures.

Abstract: Time: 6.00pm Registration and Refreshments 6.30pm Commentary and panel debate 7.30pm Refreshments and networking Venue: Cass Business School 106 Bunhill Row London EC1Y 8TZ The Pensions Commission is an independent body which was set up to advise the government on pensions. It will launch its First Report on 12 October. This report will be a thorough analysis of the UK pensions system and will identify the high-level options facing society. For more information, visit: overview of the report's findings. Following his presentation, Adair Turner will join the Cass panel – David Blake and Steve Haberman – to respond to questions from the audience. Adair Turner has combined careers in business, public policy and academia. He is currently vice chairman of Merrill Lynch Europe, a director of United Business Media plc, chair of the UK Low Pay Commission and chair of the UK Pensions Commission. He is also a visiting professor at the London School of Economics. Adair holds an Honorary Doctorate from the City University and his book, Just Capital – The Liberal Economy, was recently published by Macmillan. and obtained his PhD and DSc in actuarial science from City University. He has worked at Prudential Assurance and the Government Actuary's Department, and has been a member of the Council of the Institute of Actuaries. Steve has written papers on a wide range of topics, including mortality and morbidity models, annuities and pensions mathematics. His papers have won research prizes from the Institute of Actuaries. He is co-author of two recent books: 'Modern Actuarial Theory and Practice' and 'Actuarial Models for Disability Insurance'.

Abstract: This book assesses how international commissions have shaped, and even reshaped, our understanding of international affairs and the international discourse on a wide range of global issues. These issues include the global economic order and the discrepancies in wealth between economies in the North and the South; international security and the utility of nuclear weapons; and environmentalism and the demands of economic growth. More recently, international commissions have examined whether the international community will ever accept the idea that military intervention is a legitimate option when confronted by the possibility of genocide and mass human rights violations against whole populations. The varying experiences and influences of eight separate international commissions are scrutinised: Brandt, Palme, Brundtland, the Commission on Global Governance, Canberra, the World Commission on Dams, the Kosovo Commission and the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). Few scholars and practitioners would suggest that international commissions offer perfect solutions to some of the contemporary problems of their time. But this book offers strong support for the argument that ideas matter as key agents in the evolution of global governance. International commissions can often act as the mechanism that brings ideas and institutions together.

Abstract: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004) Nine days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Lt. Gen. Walter Short, the U.S. Army commander in Hawaii at the time, was relieved of duty. Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, the commander of the decimated Paciac Fleet, was relieved of command the next day. President Franklin D. Roosevelt then established by executive order a commission to investigate the attack, which was chaired by Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts. The Roberts commission issued its report on January 23, 1942, less than two months after the attack. The commission found both Short and Kimmel guilty of dereliction of duty. The two ofacers were forced to retire with reduced rank, disgraced. Most subsequent ofacial inquiries and scholarship have concluded that Short and Kimmel were scapegoats, the victims of an unfair rush to judgment, and that the real cause of America’s surprise on December 7, 1941, was the absence of an effective national intelligence structure. Unlike Pearl Harbor, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, produced no Husband Kimmel, no Walter Short. No one has taken the fall for the failure to prevent attacks that killed 2,819 innocent people. These attacks were the work of men, not fate. They could have been prevented but were not. The government failed in this responsibility, but who within the federal government is to blame for this failure? This open-ended question does not sit well with many segments of American society, especially those most skeptical of representations made by President George W. Bush and his principal ofacers. The Bush administration had little enthusiasm for an independent investigation into the events leading up to 9/11, seeing such an inquiry as a distraction from more pressing business at hand. The 9/11 attacks triggered extraordinary and simultaneous actions by the federal government on multiple fronts.1 It

Abstract: In 2003, the National Commission on the Public Service, chaired by Paul Volcker, issued a report detailing problems within the federal government today and recommending changes in its organization, leadership, and operations. This book suggests practical ways to implement the recommendations and defines a research agenda for the future. Thirteen essays address the primary problem areas identified by the Volcker Commission, and the commission report itself is included.

Abstract: In recent years both the Commission and the Council have been establishing and de facto delegating (executive and administrative) powers and tasks to what are formally termed the ‘decentralised agencies’ of the European Union. Such bodies are non-majoritarian in nature and are established in order to perform defined tasks in a relatively autonomous fashion at the European level. How does this affect the underlying principles of balance of powers among the institutions according to the original Treaty design? And how do the Commission and the Council as principals ensure that their agents do not drift away from the principals ? To what extent can one speak of mechanisms of accountability (political, administrative and public) in the institutional design and subsequent practices of non-majoritarian decentralised European Union agencies? This paper examine the ‘practices’ with regard to a number of fairly exemplary and/or new agencies with a view to shedding some light on the type of measures that are adopted in practice in order to enable principals to retain some degree of control over the exercise of discretion by the agency in question.

Abstract: Useful science or unregulated commercial whaling? Nicholas J. Gales, Toshio Kasuya, Phillip J. Clapham and Robert L. Brownell Jr consider the scientific merits of Japan's whaling activities. Japan has told the International Whaling Commission (IWC) of plans to double its annual catch of minke whales to over 900. Unlike commercial whaling, scientific quotas are unregulated: since 1987 Japan has taken about 6,800 minke whales from Antarctic waters for research, and received millions of dollars from selling whale meat. In this issue, four members of IWC's Scientific Committee argue that ‘scientific’ whaling is out of control. If the IWC is to deliver whale conservation or a sustainable whaling industry, they say, its Scientific Committee needs a greatly expanded role.

Abstract: This short article, which was submitted to the Antitrust Modernization Commission, explains why the consumer welfare standard is used by courts and is more appropriate for evaluating antitrust issues.

Abstract: IN AN INCREASINGLY COMPLEX financial world, personal finance education is more important today than ever. Nevertheless, the number of states incorporating personal finance concepts into their academic standards is not rising significantly, and students are demonstrating few gains, if any, in their knowledge of those concepts. One reason for this paradox is that personal finance education does not have a home in the American school curriculum. The natural home for personal finance education is in the economics curriculum, which is one of lo core subjects in the No Child Left Behind law. Economics provides the organizing principles and logic that could be the structure for personal finance education, helping to strengthen it so that K-12 students will learn the concepts and skills of personal finance they need to make informed choices throughout their lives. Advocacy vs. Results In recent years, many advocates have argued for improving the financial literacy of young people. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan is prominent today among those who argue that we need strong school programs in personal finance to prepare consumers for making wise choices in a new era. New information technologies and financial products have expanded the range of choices available to consumers. Furthermore, people today are called upon increasingly to take responsibility for their financial future. For example, defined-benefit programs are becoming an endangered species as defined-contribution programs, which are directed by individual investors, become more common. This is the context for Mr. Greenspan's statement, in his lead essay for this special section, that "the importance of basic financial skills underscores the need to begin the learning process as early as possible. Indeed, improving basic financial literacy at the elementary and secondary levels will provide a foundation of financial literacy that can help prevent younger people from making poor decisions that can take years to overcome." (1) The chorus of advocates for more financial literacy grows louder every day More than 14o corporations, government agencies, educational organizations, and nonprofit organizations have formed the Jump$tart Coalition for Personal Financial Literacy to advocate for more and better programs. (2) Congress has established the Financial Literacy and Education Commission, housed in the Department of the Treasury, to coordinate federal agencies and federal education efforts on financial literacy The Federal Reserve System has made financial literacy a priority in its educational programs. It appears, however, that this advocacy is not being translated into results. In responding to a survey conducted by Lewis Mandell for the Jump$tart Coalition in 2004, students answered only 50.3 percent of the questions on personal financial topics correctly Based on a typical scale used by public schools, 65.5 percent of students who took this exam (it was administered to 4,000 students in 215 high schools across 33 states) would have failed it. (3) The 2004 results represented a slight improvement over results from 2002, when students answered only 50.2 percent of the questions correctly, but results from both years marked a decline from 1997, when the survey was inaugurated. In 1997, students answered 57.3 percent of the questions correctly. (4) A Homeless Curriculum Why has widespread advocacy for personal finance education yielded such discouraging results? In large part, the problem is that personal finance education has a weak presence and no obvious home in most school programs. A 2004 survey by the National Council on Economic Education (NCEE) found that only six states required students to complete a course in personal finance, and the number of states with standards in personal finance had fallen from 40 in 2000 to 34 in 2004. (5) These personal finance standards are often embedded in the economics standards but in some cases are stand-alone standards. …

Abstract: Published by International Commission on the Balkans and sponsored by the Robert Bosch Stiftung, King Baudouin Foundation, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation

Abstract: Fines represent the principal tool in the European Commission's enforcement of EC competition law. Unlike in the United States where there is a formidable congeries of weapons against undertakings which breach anti-trust law, there are no criminal penalties, such as imprisonment for individuals in the EC. Moreover, private enforcement of EC competition law is still minimal. Thus, fines represent the main tool to remedy and deter violations of competition law. The European Court of Justice indicated in Musique Diffusion France (Pioneer), that the underlying rationale for the imposition of fines is to ensure the implementation of Community competition policy. The meting out of fines, therefore, serves two objectives (i) the suppression of illegal activity and (ii) the prevention of recidivism. During the first three decades in which the Commission imposed fines for breaches of EC competition law, the Commission was criticized for the obfuscation surrounding how it determined a given fine. During this period, there were no guidelines providing a reference point from which the Commission could impose fines leading to a lack of transparency in the fining process. There was thus a tendency to litigate before the courts in the expectation that the fine would be reduced. In addition, fines were generally fixed at such a low level that it was questionable whether they had any deterrent effect. There has been a recent evolution in Commission fining policy, however. First, the promulgation of both the Commission Guidelines on fines in 1998, which aims to make decisions over fines more transparent and impartial. Second, the toughening of the fines, which is particularly evident when one notes the condign fines of 462 million euros and 497 million euros imposed on Hoffman-La-Roche and Microsoft. Third, the development of the leniency notice, which provides an incentive for cartel members to admit to their anti-competitive conduct. Since the adoption of the 1998 Guidelines, the majority of the fines imposed by the Commission have been for cartel activity. The Commission has, however, shown an increasingly heavy-handed approach towards other infringements of Article 81 EC and abuses of a dominant position under Article 82 EC. Yet, it is not quite sure that these evolutions have reached their objectives as both the constituent elements of the 1998 Guidelines and the fining decisions, which are based on the 1998 Guidelines, are vague. This has left much room for conjecture as to how the Commission reached the final fine. The corollary of this is that there has been, as in the period preceding the 1998 Guidelines, a steady yet significant number of parties litigating before the courts. It is also still open to debate whether the fines imposed by the Commission are stringent enough. The Microsoft decision bears testimony to this. This raises the issue of whether the EC should not turn to other forms of penalties, such as criminal penalties. This path is already being followed in some Member States (e.g., UK), but seems unlikely to be followed in the EC. The Commission can neither impose fines nor criminal sanctions on individuals in light of the wording of Article 81 EC. On the other hand, Article 83(1) EC stipulates that the Council "give effect to the principles set out in Articles 81 and 82". This could be interpreted as encompassing sanctions on individuals as the effect of this would be to enhance the deterrent effect of the cartel prohibition. Article 23(5) of Regulation 1/2003 states, however, that decisions are not to be of a criminal law nature. The main purpose of the article is to provide a detailed analysis of the parameters taken into account by the Commission when imposing a fine, as well as the parameters used by the Court of First Instance when reviewing fines imposed by the Commission. In order to do this, we have reviewed all the Commission decisions and CFI judgments dealing with fines, which have been adopted since the publication of the 1998 guidelines. For each Commission and CFI judgment, we have identified the factors that have been taken into account to determine/review the fines imposed for infringements of EC competition law. The results of our analysis are summarized into two tables (one for the Commission decisions and one for the CFI judgments), which allow the reader to find for each case the factors that have been taken into account to determine/review the fines. This is the empirical side of the paper. While most of the papers analyzing the fining policy of the Commission discuss factors, such as the gravity or duration of an infringement, the presence of various mitigating circumstances, in a rather general or theoretical fashion, this paper provides precise data as to the elements that are most/least likely to be considered in the determination/review of fines. Thus, our table on the Commission decisions will, for instance, allow the reader to know in which cases, a cartel member was the leader and/or imposed coercive measures on other cartel members and to what extent this was considered as an aggravating circumstance. In turn, our table on the CFI judgments will allow the reader to identify the various reasons why, in a given case, the fine imposed by the Commission was reduced before the CFI. Another aim of the paper is to give a critical look at the Commission decisions imposing fines to see whether the reasoning on which there are based is coherent. As will be seen, it is often difficult to understand the logic of the fines imposed by the Commission. Identical factual scenarios will be treated differently, while different factual scenarios will be offer the same treatment. By contrast, we will not deal with theoretical issues, such as the optimal level of the fines or whether criminalization of competition law violations is desirable as there is abundant literature on this.

Abstract: The thwarted merger of General Electric and Honeywell stands out as, so far, the only merger between US companies to be derailed solely by the European anti-trust authorities, while being cleared by the US Department of Justice (DoJ) and 11 other jurisdictions. In this paper, the authors examine the European Commission’s decision, and the theories underlying it and compare the Commission’s approach with that followed by the DoJ. They observe that the Commission and the DoJ had a different assessment of broadly similar facts, and attempt to understand the source of the divergence. The authors find that (i) the horizontal effects identified by the European Commission rely on a particular perspective of market definition which is debatable (and leaves some questions unanswered). (ii) The anti-competitive effects in the bundling and Archimedean leveraging theories are not sufficiently robust so that they could be resumed. Accordingly, their likelihood should be supported by strong evidence but the evidence presented by the Commission was far from compelling. (iii) The deal may have involved significant efficiencies that were overlooked. These observations raise the suspicion that the Commission’s decision may have been affected by bureaucratic capture, such that civil servants did not follow the mandate that had been assigned to them. We find that the procedure enforced at the time was vulnerable to capture and that the Commission had an incorrect perception of the standard of review that the Court would apply to its decision in the context of an appeal. The accountability to which the Commission felt subject to was thus biased downwards and enlarged the scope for capture. In addition some (admittedly casual) evidence regarding the actual unfolding of the procedure, as well as subsequent reforms of process and procedure undertaken by the Commission, would support the view that significant problems arose in this area.

Abstract: This paper surveys hundreds of published social-science studies of private, hard-core cartels that contain 699 observations of long-run overcharges The primary finding is that the median cartel overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 25%: 19% for domestic cartels, 32% for international cartels, and 31% for all successful cartels Thus, international cartels have historically been about 68% more effective in raising prices than domestic cartels Cartel overcharges are skewed to the high side, pushing the mean overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods to 42% "Peak" cartel overcharges are typically double those of the long-run averages These results are generally consistent with the few, more limited, previously published works that survey cartel overcharges There is no evidence that convicted cartels are markedly less effective than unpunished ones The results of a second survey of final verdicts in decided US horizontal collusion cases, only three of which were international cartels, show an average median overcharge of 21% and an average mean overcharge of 30% Outside the United States, 62 decisions of competition commissions cited median average overcharges of 25% and a mean of 47% There are three significant policy implications First, there is a view among some antitrust writers that there is little evidence that cartels raise prices significantly for a period long enough to justify the height of current US cartel penalties This survey's results, which are based upon an extraordinarily large amount of data spanning a broad swath of history of all types of private cartels, sharply contradict these views In fact, the data suggest that US penalties ought to be increased Mean overcharges are three times as high as the level presumed by the US Sentencing Commission Surprisingly, bid rigging was no more injurious than other forms of collusion, which suggests that the USSC should amend its Guidelines that currently treat bid rigging more harshly than other forms of collusion Second, the principal antitrust authorities abroad often base their typical or maximum fines on a 10% harm presumption Average fines imposed since 1995 by Canada and the EU on identical cartels have been lower than US government fines, yet overcharges generated by cartels discovered outside the United States are higher than North America-centered cartels Consequently, anticartel laws and fine-setting practices abroad are in even greater need of strengthening Third, cartels with multi-continental price effects are the most harmful type Despite the evident increases in cartel detection rates and the size of monetary fines and penalties in the past decade, a good case can be made that current global anticartel regimes are under-deterring While the recent worldwide trend towards the intensification of cartel penalties has been desirable, global cartels are more difficult to detect, have less fear from entry of rivals, achieve higher levels of sales and profitability, and systematically receive weaker corporate sanctions than comparable domestic cartels Antitrust sanctions worldwide should be higher for global cartels than for other types

Abstract: This paper provides an economic analysis of the European Commission's decision against Microsoft's refusal to supply information on interoperability. It surveys the exceptional circumstances examined by the Commission in applying the essential facility doctrine to the case. It analyses the Commission's reasoning on Microsoft's leveraging its market power from one market to another. It discusses the amount Microsoft can request as a reasonable remuneration for the licensing of its property rights on interface. According to the author, the analysis of incentives to innovate, as proposed by the Commission, provides a sounder test forordering compulsory licensing that the new product condition introduced in Magill. However, the author points out that the assessment of incentives to innovate in the whole industry cannotbe conclusive in absence of more guidance on what constitutes a reasonable, non discriminatory and non strategic license. Regarding leveraging, the author considers that the Commission proposes a convincing story. Prejudice to consumers remains however hypothetical.

Abstract: This article develops a formal model of the politics of delegation in the European Union (EU) incorporating key institutional features: the legislative– executive role of the Commission, the legislative–executive role of the members of the Council of Ministers, the possible implementation of European policies by different national administrations and the variety of EU decision rules. The model generates propositions on how decision rules, policy conflict and the status quo affect the delegation of powers to the Commission and to national authorities. It demonstrates how qualified majority voting and, in some cases, codecision work as a commitment technology by facilitating the adoption of legislation that restrains national authorities, shifts powers from national administrations to the Commission and increases its discretion. More generally, it shows that, first, the negative relation between conflict and discretion may not hold in the case of many administrators and a high threshold for decision-making; and, second, a less demanding bargaining environment in the legislature may work in favor of an administrator with agenda-setting power.

Abstract: This article attempts to spell out the Commission's present position on the following set of questions: according to which normative criteria can European integration, European governance and the Commission's own roles in the two processes be considered legitimate? Taking the 2001 White Paper on Governance as a reference point, it is argued that the Commission is trapped between two sets of claims to legitimacy: one set of claims coming from the Monnet tradition of thought, where the stress is on unity, efficiency, responsibility and impartiality; and a second set of claims coming from the post-Maastricht critique of the Union, which highlight diversity, clarity and democracy. The result has been that the European Commission entered the recent constitutional debate with a set of proposals that did not do much to strengthen its own position in the Union, or to contribute innovative ideas to the debate, which was meant to deal with the great challenges that lie ahead.

Abstract: The report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, set up pursuant to a UN Security Council resolution, is an important contribution to the evolving law of genocide. The Commission concluded that genocide had not been committed, but that the case should be referred to the International Criminal Court for prosecution as crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Commission did not find significant evidence of genocidal intent. It looked essentially for a plan or policy of the Sudanese state and, in its absence, concluded that genocide was not being committed. The Commission endorsed the ‘stable and permanent groups’ approach taken by one trial chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). On this point, it exaggerated the acceptance of this interpretation, which has been ignored by other trial chambers of the international tribunals. However, the Commission found that the better approach to determination of the groups covered by the Convention is subjective, and that the targeted tribes in Darfur meet this criterion.

Abstract: European Law continues to make inroads into national higher educational decision‐making. In case C‐147/03 Commission v Austria 1 Austrian university policy promoting open access for all to universi...

Abstract: This article ponders over the future of human rights work within the United Nations on the basis of the author's six years of experience as the Special Rapporteur on the right to education of the Commission on Human Rights. This broadens the analysis to the factors shaping the work of the Commission on Human Rights that are not formally documented, and generates a series of questions concerning the Commission's recent past and uncertain future.

Abstract: The Government’s commitment to reform, its willingness to commission expert advice and to heed it, to try new solutions, and to patiently build constituencies that support further reforms, is … something that other countries could learn from. OECD, Economic Survey of Australia, 2004.

Abstract: (2005). The EC Fining Policy for Violations of Competition Law: An Empirical Review of the Commission Decisional Practice and the Community Courts' Judgments. European Competition Journal: Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 401-473.

Abstract: Despite a substantial amount of aid (much larger in per capita terms than provided to any other region), sub-Saharan African countries, with very few exceptions, have regressed since independence. The general history of Africa since achieving independence has been one of development failure. Some protagonists point to signs of change that argue for more aid. This article suggests that aid to Africa has not worked because human, social and institutional capital not financial capital poses the binding constraint. In that context, doubling aid to Africa from $23 billion in 2004 to $50 billion annually by 2015 seems a questionable proposition. This commentary suggests unconventional ways of dealing with the problems involved in importing the essential ingredients that Africa needs. It concludes with the observation that the aid community's current obsession with poverty reduction and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) may be harming rather than helping the cause of development in Africa and argues that the focus on growth and development should be restored. OUR COMMON INTEREST,1 the report published in March 2005 by the Commission for Africa convened by the UK government as background for the July 2005 G8 summit, begs two questions: are false hopes being raised again about the development of sub-Saharan Africa being revived with more aid? Will more aid help or hinder Africa? The commission's report appears to be based on wishful thinking of the kind that donors have indulged in for three decades. It fails to be candid about what inhibits development there. Percy Mistry ([email protected]) is chairman of Oxford International, which has private equity investments in emerging markets. He is an investment banker who has worked in the private and public sector in developing countries, particularly in Asia and Africa. He was with the World Bank in the 1970s and 1980s. 1. Report of The Commission for Africa (Department for International Development, UK Government, London, 2005).