TL;DR: A case study of risk-utility tradeoffs is presented in this article, with a focus on the Ford Pinto case and its effect on the value of life (VOL).
Abstract: Preface 1. Diagnosing the Liability Crisis Perspectives on Liability Reform Recent Trends in Products Liability Proposals for Reform 2. The Dimensions of the Liability Crisis Accident Rates Decline, But Litigation Soars The Surge in Asbestos Litigation Insurance Industry Trends Roots of the Insurance Crisis, 1980-1984 Other Economic Effects of Products Liability The Design Defect Doctrine and Hazard Warnings 3. The Litigation Process The Overall Structure of Products Liability Litigation Court Verdicts Claims Settled Out of Court Cases That Are Dropped Using Economic Models to Assess Reform Proposals 4. The Design Defect Test A Case Study of Risk-Utility Tradeoffs Risk-Utility Analysis The Producer as Insurer Alternative Risk-Utility Measures On the Threshold of Marketability Who Decides? Proposals for Restructuring the Product Defect Test 5. The Explosive Mathematics of Damages The Insurance Value and the Deterrence Value of Damages Inflation and the Increase in Verdict Awards Noneconomic Damages Has Voodoo Economics Come to the Courts? Applying the Value of Life: The Ford Pinto Case Proposals for Setting Damages 6. Regulation of Product Safety The Adequacy of Incentives Regulatory Violations and Products Liability Litigation Restructuring the Institutional Interactions 7. Hazard Warnings The Objectives of Hazard Warnings Assessing the Quality of Warnings Warnings and the Risk-Utility Test Regulatory Compliance Toward a National Warnings Policy 8. Environmental and Mass Toxic Torts The Market Paradigm and Why It Fails Products Liability--an Inadequate Remedy Agent Orange and the Economic Stakes of Mass Toxic Torts Compensation Funds Strategies for Mass Toxic Torts 9. Workers' Compensation Lessons from the Workers' Compensation Experience Job-Related Products Liability Claims and Workers' Compensation 10. Will Products Liability Reform Matter? Insurance Availability Products Liability Definitions State-of-the-Art Defenses Statutes of Limitation Collateral Source Rules and Damage Rules Effects on Premiums Conclusion 11. A Strategy for Principled Products Liability Reform Appendix A: Products Liability Costs in Different Industries Appendix B: The Litigation of Job-Related Claims Notes Bibliography Index
TL;DR: The authors examined the relationship between tort reform and non-motor-vehicle accidental death rates using panel data techniques and found that noneconomic damage caps, a higher evidence standard for punitive damages, product liability reform, and prejudgment interest reform were associated with fewer accidental deaths, while reforms to the collateral source rule are associated with increased deaths.
Abstract: Theory suggests that tort reform could have two possible impacts on accidents. Reforms could increase accidents as tortfeasors internalize less of the cost of externalities and have less incentive to reduce the risk of accidents. Alternatively, tort reforms could decrease accidents as lower expected liability costs result in lower prices, enabling consumers to buy more risk‐reducing products such as medicines, safety equipment, and medical services, and could result in consumers increasing precautions to avoid accidents. We test these effects by examining the relationship between tort reform and non‐motor‐vehicle accidental death rates using panel data techniques. We find that noneconomic damage caps, a higher evidence standard for punitive damages, product liability reform, and prejudgment interest reform are associated with fewer accidental deaths, while reforms to the collateral source rule are associated with increased deaths. Overall, the tort reforms in the states between 1981 and 2000 are associated with an estimated 24,000 fewer accidental deaths.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors evaluate the effect of tort reform on employer-sponsored health insurance premiums by exploiting state-level variation in the timing of reforms and find that caps on noneconomic damages, collateral source reform, and joint and several liability reform reduce premiums by 1 to 2 percent each.
Abstract: We evaluate the effect of tort reform on employer-sponsored health insurance premiums by exploiting state-level variation in the timing of reforms. Using a dataset of healthplans representing over 10 million Americans annually between 1998 and 2006, we find that caps on non-economic damages, collateral source reform, and joint and several liability reform reduce premiums by 1 to 2 percent each. These reductions are concentrated in PPOs rather than HMOs, suggesting that can HMOs can reduce "defensive" healthcare costs even absent tort reform. The results are the first direct evidence that tort reform reduces healthcare costs in aggregate; prior research has focused on particular medical conditions.
TL;DR: The authors examined the relationship between tort reforms and claim severity for an automobile liability incident while controlling for a variety of cost drivers including the presence of no-fault rules, and the impact of a plaintiff's attorney.
Abstract: This study focuses on the economic consequences of tort reform. In particular, we address two issues. First, we test the relationship between tort reforms and claim severity for an automobile liability incident while controlling for a variety of cost drivers including the presence of no-fault rules, and the impact of a plaintiff's attorney. In addition to examining the effect of tort reforms on total claim severity, we also test their effect on economic and non-economic damages separately. Second, we test the proposition that tort reforms, by reducing the damages available at trial, have reduced the likelihood that an injured party will seek legal remedy. Both aspects of this study are examined with individual data from a large sample of insurance claims from 61 insurers. Our results suggest that many of the reforms have had a statistically significantly effect on total damages, non-economic damages and economic damages. Caps on non-economic damages, collateral source rule reforms, and minor reforms impacting prejudgment interest, frivolous suits, and provisions for periodic payments are negatively related to the value of non-economic claims, while joint and several reform is positively related to the value of non-economic claims. We find collateral source rule reforms and minor reforms are negatively related to the value of economic claims. We find that caps on non-economic damages and minor reforms are associated with a decreased probability to file. We do not find any evidence that joint and several or collateral source rule reform is associated with the decision to file.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors evaluate the effect of tort reform on employer-sponsored health insurance premiums by exploiting state-level variation in the timing of reforms and find that the most common set of tort reforms during this period reduces premiums of self-insured health plans by 2.1%.
Abstract: We evaluate the effect of tort reform on employer-sponsored health insurance premiums by exploiting state-level variation in the timing of reforms. Using a dataset of health plans representing over 10 million Americans annually between 1998 and 2006, we find that the most common set of tort reforms during this period reduces premiums of employer-sponsored self-insured health plans by 2.1%. Of the four individual reforms comprising this set, caps on noneconomic damages and collateral source reforms have the greatest impact. We do not find reductions in premiums for fully insured plans, which in our sample are almost entirely Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). Further analysis reveals that self-insured HMOs are also unresponsive to reforms. Taken together, these findings suggest that HMOs reduce ‘‘defensive medicine,’’ even absent reform. The results are the first direct evidence that tort reform reduces healthcare costs in aggregate; prior research has largely focused on particular medical conditions. (JEL I1, K3, K13, K20)