TL;DR: Three possible processing models are presented that vary in the way in which (and the extent to which) they instantiate the modularity claim and a modified concept of modularity is proposed for which an empirical program of research is more tractable.
Abstract: There is evidence, beginning with Cheng (1986), that mobile animals may use the geometry of surrounding areas to reorient following disorientation. Gallistel (1990) proposed that geometry is used to compute the major or minor axes of space and suggested that such information might form an encapsulated cognitive module. Research reviewed here, conducted on a wide variety of species since the initial discovery of the use of geometry and the formulation of the modularity claim, has supported some aspects of the approach, while casting doubt on others. Three possible processing models are presented that vary in the way in which (and the extent to which) they instantiate the modularity claim. The extant data do not permit us to discriminate among them. We propose a modified concept of modularity for which an empirical program of research is more tractable.
TL;DR: This work evaluates the details of this hypothesis through a series of experiments on language, face processing, and theory of mind carried out with subjects with Williams syndrome, a rare genetic neurodevelopmental disorder resulting in an uneven lin-guisticocognitive profile.
Abstract: Many species can respond to the behavior of their conspecifics. Human children, and perhaps some nonhuman primates, also have the capacity to respond to the mental states of their conspecifics, i.e., they have a “theory of mind.” On the basis of previous research on the theory-of-mind impairment in people with autism, together with animal models of intentionality, Brothers and Ring (1992) postulated a broad cognitive module whose function is to build representations of other individuals. We evaluate the details of this hypothesis through a series of experiments on language, face processing, and theory of mind carried out with subjects with Williams syndrome, a rare genetic neurodevelopmental disorder resulting in an uneven lin-guisticocognitive profile. The results are discussed in terms of how the comparison of different phenotypes (e.g., Williams syndrome, Down syndrome, autism, and hydrocephaly with associated myelomeningocele) can contribute both to understanding the neuropsychology of social cognition and to current thinking about the purported modularity of the brain.
TL;DR: Recent methodological advances allowing continuous rather than categorical assessment of ToM show that ToM may be observed to function independently from general cognition in aging, but further investigation is needed to confirm this point.
TL;DR: The possibility of machines having artificial “personality,” roughly as the authors mean the term when referring to people is explored.
Abstract: This article explores the possibility of machines having artificial “personality,” roughly as we mean the term when referring to people. Relevant aspects of the psychological theories of personality are briefly summarised, particularly the social-learning theories.
TL;DR: An emomental agent is introduced that interacts with an ITS to communicate the emotional state of the learner based upon his mental state.
Abstract: Intelligent Tutoring Systems (ITS) learner model has progressively evolved. Initially composed of a cognitive module it was extended with a psychological module and an emotional module. The learner model still remains non-exhaustive. Methods of data collection on the cognitive and emotional state of the learner often lack precision and objectivity. In this paper we introduce an emomental agent. It interacts with an ITS to communicate the emotional state of the learner based upon his mental state. The mental state is obtained from the learner's brainwaves. The agent learns to predict the learner's emotions by using machine learning techniques.