TL;DR: RISE as discussed by the authors is a randomized instruction set emulator based on the open-source Valgrind x86-to-x86 binary translator, which is designed to resist binary code injection attacks.
Abstract: Binary code injection into an executing program is a common form of attack. Most current defenses against this form of attack use a 'guard all doors' strategy, trying to block the avenues by which execution can be diverted. We describe a complementary method of protection, which disrupts foreign code execution regardless of how the code is injected. A unique and private machine instruction set for each executing program would make it difficult for an outsider to design binary attack code against that program and impossible to use the same binary attack code against multiple machines. As a proof of concept, we describe a randomized instruction set emulator (RISE), based on the open-source Valgrind x86-to-x86 binary translator. The prototype disrupts binary code injection attacks against a program without requiring its recompilation, linking, or access to source code. The paper describes the RISE implementation and its limitations, gives evidence demonstrating that RISE defeats common attacks, considers how the dense x86 instruction set affects the method, and discusses potential extensions of the idea.
TL;DR: This article explores the use of compiler techniques to accomplish code compaction to yield smaller executables and shows that careful, aggressive, interprocedural optimization, together with procedural abstraction of repeated code fragments, can yield significantly better reductions in code size than previous approaches.
Abstract: In recent years there has been an increasing trend toward the incorpor ation of computers into a variety of devices where the amount of memory available is limited. This makes it desirable to try to reduce the size of applications where possible. This article explores the use of compiler techniques to accomplish code compaction to yield smaller executables. The main contribution of this article is to show that careful, aggressive, interprocedural optimization, together with procedural abstraction of repeated code fragments, can yield significantly better reductions in code size than previous approaches, which have generally focused on abstraction of repeated instruction sequences. We also show how “equivalent” code fragments can be detected and factored out using conventional compiler techniques, and without having to resort to purely linear treatments of code sequences as in suffix-tree-based approaches, thereby setting up a framework for code compaction that can be more flexible in its treatment of what code fragments are considered equivalent. Our ideas have been implemented in the form of a binary-rewriting tool that reduces the size of executables by about 30% on the average.
TL;DR: The concept of “threaded code” is presented as an alternative to machine language code and hardware and software realizations of it are given.
Abstract: The concept of “threaded code” is presented as an alternative to machine language code. Hardware and software realizations of it are given. In software it is realized as interpretive code not needing an interpreter. Extensions and optimizations are mentioned.
TL;DR: TIL introduced and popularized the notion of a certifying compiler, which attaches a checkable certificate of safety to its generated code, inspiring the development of Proof-Carrying Code and Typed Assembly Language as certified object code formats.
Abstract: The goal of the TIL project was to explore the use of Typed Intermediate Languages to produce high-performance native code from Standard ML (SML). We believed that existing SML compilers were doing a good job of conventional functional language optimizations, as one might find in a LISP compiler, but that inadequate use was made of the rich type information present in the source language. Our goal was to show that we could get much greater performance by propagating type information through to the back end of the compiler, without sacrificing the advantages afforded by loop-oriented and other optimizations.We also confirmed that using typed intermediate languages dramatically improved the reliability and maintainability of the compiler itself. In particular, we were able to use the type system to express critical invariants, and enforce those invariants through type checking. In this respect, TIL introduced and popularized the notion of a certifying compiler, which attaches a checkable certificate of safety to its generated code. In turn, this led directly to the idea of certified object code, inspiring the development of Proof-Carrying Code and Typed Assembly Language as certified object code formats.
TL;DR: This paper presents the first practical, fine-grained code randomization defense, called Read actor, resilient to both static and dynamic ROP attacks, and uses a new compiler-based code generation paradigm that uses hardware features provided by modern CPUs to enable execute-only memory and hide code pointers from leakage to the adversary.
Abstract: Code-reuse attacks such as return-oriented programming (ROP) pose a severe threat to modern software. Designing practical and effective defenses against code-reuse attacks is highly challenging. One line of defense builds upon fine-grained code diversification to prevent the adversary from constructing a reliable code-reuse attack. However, all solutions proposed so far are either vulnerable to memory disclosure or are impractical for deployment on commodity systems. In this paper, we address the deficiencies of existing solutions and present the first practical, fine-grained code randomization defense, called Read actor, resilient to both static and dynamic ROP attacks. We distinguish between direct memory disclosure, where the attacker reads code pages, and indirect memory disclosure, where attackers use code pointers on data pages to infer the code layout without reading code pages. Unlike previous work, Read actor resists both types of memory disclosure. Moreover, our technique protects both statically and dynamically generated code. We use a new compiler-based code generation paradigm that uses hardware features provided by modern CPUs to enable execute-only memory and hide code pointers from leakage to the adversary. Finally, our extensive evaluation shows that our approach is practical -- we protect the entire Google Chromium browser and its V8 JIT compiler -- and efficient with an average SPEC CPU2006 performance overhead of only 6.4%.